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2ABSTRACT
In this thesis is outlined the development of British admin­
istration in its Burmese provinces between 1852 and the war of 1885- 
In 1852 the British government of India acquired its third Burmese 
province when Pegu was annexed, as Tfenasserira and Arakan had been 
annexed earlier in 1826. The difficulties of establishing British 
administration in Pegu are discussed, as well as the later amalgam­
ation of the three British Burmese provinces into that of British 
Burma and the subsequent development of administration there.
This development was influenced by the indigenous system of 
government; by practices established between 1826 and 1852 in 
Tenasserim and Arakan; and by British administrative practices 
that were standard in all of British India. British administrat­
ive objectives were basically the maintenance of peace and order 
but as it was necessary for the revenue of provinces to pay for the 
costs of administration, economic development was also important. 
Accordingly the most important functions of the British adminis­
tration in Burma were those of police, justice, and revenue.
Social stability and a laissez-faire economy gave impetus to 
economic growth within the province. This forced the administrat­
ion to expand its existing framework; to establish departmental 
government; and to allow the indigenous people more responsibility 
in it. The way in which this occurred was, however, largely deter­
mined by developments within India, to whose government the province. 
of British Burma was subordinate.
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INTRODUCTION
The annexation of Pegu and its addition to the British 
Indian territories in 1852 completed the process of British ab­
sorption of lower Burma. This had begun in 1826, when the form­
er Burmese provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim were formally ceded
"I
to the British by the treaty of Yan-dabo. By this were ended
the three decades or so of Anglo-Burmese frontier friction which
had first been fostered by dissident Arakanese refugees in British
Bengal and finally aggravated by Burmese aggression towards Assam,
2Manipur, and other neighbours. The reasons for the annexation 
in 1852 seem less clear. Richard Cobden claimed that annexation
occurred through 'our insatiable love of territorial aggrandise-
3
ment'. Whether this was so or whether annexation was largely
The spelling of Burmese proper names and words throughout the 
thesis is the modern one favoured by the Burmese Department at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, except where 
the modern spelling makes the word completely unfamiliar to those 
accustomed to the old and frequently varying spelling. Thus 
Mandalay has been spe3^t^ah-d^2eiMr^ >ut Moulmein has not been spelt 
.as Maw-lamyaing. Whfrre Anglicised names have now lapsed in
^modern Burma, the old names and spelling have been used, thus 
\Akyab rather than Sit-twei and Mergui rather than Beik have been 
/retained. The modern spelling has also been used for the names 
/ of well-known people, but for those less well-known the spelling 
is as found in the records. In the case of any confusion a list 
of old and modern spelling is to be found on page 292.
2
D.G.E.Hall, A History of South-East Asia, (London,195$) PP-505-17* 
and Maung Htin Aung, The Stricken Peacock, (The Hague,19^5)*PP*11»
29-31.
^Richard Cobden, How Wars are got up in India: The Origin of the 
Burmese War, *fth ed.,(London,1&53)»p.56. Cobden' s view was sup- 
ported by Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma,(London,1962), 
pp.122-1^7 and by Maung Htin Aung, op.cit.,pp.4l-51. They
an accident stemming from an,attempt at gunboat diplomacy, there
were for the British several attractive aspects to the acquisit- 
k
ion of Pegu.
A troublesome neighbour was effectively hamstrung by being 
deprived of its maritime provinces and confined as a landlocked 
state to a greatly reduced sphere of influence. Furthermore, the 
British acquired a province of promising economic potential.
The province had suffered during the recent war and had been 
racked by centuries of violence caused by the internecine strife 
between Burmese and Mons, whose traditional homeland Pegu was.
Yet despite this, the rich delta and riverine land of Pegu had 
long been an important supplementary granary for the dry Burmese
believed the war and the subsequent annexation was unprovoked by 
the Burmese and entirely due to British imperialist arrogance 
and aggression. The attitude of the governor-general of India, 
the Marquess of Dalhousie, though not entirely consistent, seemed 
to have been that the war and annexation were necessary to
preserve British prestige in the East. J.G.A.Baird (ed.), Private 
Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, (London and Edinburgh,1910) 
pp.192-215* D.G.E.Hall believed the events of 1852 were due to 
the ’traditionalism, pride and ignorance of the Court of Ava’, 
Op.cit., pp.518, 526-7.
Dalhousie had despatched Commodore Lambert with several ships to 
Rangoon to back the demands of two British traders for reparations 
from the Burmese. It was largely due to his exceeding his instruc­
tions that hostilities began.
5
The irrigated area around Kyauk-hse was the main granary of the 
north, but traditionally there was heavy reliance on rice imports 
from the south. Michael Symes, An Account of the Burmese Empire 
and the Kingdom of Assam, (Calcutta,1959)> p . 10 and John f.Cady,
A History of Modern Burma, (New York,1958),p p . T h r o u g h o u t
.the thesis those referred to as Burmese are mostly those for whom
I the Burmese language is their mother tongue. However, due to the 
facts that Arakanese is only a dialect of Burmese, that many Mons 
no longer spoke Mon as their mother tongue during the period under 
review, and that many British officials considered it unnecessary
65
heartland of the north. Even in the straitened circumstances
of this ravaged region in the reign of King Bo-daw-hpaya (1782-
1819)» rice was frequently produced in such abundance that 'the
£
combined efforts of men and cattle could not consume it'. Once 
the British lifted the ban on rice exports, imposed by the Burmese 
largely for fear of famine, the province promised to develop into 
a greater granary than either of the two Burmese provinces annexed 
earlier. Moreover, there was also the lure of Pegu becoming a 
springboard for British trade to the fabled markets of western 
China*
Arakan and Tenasserim had been similarly 'disrupted: before
their annexation. The former had been torn by a century of civil
war before being forcibly incorporated within the Burmese empire.
Tenasserim had long been the battle ground for Burmese-Siamese
contentions. Both had been further depopulated by mass executions,
by mass deportations to other areas, and by mass requisitioning of
7
men for war and pagoda building.' In terms of increases in pop­
ulation and in area cultivated, both had responded to two and a 
half dedades of British rule and Arakan had become a great rice
to make such distinctions in their records among people so alike, 
the word 'Bu^mesavl has sometimes been used to refer to people be­
longing tothe l}cn-Burmese-Arakanese groups, as opposed to the
hill peoples pr to Indians or Chinese. The work 'BujCEiflnJ Wafers,
in general, t6 indigenous inhabitants of Burma.
6 ^
G.E.Harvey, HistPry of Burma, (London,1923),p*357« Rice was grown
for internal consumption only, although Arakan had had a consid­
erable export trade in rice in the 17th century. D.G.E.Hall, 
op.cit.,p.53^«
7 Ibid.,p.l68; D.G.E.Hall»op.cit.,pp.299 and 398; Michael Symes,
7exporting province. There was every reason to expect Pegu to pros­
per similarly.
British policy objectives The basic objectives of British adminis­
trative policy were thei establishment of 
peace and order, of an adequate governmental organisation to achieve 
this, and of a revenue yield sufficient to maintain it. For much of 
the period administrative policy was coloured by a comparatively neg­
ative attitude to government, perhaps best defined by Palmerston 
when he declared f,tthe business of government” is to leave things
Q '
alone.'c Yet early nineteenth century liberal concern for equality
before the law and freedom from oppression and corruption and the
belief by Bentinck and the radicals in the panacea of western culture
9
for the' ills of India, also influenced administrative policy. After
the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857i however, all interference^rith
traditional social customs and religious matters was eschewqd./^
/)
The promotion of British trade and the creation of markets for Brit­
ish goods was of great national interest in this period, but in 18j53 
the trading activities of the government of India, then the East
op.cit.,pp.l8-19» and Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma. (N.Y. a nd 
London,19§7)» pp .168 and 197-9* Many also fled from Burma either into 
British India or into Siam. Tenasserim was also a traditional Mon 
area.
Q
Quoted in L.H.Jehks, The Migration of British Capital, (U.S., 1927) «P231*
9
The word 1 western1 has been used here and later in the same sense as 
Percival Spear used it in A History of India,Vol.II,Penguin ed., 
(Middlesex,1985)>p*151• To some extent, British retention of Tenass­
erim was also based on concern for Burmese oppression of the Mons 
should Tenasserim be returned to the Burmese. 
i°it was thought that the Mutiny was largely due to the culmination of 
resentment at the too rapid and indiscriminate introduction of alien 
and western ideas and institutions and too cavalier an attitude to 
traditional practices.
India Company, had been abolished, and it pursued a laissez-faire
11economic policy thereafter.
In the latter part of the century, however, the negative element
in government philosophy was somewhat reduced, as the government as«
sumed greater responsibility for the material welfare of its subjects
and continued the work, begun by Dalhousie, of transforming India
materially - by public works, improved communications, and education.
Nonetheless, care was still taken to balance government expenditure
on such projects with government revenue and this development brought
11a
no change to the governments basic administrative priorities.
The connexion with India The incorporation of the British Burmese
provinces into the Indian empire made them 
subordinate legislatively and fiscally to the government of India, 
which was itself subordinate to the authorities in London. These, 
in turn, were responsible to parliament. Yet parliament did not 
intervene in matters of routine administration, leaving these largely 
to the experienced officers at the Indian and provincial levels. As.;. 
Joseph Dautremer commented, in comparing Indian with French provin­
cial administration in Indo-China, this ensured a large element of 
continuity in administration which was lacking in Indo-China, sub­
ject as it was to conflicting political pressures emanating from 
12Paris•
J.S.Furnivall,Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia,(New York,
19^1),p.l6. The administrative reports for British Burma reveal, 
however, British concern for the growth of trade and consumption 
of British goods.
*1 ^ • r
J.S.Furnivall ,op_;_cit* ,p»2V and Raninder Kumar, liberalism and 
Reform in India', Jnl.of World History.Vol.VII.NoA.IQfi^.nn.fiQO-Oin.
The connexion with the government of India brought the impos­
ition not only of its policies on provincial government but also, 
to a large extent, the mould in which the administrative system was 
cast. Moreover, as administration between 1852 and 1885 was or­
ganised more and more for the achievement of efficiency, increas­
ing conformity was established in administrative procedure through-
13out all British India.
In most instances the local and customary institutions of new­
ly annexed territories were taken as the basis of British adminis­
trative institutions, but the British administrative structure im- 
posed upon it was much the same throughout all British India.
Despite the differences between the peoples of India and those of 
Burma in custom and society, legislation was gradually introduced 
to reduce the differences in administrative procedure that inevit­
ably existed. By the introduction of the Civil Procedure Code of 
1859> of the Penal Code of i860, and of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of 1861, the process was well underway of bringing basic uniformity
into these spheres of administration to all provinces under the
15government of India. Complete uniformity m  administrative pro­
cedure was never obtained but by 1885 many of the traditional in­
12
Burma under British Rule,(London,1913)*PP»180-81. See also Vir­
ginia Thompson, French Indo-China, (N.Y., 1937) tPP«7**-75» and 
D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.6k3.
13See D.G.E.Hall,op.cit.,p.53^ and J.S.Furnivall, Colonial Policy 
and Practice - A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, 
(Cambridge,19^8), p.4o.
1 John Strachey, India:, its administration and progress, (London,
1911)» p.7* See also Chapter II.
^See Francis Du Pre* Oldfield, *Law Reform*, C.H.I.,(Cambridge,1932), 
Vol.VI, Chpt.xxi,p.384.
stitutions of government in Burma had been modified to suit the re­
quirements of conformity imposed by the government of India*
Moreover the fiscal subordination of British Burma to the gov­
ernment of India ensured that the amount of revenue retained for ex 
penditure within the province was decided by the Indian government* 
Although basic costs were considerably higher in British Burma than 
in other provinces, comparatively little allowance was made for
this and the government of India expected administration to be main
16tained there at the same standard as in the rest of British India*
Si' fundamental tenet of the government of India was that the objec­
tives of administration should be achieved not only with efficiency 
but also with economy. As the revenue of British Burma more than 
trebled betweeiy1l6 6 l and 1885 and as the rate of taxation was con­
siderably higher in British Burma than elsewhere in British India, 
members of the provincial administration were frequently to protest 
at the stringent interpretation of this by the government of India,
particularly when it seemed that the degree of economisation in ad-
• . 17ministration was prejudicial to its efficiency. Moreover, be­
cause of the volume of British Burmese revenues, there was some 
resentment that the government of India still maintained its basic 
administrative priorities and had less sympathy for projects con­
cerned with more than these. For this reason it was sometimes
Although higher rates of wages were generally granted for the 
j lower ranks of government employees, such as police constables,
| salaries for higher ranks of the administration were frequently 
not as high as in the rest of India.
17Gross revenue increased from 78.68 to 258*97 lacs of rupees be­
tween 1861-62 and 1885-86. See also pp.125-2^.
11
said that the province was little more than a fmilch cow* for India*
and that it would be better off with the connexion to India severed
and the colony administered directly from London as were the Straits 
18
Settlements.
Part of the revenue from all the British Indian provinces was
used to maintain the central administrative organisations not only
of the government in India but also of the India Office in London.
There were also other expenses entailed in maintaining such a vast
19
administrative system so far from Great Britain. In addition to
meeting these expenses, however, the government of India had to 
face a chronic financial crisis throughout the entire period under 
review.
The financial liabilities of the East India Company had partly 
prompted the takeover by the Crown in 1858 and under the new admin­
istrative arrangement the financial organisation of the government 
of India was greatly improved. Its persistent financial difficul­
ties thereafter were,<however, due to the initial enormity of the 
Indian debt and to the need of paying off the deficits caused by 
the loans raised in England on the guarantee system to finance 
the great railway expansion which occurred in India between 
1859 and 1869. The coincidence of a general rise in
prices and wages and an ever increasing demand from the provin-
~ 1
John Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before«(Westminster, 
1901), Vol.I,p.2^0 and Alleyne Ireland, The Far~Sastern Tropics, 
(Westminster,1905)»P«9^« See also page 127* footnote 33*
^India bore the cost of the telegraph line from England and some ex­
penses of the Mediterranean fleet. See also page 116. Until 1858 
Indian affairs in London were administered by the Board of Control 
but thereafter by the Secretary of State for India.
12
cial governments for more money for administration, did nothing
20to alleviate the situation* To these embarrassments of the
l860fs were added those of the next two decades when the value of
silver on which the Indian currency was based continued to fall
in response to the demonetisation of silver in Europe. As charges
in England had to be met in gold, the lower the gold rate of silver
became, the more rupees had to be sent from India and the fewer
there were available for expenditure within the various Indian 
21provinces. The continually rising prices and severe famines
only added to the difficulties of the Indian government as did
22the various wars that were charged to the Indian account.
This, to some extent, explained the extreme parsimony of the
government of India in this period.
It was largely due to the financial difficulties of the 
government of India and to the general reorganisation of admin­
istration following the takeover by the Crown in 1858 that Ten­
asserim, Arakan, and Pegu were united into the province of 
British Burma under a chief commissioner. This was expected 
to be a more efficient and more economic administrative arrange­
ment than having three separate provincial commissioners corres­
ponding separately with the government of India on matters that 
20
Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of India, 2nd ed.,(London,
1931), PP.13 and 131-2.
21
Yaman Govind Kale, Introduction to the Study of Indian Economics, 
(Poon,1917), p.238.
22
Leland Hamilton Jenks, op.cit., p.221. They included the 1859 
war with China and the Afghan war of 1879*
13
were frequently much the same. Moreover, the cultural and re­
ligious affinities of the three main ethnic groups in the three
23provinces favoured such a union. All were of predominantly
Pareoeeanstock with only superficial differences in skin tone and
2kall were Buddhists. Linguistically too they had much in common,
Arakanese being a dialect of Burmese, and the Mons having long
been required by the Burmese to forsake their own language for
25
that of the Burmese. As well as this, they had many adminis­
trative institutions in common and many of these had been largely
26preserved under British rule.
Administrative system in Burma The system of administration
under the Burmese had been char­
acterised by a strong and stable system of local rule and by a 
relatively weak system of central government. It rested on cus­
tom and authority rather than on.strictly defined codes of law, 
with the Buddhist religious order acting as guardian of tradition­
al moral and social values. While the latter stood mostly apart 
from the process of government, it was the duty of the king to 
protect and support its role in society. There was no separation
2?B.P.P., 1862, Feb. No.21.
2kCharles A. Fisher, South-East Asia, a Social, Economic and Polit­
ical Geography, (London and New York,19^*0 iPP*^12-^32 and E.H.G. 
Dobby, Southeast Asia, 5th ed.,(London,195&), pp.18^-89* The 
various hill peoples were basically animists, with the exception 
of the Buddhist Shans, and had less in common linguistically.
25The British in Tenasserim had continued to use Burmese as the 
official vernacular rather than Mon.
? 6
See Chapter II.
14
of judicial and executive powers and the same official who col­
lected revenue also tried civil and criminal cases. His juris-
27diction was mostly personal but partly territorial.
Under the British a strong system of central government was
established, resting on law, impartially administered. Initially
jurisdiction was territorial but later with the setting up of
specialised departments it became partly functional as well.
'In matters of chief concern to the maintenance of order and the
promotion of commerce', the law was based on English law, but the
government allowed Burmese customary law to apply in social matters
2
such as marriage and inheritance when the contestants were Burmese. 
Because it was British policy to avoid interference in traditional 
religious and social institutions, no longer was government support 
and protection given to the role of the Buddhist religious order 
in the indigenous community.
As in India the country was divided into districts, which 
until 1862 were grouped into provinces under commissioners subord­
inate to th/authorities in India. Thereafter the provinces became 
divisions, grouped into a province with the commissioners subordin­
ate to the provincial chief commissioner, who was responsible to 
the government of India. At district level administration was 
similar to that under the Burmese regime in that the district
27
Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, (Princeton, 
1965)»PP*17-32 and J.S.Furnivall, The Governance of Modern Burma, 
(New York,1966),p.5* See also below, pages 32-33.
28J.S.Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, p.12, and
p.a.a., 1855-5 6, p.2 1.
15
officers, known as deputy commissioners, were revenue officers,
29judges, and magistrates. They were also responsible at dis­
trict level for all other functions of government, such as those 
performed by departmental officials.
The lowest administrative units in the hierarchic order in 
which authority was arranged were those in the charge of indigen­
ous officials, the nature of whose functions initially were left 
largely unchanged from the Burmese regime. Their jurisdiction, 
however, became in theory if not always at first in fact, com­
pletely territorial. Later both the units and the functions of
the officials were modified in accordance with the administrative
30
requirements of the government of India.
Because of the administrative priorities of the government 
of India, the most important administrative functions were execut­
ive, judicial, revenue, and police. From the time of the Marquess 
of Dalhousie's governor-generalship (1848-1836), public works had 
been regarded as important adjuncts to administration because of 
the improved efficiency in administration that better communicat- 
ion would cause. In British Burma, however, despite a promising 
start made by Dalhousie, they were mainly of importance when works 
of military and strategic importance were required. As in the 
rest of India, the social service departments of education and 
public health were the 1 Cinderella* services which suffered first
29
J.S.Furnivall, The Governance of Modern Burma, p.?*
30
See below, pages 242 and 233* —
16
31m  any financial crisis.
Administrative staff numbers were kept low and increased 
only when the standard of administrative efficiency was threat­
ened, the government of India, as J. Chailley—Bert described it,
being *eager to obtain a maximum of work from a minimum of 
32
personnel1. The system of government was firmly dominated 
by Europeans and only in the last years of the period was any 
attempt made to open the more responsible positions, previously 
reserved for Europeans, to indigenous people. Even then the 
number of such openings was .small. At about the same time, 
however, effort was being made to promote the principles of 
self-government in the various institutions of local government 
that had been introduced under British rule and by making use of 
traditional institutions not previously incorporated into the 
administrative structure. The two Municipal Acts of 187^ and 
l88*f progressively liberated the municipal governing bodies in 
the seven or so largest towns of the province by endowing them 
with larger responsibilities and by restricting the powers of 
the executive government to interfere.^ Lesser powers were
31
Salaries were always lower in these departments than in the m a m  
departments of the administration.
^ The Colonisation of Indo-China, (London,189^)» p.285*
33See Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in 
India, Pakistan, and Burma  ^ (London,195**)» PP*37 and A7 . Although 
aome members of municipal committees in some provinces of India 
had been elected since 187^ -, only in the 1880*s were any mbmbers 
elected in British Burma, and then only if a majority of the 
householders of the towns were in favour. B.H.P.,188^,Jan.Index 
No.26 and L.B.M.A.R., 1885-86.
17
34granted in the smaller towns*
In the larger towns the tradition of respected members of 
the community acting as arbiters in disputes was incorporated into 
the scheme, then being introduced throughout all British India,
of employing honorary magistrates 'to take a share in the judicial
35administration of the country'. They were required to dispense
summarily with the lesser cases that tended to clutter up the 
36courts. In the country it was intended to make the village
elders, (lu.~gyi), the backbone of the rural self-government system
37m  the rural boards that were to be set up throughout the province.
Although the introduction of such measures was not expected 
to increase the efficiency of administration, it was expected to 
increase the economy of administration by placing the burden of 
local self-government on the people, both administratively and
70
financially. Moreover, none of the main functions of government
'zL
B.B.M.A.R., 1882-83 and 1883-84. By the end of 1883 there were 
thirteen municipalities, of which eight had committees with an 
elected majority, and nineteen town committiees. L.B.A.R.,1883- 
86, pp . 18 and 22.
BjIUP., 1881, June Index No.2.
36B.B.C.J.R., 1885, Resolution. By 1884 benches of honorary magis­
trates were disposing of much of the minor judicial work in the 
towns.
37Note of the principal measures of administration under consider­
ation in the Home Department of the Government of India during 
the viceroyalty of the Marquess of Ripon, (1884), (B.M. I..S.290/l3) 
p.246 and B.H.P., 1882, Aug.Index No.28 and 1883* Sept.Inde^o.24.
70
Note on the principal measures of the Marquess of Ripon, p.248 
and B.H.P., 1880, Nov. Index No.25.
18
39were entrusted to the local government bodies* Similarly the 
decision to give more administrative responsibility to indigenous 
people was based not only on democratic principles and the desire 
to placate the growing political consciousness and resentment of 
the people of India against British rule*, It was also based on 
the same principles of economy as the attempt to develop local 
self-government* Although Burmans were not as politically org­
anised and articulate as many Indians, the same economic necessity
i • * 1+0spplied*
Development of the province The expansion of administration in
British Burma was largely dependent 
on the increase in revenue and therefore on the development of the 
province. Yet while the establishment of greater social security 
and stability and the encouragement of 1 an export. 'economy ■ virtu­
ally ensured the development of the province, more positive steps 
were taken by the administration, especially in the latter part of
39After 1880 municipal committees were responsible for the adminis­
tration of all matters for which revenue was collected* For in*' 
stance, until then the municipal police administration had been 
paid for out of municipal funds, but from then on was paid for by 
the provincial administration which remained in control of all 
police administration in the province.
*f0
Although the British at this time believed the Burmese to be 
rather politically immature, they were aware that they were more 
acquiescent than enthusiastic about British rule* B.B.A.R.,1880- 
81, p*10. For this reason the British remained suspicious about 
the effect of the various attempts of the Burmese king to main­
tain contact with lower Burma. Moreover, in the early 1870*s 
there was at least on^ conspiracy and one attempt at rebellion,
the period under review, to accelerate such development and to 
ensure that such economic growth was well established* These 
comprised mainly the encouragement of both immigration and cultiv­
ation by taxation concessions, land policy, and various other 
measures•
Migration policy From the first year of British administration
in Burma it had been realised that the relative 
under-population of the area would be an impediment to economic 
growth and the development of the province* Labour was in short 
supply and was thus expensive to employ and difficult to secure* 
Consequently the maintenance of a strong and steady stream of im­
migrants became a constant desideratum in British administrative 
considerations. Only after the annexation of Pegu, however, did 
immigration occur on any large scale and it was in this period 
that greatest effort was made by government to encourage this*
Until the decision to launch official schemes to aid Indian mig­
rants to Burma, the main policy of the administration to encourage 
immigration and land settlement was the granting of taxation con­
cessions in the first years after newcomers* arrival. They were 
exempted from the general capitation tax and for a limited period, 
varying according to circumstances, from paying land revenue.
Land was also made readily available to them.
but there was nothing in Burma at this time to equal the vocality 
of various educated Indians on political issues*^B.H.P.,1875»No v . 
Index Nos.'ll and 17 and Naresh Chandra Roy, Indian Civil Service,
(Calcutta,1933)» P*65*
In the first years of British administration in Pegu and
British Burma, the neighbouring countries of Upper Burma and Siam,
the various hill countries, China, and India - in approximately
that order - were looked to as a source for repopulating the land*
It was believed, partly on the basis of the physical decline of
Indian troops in the province, particularly on the frontier, that
Indians were physically not suited to the country and did not
*f1Amalgamate1 well with the people* Their value as labourers
in the main seaport towns had, however, long been recognised.
The maintenance of a steady stream of migrants from Upper 
Burma and Siam was, however, not to be achieved, as both countries 
were also thinly populated and both forbade the emigration of their 
people* Although the Anglo-Burmese commercial treaty of 1862 fac­
ilitated the movement of traders between Upper and British Burma 
and men were permitted to migrate seasonally in search of work, 
women and children were forbidden to join the movement. Many 
whole families and villages did migrate to the south, however, but 
they did so only by eluding the Burmese guards posted at the front-
bzier. The numbers of immigrants tended to fluctuate according to
the political and economic conditions in Upper Burma, so that in
L.1
I*L.P., 1871, Nov. No.20, Encl.Com.of Arakan to Ch.Com.,June 29»
1870.
Up
I.F.P.(Pol.), 1871» July No.292. In 1871 it was reported that 
the Burmese guards placed at six mile intervals along the frontier, 
ostensibly to protect traders and deter thieves and gang robbers 
(usually referred to as dacoits), were actually employed in pre­
venting would-be migrants from crossing the border.
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years of peace and plenty there were fewer migrants.
There was no similar movement of Siamese. Furthermore 
nothing came of early British hopes that the Siamese government 
would relax its ban on migration to the extent of allowing the 
return of the Mon refugees and their descendants, who had fled
ZfZf
from Tenasserim under the Burmese.
The Burmese were also reluctant to allow the migration of 
Shans to British Burma, as a number of Shan sawbwas (chieftains) 
owed allegiance to the Burmese throne. The British, however, 
were more active in promoting Shan migration than either Burmese 
or Siamese. From 1863 on small pensions were given to sawbwas, 
who had led groups of their people to British Burma, both to 
support and to encourage them to attract more Shans to the coun- 
try, as they were regarded as good settlers and agriculturists. 
After a British political agent was stationed near the Burmese 
northern boundary, Shans were employed as recruiting agents and
43
Heavy taxes also contributed to the causes for the exodus from 
Upper Burma and in 1864 it was reported that the king, Min-don 
(1853-1878), had ordered that no further taxes were to be col­
lected in the frontier districts in order to stem the tide of 
emigration. I.F.P., 1865, May, No. 143* The British, in fact, 
regarded any increase in Burmese taxation as ensuring a new 
exodus of migrants for the south. See also I.F.P.(Pol.),1873* 
Ap. No.146.
Ll Ll
Ibid., 1864, Nov. No.181.
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I.F.P.(Fin.),1863, Dec.No.4. and I.L.P.,1871, Nov.No.20. The 
unsettled conditions of the Shan countries and their contention 
with their Burmese overlords contributed to their migration. On 
occasion as many as two to three thousand Shans were reported 
entering Pegu merely in anticipation of receiving grants of 
wastelands.
22
steamers carried groups of Shans down the Irrawaddy into British 
Burma,
Although the Manchu prohibition on Chinese emigration was 
lifted in i860, no official British policy of actively encouraging 
Chinese immigration followed. The provincial administration fav­
oured providing assisted passages for Chinese emigrants from Amoy 
but the government of India rejected the proposal on the grounds 
that recruited migrants would be of little use in the province, 
as it believed that Chinese migration was most beneficial when it 
was spontaneous. Partly because of this and because spontaneous
immigration was largely checked by the fact that Singapore was 
closer than British Burma to Canton, Chinese immigration did not 
occur on any considerable scale. The outbreak of the Panthay 
rebellion in Yunnan, while disrupting the flourishing caravan 
trade established in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
also must.hav§- checked any flow of migrants from that direction 
which may have developed. Once the Panthay stronghold of Tali
Zf8
fell in 1873, however, many Panthays sought refuge in British Burma.
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.F.P.(Pol.), 1873, July No.433; Oct. No.29; 1874, Mch. No.187; 
and 1878, Aug., No.136. Groups of several hundreds were re­
ported awaiting transportation on two occasions, despite Burmese 
efforts to deter them.
7I.F.P.(Po1.), 1862, Dec.No.30^ and I.F.P.(Gen.).1862, June Nos.
30-6 1. The government of India, however, urged the promotion of 
Chinese migration through Upper Burma which had been mentioned 
by Chinese traders in Man-dalei when Phayre, the first commiss­
ioner of Pegu and later chief commissioner of British Burma, was 
there in 1862.
48They were transported by steamer with the Shans.
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As these sources of migrants had by no means satisfied the
labour needs of the province, several official schemes for promot-
ifQ
ing Indian immigration were developed in the 1870*s and after.
The famine in Bengal of 187^ prompted the first scheme of state 
immigration and the government of India ordered the commencement 
of earthworks for the first railway in Burma as relief work.
By 1876 seven and a half thousand migrants had entered the prov­
ince under the scheme, but it was abandoned in 1876-77» as many
of them died or returned to Bengal without repaying the loans for
50their passage and few became agriculturists. This, in fact, 
was one of the difficulties with Indian immigration that although 
many Indians entered the country comparatively few stayed once 
they had made some money.
Another scheme was introduced, however, in 1876 by the 
British Burma Labour Bill, by which immigrants, including women 
and children, were recruited from Kakinada. Over 750 were re­
cruited but because they were highly protected by the Act, Indians 
brought into the province by private contractors were more in 
demand, and the former did not settle. Recruiting ceased soon 
after
ij.Q
This had been anticipated by Phayre as early as 1856. P.JUR.,1855 
56, p.59-
5°B.B.A.E.. 187^-7 5, Intro.,p.Zk and 1875-76, Intro.,p.21. The 
scheme cost 195,000 rupees of which 100,000 rupees had been re­
covered by March 1877*
^J.S.Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, 
2nd ed., (Rangoon,1938),p.l63 and B.B.A.R.,1877-78. p.77.
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A further scheme was launched in the 1880's with the specific 
objective of securing labourers rather than settlers. The number 
of Indians entering Pegu had doubled in 1880 when the monopoly of 
the British India Steam Navigation Company had been broken by the 
establishment of the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company. Although 
fares had been reduced by 50 per cent, the demand for labour re­
mained so high that the government decided to subsidise fares for
52immigrants from Bengal and Madras. The financial difficulties 
of the province in 1883 and after and the subsequent reduction in 
the public works establishment and agenda caused the subsidy to 
be withdrawn early in l88^ f. By this time there had been a con­
siderable improvement in the labour supply as well as an increase
in the number of Indians who stayed in the province rather than
53return to India.
Land policy When British administration was first established
in Pegu not only was the land sparsely populated but 
there was also little fixity in land tenure. It seemed that arable 
land was so abundant that it was virtually valueless and though 
hereditary rights to land were recognised, only in the northern part 
of Pegu apparently had some lands been held by families for gener-
^2b.b.a.r., 1881-8 2, p.52.
Ibid.,1883-8^,p . 86 and J.S.Furnivall, An Introduction to the Pol­
itical Economy of Burma, p.86. See also below page 288.
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ations. Mostly a man's right to land depended only on his cult-
5k
ivating it so long as no previous occupant objected*
It became an object of British policy to encourage people 
to remain in occupation of the land they had initially cultivated.
The old Burmese custom of taking up unoccupied land was codified 
in that so long as no one disputed a cultivator's occupation of 
land in twelve years, the government would treat it as his private 
property. Areas of land, usually from 15 to 20 acres in extent, 
were also granted to applicants, who satisfied the local officials 
that they were genuine cultivators. Such grants confirmed the
cultivator's right to the land, so long as revenue was paid and
55the land developed. There was also the lease or settlement sys­
tem of revenue assessment which encouraged the expansion of cultiv­
ation. Under this system cultivators who agreed to a settlement 
of land revenue for a period of years were allowed to extend their
cultivation indefinitely without having to pay additional taxation
56within that period. Moreover, people were discouraged from the
C i[ 1
J I.F.P.P..1859. 1^th Oct., No.2lf6 and P.A.R ..1855-56. p.25. In the 
Syriam District Gazetteer it is noted that the old folk spoke of 
their holdings in the early days when 'land had not yet become a 
"thing"1, i.e., subject of property. J.S.Furnivall and W.S.Morrison, 
loc.cit., Vol.A, (191*0, p.68.
55See J.S.Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of 
Burma, pp.58-60. Large grants of land ranging from 500 to several 
thousands of acres were also made to capitalists who were expected 
to develop them. Few did little more than indulge in speculation 
and in 1871 the granting of lands under the 1861 Rules for the 
Grant of Waste Land was suspended. B.B.R.A.R., 1870-71* p-x.
See also Chapter III, page 138 •
^ L a n d .revenue settlements were also known as 'leases'.
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annual Abandonment* of lands,that was reported so frequently in
the early days of British administration, by the imposition of a
57moderate assessment on land left fallow*
Effort was also made to promote the development of the prov­
ince by reclamation works to increase the area of cultivable land. 
And throughout the entire period the administration endeavoured 
to encourage the use of new and improved implements and to foster 
the growth of commercial crops, other than rice. While the latter 
attempts were marked by little success, t^e overall objective of 
the government to secure the development of the province was
achieved. This development, however, unlike that of Dutch Java,
58was achieved without compulsion. Nor, apart from its control
of the forestry industry, did the government attempt to become 
involved in the process of actual production. It was ta confine 
its administrative activities to creating the conditions of stab­
ility in which this development was to take place.
57People had been unwilling to pay full revenue rates on land not 
cultivated but lying fallow and their * abandonment1 of lands was 
largely due to this, although Furnivall and Morrison claimed that 
the proportion of land actually abandoned was not always nearly 
so high as reported. Op.cit., p.125-
58
See D.G.E.Hall, op.cit..pp.271-2* 278, and 468-70 and J.S.Furnivall, 
Netherlands India. A study of plural economy, (Cambridge,1944),
pp.119-122.
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Chapter , I
BURMESE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE 
PRIOR TO BRITISH ANNEXATION* *
At the time of the outbreak of the first Anglo-Burmese war 
in 1824 the territory of the Burmese empire stretched from the 
Chinese frontier in the north to the western limits of Assam on 
the north west and to the border of British Chittagong on the south 
west. In the east, its territory adjoined that of Siam and in the 
east there were Karenni and the various Shan principalities 
which were dependencies of Burma and Siam. At this time the Bur­
mese empire included not only the traditional homeland of the Bur­
mese in the relatively dry inland area around Pagan and Ava but 
also the former kingdom of Arakan and the old Mon kingdoms of Pegu 
and Tenasserim in the south. It also included, because of the 
success of the relatively recent military enterprises of Bo-daw- 
hpaya (1?82-1819), the kingdom of Assam and the principality of 
Manipur.2
♦Although most of the material used in this chapter has been taken 
from secondary sources, it seemed there was need of providing some 
outline of society and government in Burma prior to British annex­
ation.
Although there were at various times Mon kingdoms other than Pegu 
and Tenasserim, such as Tavoy and Martaban, Pegu and Tenasserim 
came to stand, especially during the British regime, for the trad­
itional Mon areas.
2
The Burmese invaded Manipur in 1812-13 and Assam in 1816 and placed 
their own nominees on both thrones. See G.E.Harvey, History of Burma. 
(London,19^5),p.283. Under the term^bf the 1826 Treaty of Yan-dabo 
Burma forfeited all claims to both Assam and Manipur.
The Burmese empire had not always been so extensive nor, in­
deed, had it always warranted the title 'empire1. After the foun­
dation of the first Burmese empire in the eleventh century, the 
empire was frequently to disintegrate into no more than a series
of petty principalities each striving for pre-eminence. Only
3
under strong kings was Burma to be unified.
The heterogeneous nature of the population of Burma was also 
a drawback to the establishment of a strong and lasting empire.
Until the nineteenth century the separatism of the Hons had been 
one of the greatest causes of disintegration of Burmese empire.
After the fearful toll taken of them by Alaung-hpaya, the Mons no 
longer had the spirit nor the strength to be of much trouble to 
the Burmese and in the nineteenth century it was the Arakanese who
w  --  _   ^  ^^_ _
posed the^greatest danger to the integrity of the Burmese empire.^ 
They had been incorporated within the Burmese realm only as recently 
as Prior to this internal dissension had so weakened the
once proud and wealthy Arakanese that the prospect of a strong and 
stable government under the Burmese had made the latter welcome to 
many Arakanese. It was not long, however, before the Burmese out­
wore their welcome with their harsh administrative methods and their
Frank n. Trager, Burma from Kingdomto Republic - A Historical and 
Political Analysis^ (London, 19o7), p.19* Alaung-hpaya (1752-60) 
was such a king*
h
See G. Coedis, The Making of South East Asia, (London,1966), p#l8l.
5G.E.Harvey, op.cit., p.235*
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forced removal of large parts of the population to the Burmese 
6heartland# Large scale rebellion and emigration to British Ben­
gal followed and resulted eventually in the Anglo-Burmese war of 
1824— 26, after which the extent of the Burmese empire was consid­
erably redueed#
Society Traditional society under the Burmese regime was a
peculiarly classless one, especially when compared with 
the societies with which the future British administrators were
7
familiar - their own and those of caste-bound India# According 
to U Kaung, there were nominally at least seven classes in Burmese 
society - those of royal blood, public officers, the monks, mer­
chants and rich men, cultivators and labourers, and outcastes#
Only members of the royal family, slaves, and outcastes could not
g
inter-marry and mix generally# Slaves and outcastes inherited
Ibid#, p#267 and Arthur P# Phayre, History of Burma, including 
Burma Proper, Pegu# Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan, (London,1o^3)»
p.220#
7
British administrative records are full of references to the ’dead 
level1 of Burmese society and the want of ’social disparity and ex­
citement1 • See B#Hi»P., 1872, Aug# Index No#37 and 1882, April 
Index No*14-# But see also page 175 , footnote 53*
8 ’A Survey of the History of Education in Burma before the British 
Conquest and After*, J.B.R.S#,Dec#,1965* Vol.XLVI, Pt.ii, p#23* 
There were two broad categories of slaves in old Burma - those who 
sold themselves to pay their debts and tjiose, mostly prisoners of 
war, who were assigned as pagoda slaves. Although there was an elab­
orate code relating to the release of people in debt bondage, re­
lease was possible# It was otherwise with pagoda slaves; not only 
were they condemned to life servitude but also their descendants. 
These were the outcastes of Burmese society. Record of their names 
was kept by stone inscriptions# So little was life as a pagoda
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their position in society but it was always possible for those in
debt bondage to buy their freedom back, provided they had the means
to do so. Even the royal blood of some kings was sometimes very 
9thin indeed.
The considerable power and prestige attached to public office
were the appurtenances of the office rather than of the man. There
was no mandarinate as in Annam nor was there aA hereditary noble
10class similar to that in Siam. Such hereditary officials as
11
there were were mostly local ones in the provinces. In the
higher echelons of administration there was sometimes very little
slave relished that during the British regime it was discovered 
that many of these records had been carefully chiselled out, so 
that there was no record of former pagoda slaves. Taw Sein Ko,
Notes on an Archaelogical Tour through Ramannadesa, (Bombay,1893)»P*7*
^See G.E.Harvey, op.cit., pp.219 and 3^2, and also below, page 37.
10
This is discussed further on page^ *+1-4-2.
11According to D.G.E.Hall, the permanent officials of the treasury 
at the capital were hereditary. Burma, (London,1956), 2nd ed.,p.133* 
By the nineteenth century it seems that only in Upper Burma and in 
northern Pegu did local administrative officials necessarily inher­
it their positions, although it seems that all appointments needed 
confirmation from the capital and that their tenure of office de­
pended on the good will of the community. Ibid..p.133 and Ma My&
Sein, Administration of Burma, (Rangoon, 19357, p*70. In the 1850's 
Phayre found that hereditary succession to office had generally 
lapsed in the south of Pegu, as during the Burmese regime mostly 
Burmese had been appointed* P.A.R., 1855-56, p*23* There were still, 
however, some old Mon official families and it would seem that claim 
to office still tended to remain in the same families whether it 
was Mon or Burmese. See also pages *+7-**t-8.
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to distinguish the incumbent of office from his fellow villagers
12before and after elevation to public office. And while some 
officials sometimes remained in office after a change in the mon­
arch, it was not uncommon for the inauguration of a new monarch to
13herald the appointment of new officials as well.
In a Buddhist country such as Burma, Buddhist monks (hpon-gyl)
were numerous, there being at least one hpon-gy! to every village.
By the precepts and examples of their daily life in the community
they set the standard to which the Buddhist majority aspired. As
D. G. E. Hall has said, * Burmese life centred round the religious
shrines and the monasteries; and during the many times of disorder,
when the civil government broke down, it was the Buddhist organiz-
14
ation, loose though it was, which held society together.* The
monks were also responsible for the system of education that made
Burma one of the most literate countries in the world. All boys
spent at least twnor three years a^^ovi^tiates in the monasteries
(kyaung), where they learnt not only the beliefs and moral precepts
of Buddhism but also, through study of the texts, to read and write.
This practice also helped maintain the egalitarianism of Burmese
society, as no distinction was made between the sons of peasants
15and princes during the terms of their novitiates.
— —  —  —
H.Fielding Hall, The Soul of a People. (London,1904), p.79*
13See below page *f2.
1^4-
Op.cit., p.137* See also pages 32-33.
15
John F. Cady. _A History of Modern Burma. (New York, 1938), £.61.
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There were comparatively few rich men in such a Buddhist 
society. There was no social sanction to the pursuit of economic 
gain as an end in itself. As £• Sarkisyanz has noted, 1 if some­
thing was laid by in pre-colonial Burma, it was to be applied to
,fsome work of public benefit, such as a convent ... a pagoda, a
16hall, a bridge or a well*1.' In the agrarian society that
was pre-colonial Burma, there were few traders and these were 
rarely Burmese. Such Burmans as were traders were mostly offic­
ials of the king, as his virtually unlimited powers allowed him
17to impose monopolies at will.
Burmese society was largely organised into occupational 
guilds, each under its own headman, and divided into two main 
categories, the ahmu-dan and the athi. The distinction between 
the two lay in the fact that the former owed some sort of service 
to the king while the latter owed mostly taxes and service only in 
times of emergency. If a member of a service regiment (asu) or of 
an athi community were to leave his village, he would still owe
Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution. (The Hague,1965)* 
pp.1**1-*f2. According to the inscriptions at Pagan many of the 
pagodas were dbnated by *rich men1. Maung Htin Aung, A History 
of Burma, (New York and London, 1967)1 P*57*
17
The extensive list of royal prohibitions on goods for export, 
which prevailed in nineteenth century Burma, did not facilitate 
trade either. Only rarely, it seems, was overseas trade promoted 
by a Burmese king. See G.E.Harvey, op.cit.« pp.17^-5 and 357-3 
and James Low, *A History of Tenasserim,* Chpt.iv, Jnl* of the 
Asiatic Society, Vol.Ill, 1836, p.289*
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obligation to his old headman. While social divisions were thus 
arranged at a personal rather than a territorial levelt the ahmu- 
dan communities were found mainly round the capital and •home prov­
inces* and, in particular, in the Kyauk-hse area. Members of athi 
communities also tended to be found in one area, so that there would
be a whole village of silver-smiths, another of shield makers, and
19another of salt boilers.
Although the whole nation owed military service in time of 
war and although each asu and craft community had its specified mil­
itary duties, such as providing a war boat and its crew or a unit
20
of archers or shield-men, the athi were only conscripts. The
Isolated instances of the continuation of this practice were re­
ported by British officials many years after British occupation.
See also G.E.Harvey, op.cit., p.3^ -8. Harvey considered this system 
of social organisation a development from the early tribal organis­
ation of Burmese society when people were bound by ties of kinship 
or service to a leader. Op.cit.. pp.351-2. Membership of a commun­
ity was not as permanent as membership of a caste in India, as the 
king could change a family or township from one service to another 
and service could be changed through intermarriage or by applying 
to the relevant official at court with suitable presents^
19
Athi communities tended to be found in the traditional non-Burmese 
areas, such as those traditionally occupied by the Mons. According 
to Professor Cady, the only ahmu-dan in the British Burmese territ­
ories after 1852 were chance migrants, as there were no royal lands 
there. Op.cit., p.27« Shwe-daung was a royal province devoted en- 
tirely_to supporting thirteen war boats and considerable numbers of 
ahmu-dan were in the province of Prome. Phayre, however, believed 
some land supporting war boats had been only comparatively recently 
and ’arbitrarily* constituted as such. P.A.P., 1855-56, p.25 and
E.S.L.I., 1853i Encl. 6 to Letter 59 of 19th August.
20
Father Vincentius Sangermano, A Description of the Burmese Empire, 
(Rome,1833)1 76 and G.E.Harvey, op.cit., pp.205 and 3^9» Many
military units were made up of former prisoners of war and their 
descendants, e.g. the foot guards from the Kjauk-hse canal area were 
originally from Vientiane. It was possible for military service to
34
ahmy-dan provided the professional standing army as well as the
menials, musicians, and purveyors of food who served at court.
Hoyal lands were allocated to them, so that those belonging to
these groups but not actually serving at the capital were able to
21support those that were. Excluded from both the athi and ahmy-
dan were the hill peoples, such as the Karens and Chins, who were
required to pay annual family taxes and were requisitioned from
22time to time for heavy labour.
The monarchy The main source of political power lay in the mon­
archy and theoretically the administrative structure 
revolved round the person and will of the king. Because of the 
difficulties of communication areas beyond the immediate environs 
of the capital were frequently left largely to themselves. Al­
though the king appointed and dismissed the provincial governors 
and received a large share of the revenue collected, he was 
often a remote figure to the majority of his subjects. Yet 
though there was a strong and continuing tradition
be avoided by generous payment to the recruiting headmen. When 
the loyalty of conscripts was in doubt, their families were oTten 
held as hostages to be executed in the event of treachery or des­
ertion. J.F.Cady, op.cit.« pp.3^-33*
21
My Mya Sein, op.cit., p.65*
22
J.F.Cady, op.cit., pp.42-^3 and H.E.Harvey, op.cit.,p.352. Karens 
were sometimes brought in in emergency to suppress rebellion but 
many tried to escape such obligations by retreating to the hills 
and to the delta region to the south.
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of local government, the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom was 
dependent on the character and ability of the monarch, particularly 
because of the lack of an official class. No king, however, 
seemed capable of developing a strong system of central government 
that would withstand the centrifugal forces always striving to keep 
Burma divided and weak. These forces were considerably aided by 
the prevailing concept of kingship.
There was no concept of the state continuing as a political
entity from reign to reign and it: was always possible and highly
likely that the laws and system of government one king had promul-
23gated would be overridden by his successor. Moreover, the mys­
tical sanctions buttressing kingship contributed little to the 
stability of the institution. Although Burma was a stronghold 
of Theravada Buddhism, its cosmology stemmed largely from Hindu 
origins. According to these the mythical Mount Meru was the 
centre of the universe and in Burma, as in other states founded 
on similar concepts, the basis of empire organisation was the 
achievement of harmony with the cosmos. Accordingly, the state 
was conceived as a microcosm, as an image of the universe. ~ The 
capital of the empire, or more specifically its palace, with its 
soaring spire representing the mystic mountain, was conceived as
Maung Maung, Burma in the Family of Nations, (Amsterdam,1957)* 
p.20 and J. F. Cady, op.cit., p.19*
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the symbolic centre of the universe. Thus the king's personal
power came to be associated with his possession of the palace.
As Robert Heine-Geldern pointed out, such a theory
worked as a constant temptation for would- 
be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the 
royal family or outsiders, as the occupat­
ion of the palace might be achieved by a 
coup-de-main with relatively small forces 
and usually meant the conquest of the 
whole empire.^
Moreover, once seizure of the palace was achieved its continued 
occupation was sanctioned by the doctrine of Karma, taught by both 
Hinduism and Buddhism. By this, the king's power and? position 
were recognised as coming to him as his due - as a reward for 
merit.^
Further instability of the monarchy stemmed from the fact 
that there were no well-defined rules of succession to the throne, 
though various kings had tried to overcome this lack by nominating
p ^
their successors before their death. Such efforts frequently
•Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia', The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, Vol.XI, Nov.19^2, p.24. Fear of this caused 
Thi-baw, king from 187# to 1885, to become a virtual prisoner in 
his palace even to the extent of foregoing the ritual circumambul- 
ation of the capital at his coronation. Bo-daw-hpaya, however, 
was not much influenced by such considerations, as Symes reported 
that he did not at one period enter his capital for three years, 
as he had removed the whole court, with the exception of a care­
taker prince and minister, to the area where he was building a 
pagoda. D.G.E.Hall (ed.), Michael Symes; Journal of his Second 
Embassy to the Court of Ava in 1802, (London,1955)iPP*1^0 and 152-3*
25Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, (Princeton, 
N.J., 1965), P*22.
26 —  —
Alaung-hpaya had intimated that the succession was to go in turn 
to each of his sons by the chief queen. Bo-daw-hpaya had stipul-
37
only augmented the uncertainty surrounding the succession. Min- 
don's heir apparent was assassinated and he refused to nominate 
another for fear of a repetition of events. As hereditary links 
with the throne were important buttresses to any aspirant's claim, 
the reign of a king insecure of his position was frequently inau­
gurated by 'the massacre of the kinsmen'. By this effort was 
made to eliminate all possible rivals with blood links to the 
throne, as any survivor could turn claimant.
The cosmological significance attached to possession of the 
palace and the other factors sustaining kingly authority, such as 
control of the army and patron and protector of the Buddhist faith 
meant that the powers of the king were immense. There was no 
institution of restraint in the Burmese administrative structure.
The hlut-taw, (the supreme council), acted only in an advisory and
executive capacity with the king's word as final in matters of great 
27moment. Nor did the fact that the king was patron and protector
of Buddhism in the realm necessarily act as a restraining influence.
It was the duty of the king to maintain order and discipline in the
28country, as it was the duty of the people to obey his instructions.
In this way there was public compliance at many acts of ruthlessness,
ated that the succession was to go first to his eldest son and then 
to his son's eldest son. Michael Symes; Journal, pp.19^-5*
27
Father Vincentius Sangermano, op.cit. «p.6*f and J.F.Cady, op.cit. t
p.16.
28
Maung Htin Aung, Burmese Law Tales - the legal element in Burmese 
Folk-lore. (London, 19&2), p.7*
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committed in the name of preserving order in the realm. And
many kings frequently managed to reconcile such acts with those
of great piety, so that neither the exigencies of power politics
nor the aspirations, cherished by most Burmese kings, of the at-
29
tainment of future Buddhahood seemed greatly prejudiced*
The effective assertion of the king's authority was depend­
ent on the strength and mobility of his army, the loyalty of the
central and provincial governors, and the reliability of his es-
30pionage system. Frequently the retention of the throne, even
by a strong king, was achieved only by maintaining a precarious
balance of power between rival groups. In this he was aided by
his espionage system by which, as in other Indianised states, the
king had agents, known in Burma as na-gan-daw or rthe king's ears’,
scattered not only through the central administration and court
31but also throughout the provinces. Their work was aided by 
local rivalries and factional jealousies, such as the one Symes
29^ Donald Eugene Smith, op.cit., pp.23-25 and E. Sarkisyanz, op.cit.t 
p.58.
30J.F.Cady, op.cit.« p.9 and John Nisbet, Burma under British Rule 
and Before, (Westminster,1901)f Vol.I, pp. 153-^*
31Ma Mya Sein, op.cit., p.*+0 and D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.132. John 
Crawfurd, the envoy of the government of India to the Burmese 
court in 1826-2 7* described the na-gan-daw as 'authorised spies'. 
See also H.G.Quatrich Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Ad­
ministration. (London, 1931)* P«73*
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described between the myg-wun of Rangoon and his deputy governor. 
With the poor communication between the capital and the outlying 
provinces not even the most reliable system could prevent the abuse 
of power nor remove the possibility of the outbreak of rebellion 
in the provinces.
The central administration Administration at the capital and its
immediate environs was probably the
33most regular and efficient in the whole country. It centred 
round the hlut-taw, the supreme council of the realm, and the var­
ious special administrative institutions for the palace and the 
capital. The hlut-taw was usually composed of four, but sometimes 
six, wun-gyl, (’bearers of the great burden1). They controlled 
all departments of government but there was no distribution of de­
partments to individual wun-gyi, as in Siam. The hlut-taw, lit­
erally ’place of release*, was responsible for the registering of
all royal edicts and the issuing of royal letters according to
3/f
the prescribed etiquette. It was also the chief court of law,
hearing appeals from the two courts, criminal and civil, at the 
capital and also acting as supreme arbiter in civil and criminal
32Michael Symes: Journal, p.218. The machinations of the deputy 
governor with his intimations of the intimacy of the governor with 
the English led to the governor’s recall from Rangoon for a time 
and his being confined to the limits of the Court.
33J.F.Cady, op^cit., pp.19-20.
3*fD.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.132.
appeals from provincial courts* It also heard in the first
35instance cases of great importance, such as those of treason*
In theory the king presided over its meetings and a throne stood 
in the council chambers. In his absence abeisance was made to 
the empty throne and either the heir apparent or the senior wun-
t 36gyi presided* Except when the king was unusually energetic,
the hlut-taw managed the routine business of administration with
37the king intervening only in matters of great importance.
The wun-gyl were assisted by a number of wun-dauk, ('props' 
usually younger men of ability and promise who acted not only in 
a secretarial capacity but also participated in the discussions
7Q
of the hlut-taw though not in its formal decisions. There
were also a number of officials, whom Hall considered best des­
cribed as 'privy councillors', two of whom were always in at­
tendance on the king, so that their influence on him could be
_ 39
greater, despite their lower rank, than that of the wun-gyi.
35Ibid., p.133 and J.F.Cady, op.cit., p.17*
36“
Michael Symes;. Journal, p.153*
37Rather than revoke the orders of the hlut-taw, the king normally 
removed members who consistently made decisions which displeased 
him. G.E.Harvey noted that to the end of the monarchy 'the 
Hluttaw was liable without a moment's notice to be flung into 
jail for a night or two, while its office remained closed, mere­
ly because the king was displeased for some trivial reason.' 
Op.cit., p.329*
38
D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.132.
39Ibid.
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Other important offices of the central administration 
were those of the athi-wun (official in charge of athi affairs), 
of commanders of the various military divisions, such as the 
myin-wun, (cavalry commander), of the paymaster-general, and 
the master of the ordinance. The treasury was not only the 
fgold house* but also the depository of the evidence of the per­
iodic revenue inquests on which taxation and the appointments of
40headmen were based*
Closely allied with the central system of government for 
the whole country were the special administrative institutions 
for the palace and capital. Four myo-wun had the respons- 
sibility for the general administration of the capital and pre­
sided over the proceedings of the criminal court there. Civil
cases were heard in the other special court by two lesser 
41officials.
The wun-gyl were all appointees of the king and as, 
with most other important government officials, were 
usually selected for their sagacity, their administrative 
experience, their political and blood connexions,
42on their loyalty and friendship to the king.
ifO _J.F.Cady, op.cit., pp.19-20.
If"]
Father Vincentius Sangermano, op.cit., p.64 and D.G.E.Hall, op. 
cit.,p.133» Cases concerning inmates of the palace were heard 
by the privy councillors.
42Sangermano reported that so great was the revernnce with which
42
While the frequent appointment of new officials at the beginning
of a new reign was an attempt to remove conflicting loyalties near
the throne, it was also the cause of the lack of administrative
k3
continuity that tended to occur from reign to reign* Yet though 
there was no formal system of examination to govenn entry to the 
administration, higher education was available in the form of in­
tensive study of the Pali and Burmese classics in the larger monas­
teries, which were the main centres of learning and culture in 
Burma. Such study provided the secretarial and literary skills 
needed by those attaining high office and some monasteries offered 
courses of instruction in court protocol, engineering, and manufac-
/fif
tunng techniques.
Until the reign of Min-don no fixed salaries were paid to 
officials. The higher officials, such as royal princes and wun-gyT\ 
were remunerated by the grant of the revenue of districts, of which 
they became the myp-sa (*eater*3. They were then known by the name 
of these districts, thus Min-don had been the myo-sa of the Seven 
Hills District of Min-don before he ascended the throne and Tha-ya- 
wadi (1837-^6) had been the myp-sa of the Tha-ya-wadi~district•
the white elephant was held, that anyone catching one could be pro­
moted to the rank and status of an official. Op.cit.,p.59*
G.E.Harvey, op.cit., pp.338-39*
1+1+ ----
J.F.Cady, op.cit., p.60. It was noted in British Burma in the early
1870's that the Burmese king maintained standards in the kyaung by
occasionally having the hpon-gyi examined in grammar, metaphysics,
and Buddhist doctrine. B.B.R.F.I.,1872-73« P*16.
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Lesser officials were granted assignments of land on the royal 
domain. 45
Provincial administration In the early nineteenth century the
Burmese empire was divided into a 
series of provinces, each under a governor appointed by and res­
ponsible to the king, and each taking its name from the major town
k6and administrative centre* Except when they were of royal blood,
provincial governors had no claim to local allegiance, apart from
Zf?
holding the royal warrant of authority* Once this was removed
they frequently returned to the comparative obscurity of their vil- 
if8
lages* While they held office, however, their powers and the
5D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.13k.
----Some provinces were grouped into one major administrative unit or 
super-province, as were the provinces of Arakan, where all the pro­
vincial governors were subordinate to the governor at Mro-haung. 
B.S.P*P., 1826, 9th June, No.10. Similarly the governors of prov­
inces such as Martaban and Bassein were subordinate to the governor 
at Rangoon. Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma, (London,1962), 
p.137 and P.A.R.t 1853-56, p.7. 
k?
Many of these, such as Taung-ngu and Martaban, were former king­
doms, so that in earlier centuries, at least, when their governors 
were of royal blood they frequently had the status of nominal or 
vassal kings. According to H.L.Shorto, ’It seems that there was no 
means known to Pegu or Ava of extinguishing an extant kingdom: 
annexation meant placing a nominee on the throne, ... , so that 
the progressive unification of the country merely increased the 
possibility of rebellion as soon as central control slackened.’
*A Mon Genealogy of Kings’, Historians of South East Asia, (D.G.E. 
Hall,ed.,London,1963), p*69* See also G.E.Harvey.op.cit..p.182
and Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma, pp.1^8-9/
 -----------
B.S.P.P., 1826, 23th April, No.25* Ends. 5 and 6 .
opportunities for the abuse of them were considerable. As John
Nisbet pointed out*
Instructions from the central authority were 
often treated with indifference, and orders 
from Mandalay did not necessarily carry the _ 
same weight as attaches to similar missives 
in most civilised countries. Even the exec­
ution of royal orders could sometimes only 
be relied on as far as they could be carried 
out by armed force.^
The fact that there was little security of tenure only seemed to
increase the tendency of officials to make the most of their pos-
50itxons while they yet held them.
Although the size of the provincial administration varied 
according to the 6ize of the province, in general, the structure 
of the administrative organisation and the functions of its of­
ficials were much the same from province to province. The myp- 
wun was responsible to the king and the hlut-taw for all that 
happened in his province but was aided by various officials.
These were appointed by the king to be responsible for some par­
ticular aspect of administration, such as the ahkun-wun, who was
the collector of land revenue and the supervisor of granaries,'
51and the ahkauk-wun, (collector of customs). Usually the admin 
istrative organisation of each province was composed of the gov-
Op.cit.,Vol.I.«pp.155-^-» JamPS kow stated that the government of 
Ava (i.e. of Burma)\^never 1 allow a new governor of a distant prov 
ince to proceed to his destination until he has delivered up his, 
nearest relatives as hostages for his good conduct and fidelity. 1 
Op.cit., Chpt.V, p.291.
50
H.Fielding Hall, op.cit., pp.80-81.
51
Ma Mya Sein, op.cit.. pp.55-59*
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ernor and deputy governor, an ahkun-wun, an ahkauk-wun, a sit-ke
(conservator of the peace), a nscrgan, (king’s reporter), and a
secretary. In Rangoon in the early 1820’s there were two deputy
- 52governors, two ahkun-wun, and four sit-ke.
The executive duties of the myp-wun and his colleagues in­
cluded the supervision and inspection of the various administrat­
ive units which constituted the province, the collection of reven­
ue, the organisation of an annual census, and the compilation of 
reports on the people. Besides these executive duties they were 
also responsible for the administration of justice for the prov­
ince in the myo-yon (governor’s court). Each official could act 
as an independent judge, though in cases involving capital punish­
ment, the sentence had to be confirmed by the myp-wun, who alone
53was vested with powers of life and death. Decisions of the 
myo-yon could be appealed against in the hlut-taw but litigation 
of this nature was an expensive, tedious and uncertain process. 
Provincial governors were expected to send records of their pro­
ceedings to the hlut-taw, though they did not always do so.
There was little system to the arrangements for emoluments 
for provincial officials. Theoretically, one-tenth of all produce 
was due to the king but considerably more was levied from the peo­
ple to provide a livelihood for the myp-sa, myp-wun, and the
^ B.S.P.P., 1826, i H h  April, No.55.
53
Ibid ., P.A.R., 1855-56, p.*f. and Ma Mya Sein, op.cit.. pp.^1-^2
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5k
various officials in the lower administrative levels. Officials
of the myp-yon also received perquisites from their judicial work*
Furthermore, there were few officials at any level who did not
benefit from occasional 'gifts'. These were given to superiors
whenever someone succeeded to office, especially in the regiments
55
where it was compulsory*
Local government Each province consisted of a number of town­
ships or villages, known variously as taik and
56
myp and in Arakan as kyun and kyoung. These were the basic
units in local administration and the most stable element in the
57
entire structure of government. Each was under a headman known
variously as myo-th/gyl, taik-thagyi, kyun-ok, according to the
  / /________________________________________
5if
Maun-Htin Aung, A History of Burma, pp.236-7 *nd Father Vincentius 
Sangermano, op.cit** p.73* See also below, page ^9#
^B.S.P.P*, 1826, 9th June, No.10 and Ma Mya Sein, op.d t.,p*72.
56-
myg can mean either a fortified town or a township governed by 
a myo-thagyi* A taik can be a treasury, a township, a township sub­
division, or the term applied to the seven divisions of Burma made in. 
the seventeenth century. Ma Mya Sein, op.cit.. p.3k. According 
to Professor Cady, the term, taik, was used to describe an artific­
ial administrative unit, interposed between the province and the 
township units of Mon Burma where depopulation in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century had swept away the traditional social and 
administrative structure. Op.cit*. p.28. According to Ma Mya Sein, 
however, many of the townships constituted by the British in 185^ 
corresponded in name and area with those established by Ra-zqydarit, 
king of Pegu in the 1*fth century. A kyun, (literally 'island'), 
was a lowland administrative unit and kyoung, ('stream'), was an 
upland one. Report on the Progress of Arakan under British Rule 
1826-1873, p.7.
37Maung Maung, op.cit., p.19*
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title of his administrative charge. The duties of thagyi were 
similar in kind though not in degree, as their powersr could vary 
considerably. Some myo-th^gy!, generally of royal blood or with 
powerful connexions, had power to pass the death sentence and some
were also the myp-sa of their charges.^ Thgfgyi were responsible
/
for multiple duties - collecting taxes, maintaining order, arbit­
rating in disputes, arresting criminals, and keeping a register of 
the people in their circles.
A myp-th^tgyl did not necessarily have jurisdiction over all 
the people in his district as he tended to be primarily the head 
of the athi and had jurisdiction of the ahmn-dan in his circle in 
criminal procedure only. Ahmn-dan communities were subject to 
their own regimental officers, such as myln-gaung (cavalry officer)
and pe-nln (steersman), who, however, could also be known as myQ-
1 * 5  9thatfgyi - Although headmen were hereditary mainly in the north
iri the future province of British Burma, great store was usually 
set on the hereditary line and effort was made to protect it from
58
Ma Mya Sein, op.cit., pp.68-70. When this occurred the myp often 
had the status of a province with the myQ-thagyl directly respon­
sible to the capital. When a myp-sa was a member of the hlut-taw 
or of the king*s court, he was unable to administer his province 
directly and a governor was appointed in his place, though the myp- 
sa continued to receive a large share of the revenue. Ibid.,p.33 
and Michael Symes: Journal, p.218.
59
For the hill peoples, such as the Karens and Chins, special of­
ficials with similar functions to the myp-thagyl were appointed.
E.S.L.I., 1833* Encl. 6 to Letter 39 of 19th August.
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u s u r p e r s A n d  although headmen needed to hold appointment
orders from the king, the will of the people was an important
factor in their retention of office. Ma Mya Sein states,
The Myothugyi were really non-officials in the 
sense that they were at first appointed by the 
people and that the people looked upon them as 
one of themselves and not a court official.
The Burmese included Government officials as 
one of the five enemies of mankind but the 
hereditary Myo-thugyi was usually loved and 
respected by all. He guarded their interests 
against the avarice of the Government offic­
ials.
Thagyi were normally assisted by ywa-ok and ywa-gaung, who 
carried out police, magisterial, and revenue duties in the villages
62 —and hamlets of their circles. There was usually a gaung in 
every hamlet and in each of the wards into which the towns were 
divided. They reported to the thagyi all unwonted activity in 
their charges and, in fact, constituted the only police in the 
whole country. In the towns an officer was normally appointed 
to keep watch at night and apprehend all suspicious persons after
^ S o  strong was this tradition that so late as 1879 when the Brit­
ish appointed a thagyi for Ok-hpo township in the Bassein district, 
the inhabitants tried to coerce what they regarded as the usurper 
and preserve the position for the boy they believed had a heredinlt- 
ary right to the thagyi-ship. They hamstrung the unfortunate in­
cumbent's pony, burnt two of his boats, placed an empty coffin in 
front of his door during the night, and threw stones at him and 
his wife when they attended a local pwei. B.H.P., 1879* July 
Index No.*f*f.
61
Op.cit.« p.62. The people could petition the king if a myQ- 
thagyi abused his powers.
62
The latter were often appointed by the thagyi, whose relatives 
they often were, but in some areas they were elected by the people.
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nine. He had no establishment but was authorised to call on the
63inhabitants to assist him*
Taxation system The taxation system in Burma was highly complex
and, at times, exceedingly rapacious* This 
was partly due to the organisation of society with its division 
into main groups of athi and ahmp-dan and partly due to the ex­
treme localisation of the administrative system* Crawfurd, indeed, 
described the old Burmese fiscal system as 'the most faulty and mis-
65
chievous part of the whole administration •••' The lack of fix­
ity in demand and of regular salaries for officials as well as the 
many opportunities for abuse in the Burmese administrative system 
all contributed to this. The one-tenth of all produce due to the 
king could be increased whenever some extraordinary expense was to
incurred, such as a deputation to be received or a mission to be 
6 5sent. And at the local level, although, according to Ma Mya
Sein, the 'rate of taxation was stated in ameindaws and sacred 
books, the actual rate differed immensely in different localities.
In some my<?, the rate depended on the condition of the crops,
B.S.P.P., 1826, 27th Jan. No.22; 25th April, No.15; and 27th April, 
No.13» Encl*9« Phayre believed this practice of having gaung or 
representative agents of the central government in every hamlet and 
village was an extension of the system of employing na-gan-daw. 
P.A.R., 1853-56, p.5.
65---
Quoted m  D.G.E.Hall, op.cit.. p.135-
65
B.S.P.P.,1826, 15th April, No.55* Those collecting such extra­
ordinary taxes would also extract their commission.
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which left a great chance open to the collectors of revenue to 
misappropriate the revenue
Taxes were paid in kind or in silver. The athi were the 
main tax-paying class but there were taxes that were common to all. 
These included dues on ferries, brokerage, and customs duties.
Taxes on land producing rice, whether they went to the royal trea­
sury or to support the service people, were paid by nearly all
67who cultivated. Land tax, however, was comparatively light
and was assessed by area mostly according to the number of oxen
68used to till it. There was also a tax on fruit trees and on
69other miscellaneous cultivation. Fisheries yielded consider­
able revenue, as most inland ones belonged to the crown and were 
rented out. fievenue from coastal fisheries was secured by taxing 
each boat according to size. There was, in fact, little that was 
not taxed but the major tax was that on the household, (taing-gyei). 
This was an assessment of the means of each family or revenue house 
according not only to annual produce but also according to house-
66 . ^
Op.cit.» p.67. An amein-daw is an edict. Although the British in 
Pegu in the 1850*s discovered how much revenue was sent from the 
various provinces to the capital, they did not discover how much 
was retained by the local officials 'for their own show*. Phayre 
estimated it to be about two-thirds of that which went to the cap­
ital. P.A.B.t 1855-56, p.22.
^E.S.L.I., 1853* Encl. 6 toLetter 59 of 19th August.
go
Ibid., 1852, Encl.5 to Letter of 6th Nov. and B.S.P.P., 1826, 
1*fth April, No.55* It was estimated in 1826 that the tax on the 
yoke of cattle was no more than a twenty-fifth part of the produce.
^B.S.P.P., 1826, 9th June, No.10.
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hold possessions and even grown sons and daughters.
Customs duties yielded considerable amounts of revenue,
71
as they were levied on all foreign imports and on exports as well.
In 1826 there were no less than thirteen customs houses along the
river between Rangoon and Ava at all of which duty was imposed.
It was estimated in the same year that customs and tonnage duties
72at Rangoon had amounted to 150,000 rupees. Theoretically there
were no excise duties, because the consumption of alcohol was il­
legal; but foreigners could be exempted from this prohibition by
73the purchase of licences from local officials.
The harshest levy of all, however, was that of men. Men 
were levied whenever labour was needed for some extraordinary pur­
pose, such as building a road, a temple, or waging a war. Owing 
to the fact that Burma was almost constantly at war with one or 
other of its neighbours there was a constant drain on the populat-
70A revenue house was a group of several families counted together
for taxation purposes. P.A.R., 1855-36, p.23*
71Michael Symes, An Account of the Religion and Civil Institutions 
of the Burmans, (Calcutta, 1839)* pp.46-41. According to Symes, 
the duty on imports was one-tenth per valorem but it would seem 
considerably more was imposed. Sangermano reported that ’sometimes 
these exactions are so oppressive that no one will venture his 
goods to Amarapura, as any profit he might hope for, from their 
sale in that city, could be beforehand entirely absorbed by pay­
ments at the cioche (customs houseD ... The visits of the [cus­
toms? inspectors resemble a robbery rather than a collection of 
dues, for besides the usual tax, fco.much if=s demanded in the name 
of present, and so much is stolen, that the owner, after having 
passed two or three cioche, will generally be glad to hasten back
to Rangoon ... f Op.cit.. p.73*
7 B.S.P.P.-. 1826, 1^th April, No.55.
73D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.135*
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ion for soldiers, Sangerraano reported that when he first arrived 
in Burma during the reign of Bo-daw-hpaya, the banks of the Irra­
waddy were lined with habitations but when he returned some years
later after Bo-daw-hpaya had waged some of his wars, 'a very few
7k
villages were to be seen along the whole course of the stream. 1
Many, unable to bear the continuous exactions of men and taxes,
75fled to Siam or to Bengal. ^
Buddhism While much of the revenue extracted from the people
found its way to the royal treasury for the upkeep and 
aggrandisement of the king's court, a considerable amount was de­
voted to the maintenance of the Buddhist monastic order and to the 
construction of pagodas and kyaung. Lands were assigned in per­
petuity to the monastic order as well as slaves to work them and 
to maintain the kyaung and pagodas. Yet while it seemed that 
the economy was strained at times beyond endurance by the king's 
demands for the means of meeting both his political needs and his 
religious obligations, the institutions of Buddhist monasticism 
tempered those of the secular power with mercy. The monastic 
order held no political power and in matters of state the monks
7k
Op.cit., p.79*
75So many fled to Siam that the Siamese government appointed spec­
ial guards to look after them and maintained stores of rice along 
the escape route. Michael Symes: Journal, p.211, f.n.79.
Sometimes whole villages were assigned for the maintenance of 
monasteries. U Kaung, op.cit., p.23.
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77generally remained aloof. They did, however, have enormous in­
fluence which they sometimes used to secure clemency from governors 
when they oppressed their people or from the king to obtain mercy 
for conquered people, for rebels, or for any others likely to suffer 
at his hands.^
The king appointed a primate, ('possessor of discipline'), 
and controlled the Buddhist order through him. He was usually the
abbot of an important kyaung in the capital and a man esteemed for 
79his own merit. The primate exercised authority through the
royal mandate and acted as the official channel for communications 
by the king with the monastic order. He was responsible for the 
general administration and supervision of the order and was assisted 
in this by a council of eight. They appointed the heads of monas­
teries both in the capital and in the provinces; issued orders and
77There were, however, numerous exceptions to this, as J.F.Cady 
points out. Op.cit., pp.52-55* Honks were used to conduct geace 
negotiations on occasion. There were also instances of hpon-gyi 
leaving the kyaung to assume political roles.
r p Q  ^  _
Hpon-gyi were known to have forcibly rescued condemned men on 
their way to execution. P.Bigandet, The Life or Legend of Gaudama, 
the Buddha of the Burmese, Vol.II (London, 1$8c>2* 3rd ed.,p.309*
On rare occasions under the British regime, hpon-gyi were known to 
petition the British authorities against acts they considered 
harsh. See B.H.P., 18?2, Feb.Index No.*tO.
79Customarily, the king had served his novitiate as a boy under this 
abbot. In 1871 a British official in Upper Burma, J.Talboys 
Wheeler, reported that on the death of the primate, Min-don had 
assumed direct control of the Buddhist order by refusing to nomin­
ate a successor and by undertaking the functions of primate him- 
seif. I.F.P., (Pol.), 1871, July No.273*
54
rules for the guidance of monks and novices; decided cases within
g
the monastic order; and generally maintained discipline within it#
and learning in society but also of the law, for though 'they
never sat in the courts, the law-books which guided judicial decis-
law in Burma was based on custom rather than on rigid codes, with 
the law books, (damathat), being treated merely as guides to con­
duct, not as statutory law* These were periodically revised.
The aim of judges was not impartial administration of the law but 
the achievement of compromise and satisfaction for both plaintiff
Qp
and defendant.
There was no penal code, as came to exist in British India.- 
The administration of criminal law was an extension of the activ-
»0
U Kaung, op.cit.. p.23* Monks were beyond the reach of the civil
men, also wrote the Burmese chronicles. Their justification of 
writing about kings and other temporal things, normally forbidden 
to hpon-gyi, is explained by U Tet Htoot, as illustrating the im­
permanence of all things and of giving 'moral instruction to kings, 
ministers ... and other government officials ... ' 'The Nature of 
the Burmese Chronicles', Historians of South East Asia, (ed.D.G.E. 
Hall, London, 1963), P*50.
12Maung Htin Aung, Burmese Law Tales, pp. 10 and 21; John Jardine, 
Notes on Buddhist Law, (Rangoon, 1&82), p•135 and J.S.Furnivall, 
Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 19 +^8), pp.131-32. D.G.E. 
Hall, however, considers' Furnivall's account of administration of 
civil law in traditional Burma as somewhat idealised and quotes 
Crawfurd's comment, that 'no prudent person enters into a lawsuit*' 
Op.cit.. p.136.
Law The monks were the main custodians not only of scholarship
ions, were almost all compiled by monks.' 81 The system of civil
.eTfrocked.
D.G.E.Hall, op.cit., p.137* The hpon-gyi, together with some lay-
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ities of the executive, as a criminal offence was associated with
breaking the king’s peace. This was redefined at the beginning
of each reign when the king would issue a proclamation of the lists
83of offences he would consider as crimes against his peace. Pun­
ishments were also defined, though these were mostly inflicted at 
the discretion of the judge. Grimes of treason were subject to 
the most severe penalties but torture, whipping, and maiming were 
not uncommon. Penalties were unduly severe when crime was rife 
and sometimes were devised to suit the crime. For instance, the 
face of a thief would be blackened by soot and he would be led
through the town with his crime proclaimed to gong accompaniment
. 1 . 85at street corners.
Conclusion The harshness of Burmese administration and the lack 
of stability and continuity in the central adminis­
trative system was only partly offset by the stability and contin­
uity in local government and in the Buddhist monastic organisation. 
The frequent rebellions and the unending wars were a continuous 
drain on the resources of the country and on the population. In 
1784 Bo-daw-hpaya*s revenue inquest revealed that the population 
was less than two million and in 1825 Crawfurd estimated that the
83Maung Maung, op.cit., pp.17-18 and Maung Htin Aung, Burmese Law 
Tales, p.7«
85
John Jardine, op.cit.,p.15 and Michael Symes, op.cit., pp.20-21.
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popuEation of Burma with all its tributaries was less than four 
million.^ It seems that the Hon rebellions and the frequent
wars with Siam had caused a complete breakdown of the old social
86order in lower Burma. After the additional disruption there
caused by the Anglo-Burmese war of T852, Henry Yule, when trav­
elling through to the Burmese capital in 1855« was to report that 
only a very small part of the Irrawaddy delta was under cultivat­
ion. ’Even farther from the sea vast tracts of fertile soil re-
87
main in a state of nature or abandonment. 1
It was to remain to the British to establish a stable admin­
istrative system, greater social security, and thus the conditions 
in which the economic development of the delta was to occur.
85Quoted in G.E.Harvey, op.cit.+ p.533 and D.G.E.Hall, op.cit..p.93* 
° Ibid., p.13^.
Q o
A Narrative of the Mission sent by the Governor-General of India 
to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London, iS^ST, P*26¥.
Chapter II
FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 
IM TEHASSEHIM, ABAKAN, AND PEGU. 1
The establishment of British administration in Pegu in 1852
presented fewer problems in some ways than the establishment of
British administration in Tenasserim and Arakan two and a half
2
decades earlier. There was no thought of returning the annexed
territory to Burma, as there had been with Tenasserim, and no
thought of setting up the new territory as a British protectorate
3
as there had been with both Tenasserim and Arakan. From British 
experience during the brief occupation of the southern provinces
A fourth British Burmese province, Martaban, was also formally 
constituted after the annexation of 1852 but, except for the fact 
that separate accounts and reports were made for it, it was actu­
ally administered as a district of Tenasserim and formally became 
this in 1859* For this reason it has not been considered neces­
sary to include Martaban in the title. See also below, page84.
2
One of the main problems connected with British annexation of Pegu 
was the lack of a formal Burmese treaty recognising it. The Bur­
mese cession of Tenasserim and Arakan in 1826 had been formally 
acknowledged in the Treaty of Yan-dabo and the authorities in Lon­
don were anxious to have the annexation of 1852 similarly acknow­
ledged. Min-don, however, refused to make such a treaty, which the 
governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, thought in 1853 would have cost 
him his throne. Dalhousie was content with the fact that in 185^ - 
Min-don sued for peace and friendly relations with the British.
In time, London had also to be content with this. William Lee- 
VJarner, The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie, (London, 190*+),Vol.I, 
■p.MH, I.S .P., 1853» 27th May, No.81~and~J.~G.ft.Baird (ed.), Private 
letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, (Edinburgh and London,1910), 
pp.252-59.
■^There were later proposals to return two small parts of the territ­
ory annexed by the British in 1852-53* This included a belt of rich
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of Pegu in the first Anglo-Burmese war and from preliminary inves­
tigations undertaken by British officials from Tenasserim during 
the second war it had been established that the administrative and
social institutions in Pegu under the Burmese were similar to those
kfound in Tenasserim and Arakan. The British administrative system 
initially devised for Pegu was therefore closely modelled on the 
administrative systems of the two older British Burmese provinces, 
as it was British practice in India to take the local institutions 
of newly annexed territories as the basis of their own administrat­
ive systems.
There was initially no attempt to ensure that the British 
administrative systems in Tenasserim and Arakan developed in con­
formity with each other, so that some differences emerged in the
5
two systems that evolved. These were largely due to the different
teak forests between Prome and Myei-de, which was beyond the trad­
itional northern frontier of Pegu. When the Burmese protested that 
this was an abrogation of the terms of the proclamation of annexat­
ion, the British then offered to restore the disputed territory in 
return for Burmese acceptance of a formal treaty ceding Pegu. When 
this strategy failed, the British later offered to barter the his­
toric township of Mln-donywhich lay in their jurisdiction^for Bur­
mese signature to a treaty^ as Min-don before ascending the throne 
had been myp-sa for the township and had special attachment to it. 
Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma, (London,19&2),pp.1^7-53 and
D.G.E.Hall, (ed.), The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852-1856, 
(London, 1932), Letter "56,p.131"• See also below, footnote 6 .
Zl
B.S.P.P., 1826, Jan.27, No.22 and April 1^, No.53 and E.S.L.I.,1852, 
Encl.5 to Letter 5^ of 6th Nov.
5
At one stage the British had considered setting up in the interior 
of Arakan an exclusively Arakanese administration under British pro­
tection. This was largely due to the unhealthiness of the climate 
and the high illness rate among British troops during the war. 
Nothing came of the scheme because it seemed unlikely that any 
Arakanese would be able to command the support of all Arakanese 
and because active British administration with control over revenue
ways in which the two provinces were incorporated within the Indian 
system of government. Both were originally placed under the con­
trol of the governor-general, but Arakan, geographically adjacent 
to Bengal, was soon transferred to that presidency* Tenasserim, 
however, remained under the control of the governor-general until 
183^, when the judicial and revenue branches of the administration 
were transferred to the government of Bengal.
The fact that they were both provinces of India necessarily 
brought some conformity in administrative procedure and the applic­
ation of general British Indian administrative principles. The 
code of regulations which was the basis of law and order in the 
Bengal presidency was not, however, introduced. This was intro­
duced only when conditions in newly acquired areas were similar to
those in the original 'Regulation* areas, as the application of the
7
code implied a relatively complex system of administration. In
seemed a better prospect than the establishment of a British pro­
tectorate and the possibility of further military involvement and 
expenditure with no reimbursement from the internal revenue of Arakan. 
B.S.P.P., 1826, 12th May, Nos. 1-2. Although it seemed more likely 
that Tenasserim would either be returned to Burma or bartered with 
Siam for promises of Siamese withdrawal from Kedah and Perak, the 
setting up of an independent Mon kingdom was oonsidered for a short 
time. Ibid., 27th April, No.66 and 30th June, No.29 and D.G.E.Hall,
A History of South-East Asia, (London,1938),p.521.
The fact that until 18^3 the commissioners of Tenasserim were from 
Penang and not experienced in administration in India also enhanced 
the differences between administration in the two provinces.
7
The original 'Regulation* provinces were those in which the code of 
regulations drawn up by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 for the Bengal pres­
idency prevailed. 'Non-Regulation' provinces were also known as 
'Extra-Regulation' provinces.
60
areas where conditions were patently dissimilar and unsettled, as 
in the former Burmese provinces, as simple a form of administrative 
system as possible was devised, although officials were instructed 
'to conduct their procedure in accordance with the spirit of the 
regulations, so far as they were suitable to the circumstances of 
the country.'^
Administration in such areas, generally known as the fNon-
Regulation* provinces, was characterised by the union of all powers,
executive, magisterial, and judicial, in the hands of the district
officer, subject to the appellate and supervisional jurisdiction
of the commissioner of the province. Such a system in Burma was
not markedly dissimilar in some respects from the administrative
9
character of the former regime. For the British, the combination
of collector and magistrate in one official had the added advantage
of being considerably cheaper than the 'Regulation1 system of hav-
10ing separate magistrates and collectors. The district was the
basic unit of administration, covering an area of several thousand 
square miles. The district officer had overall responsibility for 
all aspects of district administration. These included supervising 
the work of the officers in charge of the administrative units into
0 ■■   ■ ' ■ — ■ —  ■  .......
Courtenay Ilbert, The Government of India, being a digest of the
Statute Law relating thereto, &nd fed., (Oxford, 1907)iPP*101-102.
9Patrick Fagan, 'District administration in the United Provinces, 
Central Provinces, and the Punjab, l8l8-l857f» C.H.I., (ed.H.H. 
Dodwell), 1958, Vol.VI, Chpt.V, pp.76-77 and J.S.Furnivall, The 
Governance of Modern Burma, (New York,1960), p.5-
10
John Strachey, India: its administration and progress, (London,1911)1
p.101.
which the districts: were further subdivided, as in British India
administrative responsibility was arranged in a strict hierarchy
11of specified powers and obligations.
Administrative officials in the 'Non-Regulation1 provinces 
unlike those in the 'Regulation' provinces were drawn from both the 
Indian Civil Service and the army. Frequently the latter predom­
inated, particularly in areas where the local population had first
12to be 'pacified'. The 'Non-Regulation' system was one of great
elasticity, allowing local officers much independence of judgment
and action, except in expenditure of government money. This was
. 1 3rigidly controlled by the central government m  Calcutta.
Early British administration in Tenasserim and Arakan In Tenasser­
im and Arakan
the former provinces became districts within the British administrat­
ive system. Tenasserim in 1826 consisted of Tavoy, Mergui, Yei and 
that part of the province of Martaban that lay south of the Salween 
River. The latter became known as Amherst, which was later amal­
gamated with Yei, so that, in effect, there were then only three
11
See Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, (Oxford,1939)» 
pp. 7 and 7 *^
12It was not until the late 1870's that members of the I.C.S. were 
appointed in Burma. Social turbulence followed all three annexat­
ions, though there was least in Tenasserim.
13See J.S.Furnivall, 'As it was in the beginning', J.B.R.S.,Vol.XVIII, 
Pt.ii,1928,pp.36-7 and G.E.Harvey, Burma, 1782-1832*, C.H.I.,(Cam- 
bridge, 1929), Vol.i¥,Chpt.xxx p.3^3 for details of the financial 
stringency of the government of India in this. See also p a g e H 8, 
footncbe 1 7.
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districts, Arakan, on annexation consisted of four provinces,
Sandoway, Ramree, Cheduba, as well as that of Arakan, also known as
15Mro-haung, which was its capital. Shortly afterwards the latter
was abandoned as British administrative headquarters for the fishing 
village of Akyab, by which name the district was then known. Later 
due to the lawlessness that prevailed in the marshes of An, the dis­
tricts were reorganised so that An became a separate district and
16
Cheduba part of Ramree.
The principles behind the development of British administrat­
ion in Tenasserim and Arakan were influenced by the philosophy of 
liberalism, then propounded by James Mill in the India Office, and 
supported in British India by people such as Elphinstone and Munro. 
In this stress was laid on the ideals of equality before the law
and freedom from oppression and corruption. Belief in economic
17equality was also prevalent. On a more practical level, however,
1/f
J.S.Furnivall, *The Fashioning of Leviathan1, J.B.R.S., Vol.XXIX, 
Pt.iii, 1839» pp.1^7. The inclusion of any of Martaban in the Brit­
ish province was disputed by the Burmese in the early 1830*s but 
the British refused to discuss the matter. See Anil Chandra Baner- 
jee, Annexation of Burma, (Calcutta, 19^*0, pp«21-24. The British 
did, however, concede to one Burmese territorial demand in Manipur. 
Ibid. and Dorothy Woodman, op.cit., pp.97-98.
^B.S.P.P., 1826, 27th Jan. No.10 and G.E.Harvey, History of Burma, 
(London, 1925)1 pp.267-8. But see H.R.Spearman, British Burma 
Gazetteer, Vol.I, (1879)» P*^79 and R.B.Smart, Akyab District Gaz­
etteer , Vol.A, (1917)i p.160.
An was later merged with Ramree into a new district taking the 
name of the administrative headquarters, Kyauk-hpyu, used earlier 
as a base for a Bengal regiment. R.B.Smart, op.cit., p.160.
17
J.S.Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 19^ -8) ,p.29*
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the limited resources and personnel behind the Indian government 
largely determined the nature of the administration. Hence two 
fundamental principles of administration were that the revenue of 
provinces should at least be commensurate with expenditure on ad­
ministration and that the functions of government should be con-
18
fined, as much as possible, to the maintenance of law and order.
There was little optimism that Tenasserim, depopulated by so many 
decades of warfare and depredation, would become a paying propos­
ition but the British were more optimistic about Arakan, espec-
19ially with the ban on the expect of rice removed.
In both provinces officials from the previous regime remained 
in office with duties that were little different from those they 
had had under the Burmese. They were, however, subject to super­
vision by their European superiors and official oppression and ex­
tortion were no longer sanctioned. In Tenasserim initially no 
indigenous official above the rank of myp-thagyl was retained, as 
the first commissioner, Mr. Maingy, (1826-33)? feared that reinstated
officials of the myg-yon, such as sit-ke and ahkun-wun, would abuse
20their positions of trust and bring the British into contempt. In
  —    -------------------------------------------------------------
The recent war with Burma had cost £13 million and 15?000 troops. 
Dorothy Woodman, op.cit., p.80.
^ B.S.P.P., 1826, 27th April, No.2 and 9th June, No.12. It was also 
hoped migration would occur to stimulate economic development.
20
For the British there was little distinction at this st,age between 
taik-thagyi and myQ-thagyi. Correspondence for Tenasserim,1823-35 
to 10^2-5 8, p.^ f and F.S.V.Donnison, Public Administration in Burma - 
a study of development during the British connexion,(London and New 
York,1953),p.23. Most high-ranking officials in both Tenasserim 
and Arakan fled with the coming of the British*
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Arakan the British left the authority of the kyun-ok largely un­
changed, for fear of impairing 'the efficiency of their control1,
although they felt restraints could be imposed Compatible with
21the character of an administration subject to our influence'.
The major change in the administrative organisation at this
level was that the jurisdiction of kyun-ok and thagyi was now to
be territorial rather than personal, each being in charge of a
specified area. Their main responsibility was revenue collection,
on which they were paid a commission by per centage of collect- 
22
ion. They also had some responsibility for the maintenance of
order in their townships and villages, as they had had under the
23previous regime.
21
B.S.P.P.., 1826, 9th Jan., No.12. The title, kyoung-ok, apparently 
lapsed under British rule because there were always so few kyoung- 
ok as compared with kyun-ok.
22Thagyi received a 3 per cent commission on their collections but 
kyun-ok received a 14 per cent comnission. The latter were aided 
by the village headmen, the rwa-gaung, and their assistants, the 
rwa-sari,, who also received commissions. The latter were elec­
ted by the people themselves subject to the veto of the district 
assistant. Rwa-sa-ril were usually sons or relatives of the rwa- 
gaung. Under the British the office of kyun-ok was not considered 
hereditary but in practice seems to have been largely so. Report 
on the Progress of Arakan under British rule from 1826 to 1873 
and Correspondence for Tenasserim, p.2 6.
23
Maingy had attempted unsuccessfully to convert the thagyi into a 
graded and salaried local police force but they remained much as 
they had been under the Burmese. Ibid., p.8 . In Arakan kyun-ok 
were responsible for investigating petty suits which were not 
decided by the deputy commissioner, W.B.Tydd, Sandoway District 
Gazetteer , Vol.A, (1912), p.33 and H.R.Spearman, op.cit.,Vol.I, 
p.481.
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Later in Tenasserim the office of ahkun-wun was revived, as 
Maingy needed head revenue clerks and collectors at district head­
quarters and in Arakan in 1828 a myo-thagyi was appointed to aid
and advise European officers presiding in court on indigenous cus- 
2*ftoms* Further additions to the corps of indigenous officials
came when changes were made in judicial administration in 1831 and
183^ during the governor-generalship of Lord William Bentinck
(1828-1835)• These opened the criminal and civil branches of
the judiciary to allow persons both European and non-European,
other than covenanted civil servants, to become deputy magis- 
P q
trates. In Tenasserim six myp-thagyl were appointed in each
district to try petty civil and criminal cases as well as a sit-
—  28 —ke to try more important cases. In Akyab a tayamg.-thagyi was
also appointed to try all the civil suits not exceeding 300 rupees
in value, which, in fact, constituted most of the original civil
. . 27suits.
There was little change in the organisation and responsibil­
ities of the European administrative personnel in this period.
By 1832 the judicial duties of the myo-thagyi had lapsed and he 
had become the revenue assistant to the district officer, the 
equivalent of the Tenasserim ahkun-wun. Report on the Progress of 
Arakan, pp.6-7*
^Patrick Fagan, op.cit., p.8 8.
^Salaries for myo-thagyi ranged between 23 and 100 rupees a month 
anc^  a earned 300 rupees a month. A taym3,-thagyi earned 130
rupees a month. In Tenasserim myq-thagyi came to be known as gaung 
gyok under the British, perhaps to avoid confusion with the lower 
status thagyi.
27g.E.Harvey, *Burma 1782-1832*, p.366. Until 18^ +3 all depositions 
and records in the vernacular were translated into Persian, the 
official state language of British India and of the courts, and
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For most of it both provinces were under commissioners responsible 
to the government of Bengal for internal administration, Arakan 
having been under a superintendent subordinate to the commissioner 
of Chittagong until 183*K Districts were under deputy commission­
ers, then known as senior assistants to the commissioner. After 
183^ when the rules of administration for both provinces were re­
vised, an assistant commissioner was appointed to the provincial
headquarters of each province to aid the deputy commissioners 
2 8there. Deputy commissioners could pass sentences of up to two
years* imprisonment and commissioners up to fourteen years.
Crimes requiring heavier penalties were referred to Calcutta.
Assistant commissioners had similar though lesser powers than
those of deputy commissioners, except that they could.not hear
appeals. In matters of ^doprtlbm, inheritance, and marriage,
the law was the customary law of the contestants, while in other
and criminal matters, the law was similar to that prevailing else-
29where in British India.
It was in revenue administration that the greatest difference 
lay in administrative procedure and efficiency in the two provinces.
into English. Thereafter translations were made into English only.
28 I.L.P., 1853* 22nd July, No.22. Assistant commissioners were then 
known as junior assistants.
^G.E.Harvey, *Burma 1782-1832*, p . 363 an(^  R*B.Smart, op.cit.,p.162, 
B.O.Binns, The Amherst District Gazetteer, Vol.A, (1933),pp.7^-6, 
I.L.P. , 1833, 22nd July, JTo'.^ l.
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In b o t h  the B r i t i s h  r e t a i n e d  the o ld B u r m e s e  t a i n g - g y e i  tax, as a
30poll tax on adult males. This, however, was at a reduced, fixed,
annual, and relatively minimal rate, while land taxation became 
much more significant.
in A r a k a n  w i t h i n  a r e l a t i v e l y  s h ort time an e f f i c i e n t  s y s t e m  
of l a n d  r e v e n u e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was d e v e l o p e d  w h i c h  was to be the 
ba s i s  of l a n d  r e v e n u e  p o l i c y  in the l a t e r  p r o v i n c e  of B r i t i s h  Burma. 
T h e r e  w as s o m e  e a r l y  c o n f u s i o n  w h e n  the B r i t i s h  m i s t o o k  the p o s i t ­
ion a n d  p o w e r s  of the k y u n - o k  as b e i n g  s i m i l a r  to t h o s e  of the 
z a m i n d a r s  of B e n g a l  a n d  a l l o w e d  c i r c l e s  to be put up  for sal e  and
tenders called from those aspiring to become kyun-ok but by 1831
31the B r i t i s h  h a d  the s i t u a t i o n  w e l l  in hand. The h i g h  r a t e s  of
t a x a t i o n  that h a d  i n i t i a l l y  b e e n  i m p o s e d  w e r e  r e d u c e d  b y  t h r e e -  
q u a r t e r s  a nd the r e v e n u e  c o l l e c t i o n  duti e s  of k y u n - o k  r e v e r t e d  to 
b e i n g  m u c h  as t h e y  h a d  b e e n  u n d e r  the B u r mese. An  e f f e c t i v e  s y s ­
tem of c o n t r o l  by w r i t t e n  d e m a n d s  a n d  r e c e i p t s  was devised, however,  
to p r e v e n t  a b u s e s  a nd c o r r u p t i o n .  I n d i v i d u a l  l a n d h o l d i n g s  w e r e
recognised and the precedent was also established of each land-
32holder making separate revenue payments to the government.
30 '
In 18A-1 the rate had been fixed in Arakan at k rupees a year for 
every married man and 2 rupees for each unmarried man. By 1853 in 
Tenasserim the tax was arranged to vary according to occupation 
and area. B.S.B.R.P.1853* 3rd June,No.3* See also below, page 135» 
31Contracts went to the highest bidders and settlements for three 
years were made but few were able to carry out their obligations 
and the contracts were revoked. H.R.Spearman, op.cit.,Vol*I ^.^80. 
The area under cultivation actually declined in some areas for a 
time because of this.
^R.B.Smart, op.cit. , p.181.
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A f t e r  1 83^ the l a n d  was r o u g h l y  s u r v e y e d  by  s u r v e y o r s  from C h i t t a ­
g o n g  a n d  l a t e r  by the r w a - g a u n g  w i t h  the l a n d  tax f i x e d  at b e t w e e n  
1 r u p e e  a n d  2 r u p e e s  b a n nas an a c r e  of c u l t i v a t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  to 
f e r t i l i t y . ^
In T e n a s s e r i m  u n t i l  18**2 r e v e n u e  d e m a n d  was f i x e d  as a v i l ­
l a g e  a s s e s s m e n t .  T h i s  was d e c i d e d  on  by the d e p u t y  c o m m i s s i o n e r  
in c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  the v i l l a g e  t h a g y i  and the i n h a b i t a n t s  of the 
v i l l a g e  a n d  l a t e r  d i v i d e d  by the c o n t r i b u t o r s  a m o n g s t  them s e l v e s .  
The r a t e  of t a x a t i o n  was first set at 10 p er cent of gross produce,
w h i c h  w as b e l i e v e d  to be a c o n t i n u a t i o n  of B u r m e s e  p r a c t i c e s ,  but
3bw as s o o n  r a i s e d  to 20 p e r  cent of a n n u a l  gross produ c e .  U n t i l
18^2 t a x  w a s  p a i d  in k i n d  but t h e r e a f t e r  was p a i d  in money. A f t e r
18^3 t a x a t i o n  was a s s e s s e d  a c c o r d i n g  to the a c r e a g e  of i n d i v i d u a l  
35c u l t i v a t o r s .  T he a d o p t i o n  of the r y o t - w a r i  s y s t e m  of l a n d  r e v ­
enue a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  a d e c a d e  e a r l i e r  in Arakan, was 
i n i t i a l l y  d i s a p p o i n t i n g  to the I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w ho h a d  h o p e d  
for g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  in r e v e n u e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  an d  greate:pi*evenue 
r e t u r n s  t h a n  in the past. T h e  n e w  r a t e s  w e r e  so h i g h  that the 
a r e a  of c u l t i v a t i o n  d e c r e a s e d  for a time. O n  their s u b s e q u e n t
33
G . E . H a r v e y ,  ’B u r m a  1782->1832’ , p p . 5 ^ 3 - ^  a n d  W . B . T y d d ,  o p . c i t . , 
p p . 6^-66. C l a s s e s  wer e  l a t e r  h e l d  to t e a c h  r e v e n u e  o f f i c i a l s  
s u r v e y i n g .  The i n a d e q u a c i e s  of this e a rly m e t h o d  of a s s e s s m e n t  
are d i s c u s s e d  on p a g e  139 •
5^J.S.Furnivall, fThe Early Revenue History of Tenasserim: Land 
Revenue’, J.B.R.S., Vol. XIX, Pt .iii, (1929) ,pp.8^f-90. Land revenue 
was collected under a three year contract system for a time under 
Maingy and later under a seven year one but this appears not to 
have been successful.
35j.S . F u r n i v a l l , ’T h e  F a s h i o n i n g  of L e v i a t h a n 1 , p.11^f.
36
reduction both cultivation and land revenue slowly increased.
After 18^3 revenue administration procedure in Arakan and Ten­
asserim was increasingly assimilated but Tenasserim was notorious
for the inaccuracies of its revenue returns and its slowness to
37become a paying proposition to the government of India.
In neither province was there much attempt to establish a 
system of civil police. Except for gang robbery, usually re­
ferred to as ’dacoity’, and in Arakan, insurrection, crime was
thought to be rare and when a number of cases of stabbing occurred
38in Arakan in 1850 it was considered a new phenomenon. In Ten­
asserim reliance was placed mostly on the thagyi as civil police, 
although a night watch was established in Mouhein.
The area under cultivation increased from 97>515 acres in l8*f5 to 
14-4,405 in 1832. It was estimated from the capitation tax returns 
that population also declined in numbers during the transition per 
iod in revenue policy in the early 1840’s. G.E.Harvey, ’Burma 1782 
1832’, p.567 and B.S.B.R.P., 1832, 9th Mch., No.59.
37Between 1828-29 and 1849-50 it was estimated that annual revenue 
from Tenasserim rose from about 3£ lacs of rupees to k£ lacs. Ibid 
It was largely because Tenasserim had proved such a financial 
liability to the Indian government that the British offered to 
return it to the Burmese in the 1830*s. D.G.E.Hall, Burma, 2nd ed. 
(London, 195&), p.108.
38
This was attributed to ’excessive prosperity unbalancing the 
passions’. G.E.Harvey, ’Burma 1782-1852*, p.565. The British, 
however, were scarcely in the position to assess the frequency of 
crime that took place away from district headquarters because of 
the infrequency of district tours.
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To counteract the more organised form of crime, dacoity, and 
insurrection, there was in both provinces some effort to develop a 
system of military police* In Tenasserim dacoity was mostly org­
anised by Burmese from across the border in Burmese Martaban and
in 1838 a corps of Mons was raised to act as a frontier and river 
39police. In Arakan dacoity and insurrection were mostly due to
discontented and disillusioned Arakanese, who resented the exchange 
of one form of foreign domination for another. After 1836, when 
their resentment seems to have come to a head in the burning of 
Akyab town and police station, such acts of violence seem to have
Aovirtually disappeared. Until then, however, there was need of
a strong police system and this was met by the recruitment of the
Arakan Local Battalion, composed of Arakanese and Manipuris, who
were stationed at the headquarters of districts and of the police
4-1circles into which the province was divided. In both provinces
regular troops were also stationed, though by 1851 Arakan had becoiee
so peaceful that they were withdrawn from Arakan and the local bat-
A 2
talion was employed in their stead.
39 1
It was also to protect the timber trade on the Salween River. It
was known as the Talaing Corps, Talaing being the term mostly used
by the British then for Mons who predominated in Tenasserim. It is
thought the term is derived from Telingana, a region on the Madras
coast, from which the early rulers of the Mons came. G.E.Harvey,
A H i s t o r y  of B u r m a , p . 6.
^G.E.Harvey, fBurma 1782-1852*, p.565* ^he Mons in Tenasserim were 
less resistant to the introduction of British rule than the Arak­
anese, though there were some risings in Tavoy and Mergui, led by 
ex-governors, soon after the British assumed control. Horace Hay- 
man Wilson, The History of British India, From 1805 to 1835,Vo1. 
VII, (London, 1850), p.228.
G.E.Harvey, 'Burma 1782-1852', p.56^ and W.B.Tydd,op.cit.,p.55. 
^ I.L.P.. 1853, 22nd July, No.26.
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By 1852 British rule in Tenasserim and Arakan had thus
brought greater social stability and security than had existed
before. Slavery had been abolished and British encouragement of
the rice trade allowed the development of a greater degree of in-
Zf 3
dividual prosperity. Bv 1832 Akyab had become the greatest rice
port in the world and Mou^ Lelnijg. a major exporter of tbeak. But al­
though the population had trebled in both provinces between 1826
44
and 1852, under-population was still a major problem. Migration 
did not occur on the large scale that had been anticipated and 
such population growth as there had been was attributed to the 
return of emigres and natural increase rather than to immigration.
Little had been done to develop the hinterland. Public 
works consisted largely of the construction of adainistrative 
buildings and gaols at administrative headquarters, though con­
vict labour was responsible for improving the drainage of these 
sites. Of roads and bridges there were none and Mergui was cut 
off for weeks at a time without communication with the rest of the
45province.
In both provinces the development of an administrative system 
suited to local conditions was checked by control from Calcutta.
43
Abolition of slavery was effected largely after the Emancipation 
Act of 1835* W.B.Tydd, op.cit., p.3 8.
A if
Population growth between 1830 and 1832 in Arakan was from 131,390 
to 353,643 and in Tenasserim between 1826 and 1852 from 66,000 to 
191,476. G.E.Harvey, 'Burma 1782-1852', pp.364 and 367.
43
J.Butler, Gazetteer of the Mergui District, (l884),p.9* Even the 
jetty at Akyab took seven years to build. G.E.Harvey, 'Burma 1782- 
1852', p.564.
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In Arakan there was too much; in Tenasserim too little. For
Arakan the proximity of Bengal meant that the system of administ­
ration there was * imposed ready-made from above and not built up
from below; the Bengal acts and regulations were applied by rule
47and lithographed forms followed.1 For Tenasserim Bengal was so
remote that irregularities in administration and scandals occurred
48with persistent frequency. In neither province did the poor
system of communications allow much contact with the people away
from the immediate environs of the administrative headquarters,
so that, in effect, former Burmese practices continued virtually 
49unchanged.
Furthermore, the inadequacies of the 'Non-Regulation1 system 
as developed during the previous three decades or so were becoming 
increasingly obvious. From a case in 1848 involving Captain Phayre, 
then an assistant commissioner in Tenasserim, emerged the fact that
In the early years of British rule in Tenasserim it was more lack 
of support from the government of India than lack of control. See 
J.S.Furnivall's two articles 'As it was in the beginning' and 'The 
Fashioning of Leviathan', for details of the not very successful 
efforts of the first two commissioners to establish an administrat­
ive system suited to the province.
47
G.E.Harvey, 'Burma 1782-1852* > P*563-
48
B.O.Binns, Amherst District Gazetteer. Vol.A,(1935)i P-72. One 
commissioner, Captain Durand, handed an officer in civil employ­
ment to the military officials to be tried by court martial for 
acts committed in his civil capacity. In 1830 Captain Impey, who 
was in charge of Amherst district, embezzled 15*000 rupees from 
the treasury and disappeared into Burmese territory.
49
J.S.Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p*58. In Arakan of­
ficers were also deterred from touring because of the heavy paper 
work required of them at administrative headquarters.
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air legislation passed by the Bengal Sudder Court of Legal Pro 
/ v_____
ce^ttlngs after Act II of 1835 needed legal endorsement by the
50
passage of a further act by the government of India. Besides
this it was also obvious that the government of the presidency of
Bengal,swollen by the addition of so many territorial annexations,
51 . .had become cumbersome and unwieldy. The need for reorganising
the government on a more efficient basis could not be ignored and
in the first year of Dalhousie's governor-generalship in 1848 an
examination was begun of all the administrations of the ’Non-
Regulation* provinces.
The annexation of 1852 When Pegu was annexed in 1832 it was
immediately transferred to the governor-
general* s control and at the same time a commissioner, J. Colvin,
was appointed to enquire into the administrative systems of Arakan
52and Tenasserim. Martaban, though placed under the jurisdiction
of the commissioner of Tenasserim, was also placed under the ulti­
mate authority of the governor-general. Dalhousie, not unaware
5°I.L.P.. 1853, 22nd July, Nos. 11, 22, and 23.
51|Until |833 the governor-general had also been the governor of 
■Bengal, although as early as l835^consideration had been given 
Jto the appointment of a separate governor of Bengal but nothing 
had come of it. The presidency of Bengal at one stage included 
not only Bengal and Orissa but also the British Burmese provinces, 
Benares, and the Upper Provinces.
^ B.P.P.,1852, 30th Dec.,No.3* Colvin’s appointment was announced 
only five days before the formal declaration of British annexat­
ion of Pegu by the new commissioner, Phayre. Colvin had been com­
missioner of Tenasserim from 1846 to 1849.
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of the complexity of the situation, noted,
That the Commissioner should correspond generally 
with the Government of Bengal regarding most of 
his districts and with the Government of India re­
garding one is an anomaly in form. But such anom­
alies abound, and it will be productive of no in­
convenience in practice ... Ultimately and at no 
distant date I contemplate the three provinces 
of Tenasserim, Arrracan, and Pegu being united 
under one Commissioner. At present and until 
the new Province is settled, this cannot be
done. „
53
Although Dalhousie was not ultimately to see the final amal­
gamation of the three British Burmese provinces into one, he did 
see some progress made towards this. In 18^  an act was passed 
empowering the Governor-General, in Council to take by proclamation 
under his immediate authority and management any part of the territ- 
ories under the government of the East India Company. Tenasserim
and Martaban were then transferred from the control of the govern-
55ment of Bengal to that of the governor-general. The transfer of
Arakan was to take place later in 1862 but the submission of Colvin*s 
report in 18^3 marked the beginning of a greater effort to co-ordin­
ate administrative procedure in all the British Burmese provinces.
The report represented a comprehensive investigation not only 
into the institutions and officers of administration but also those
E.S.L.I., 1853, Encl. 29 to Letter 3 of 5th Jan.
5b
Courtenay Ilbert, op.cit., p.93-
British Burma Manual, (@omp.C.S.Cooke), Vol.I,(1878),p.lvi.
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56of society* Colvin*s report and recommendations for effecting
administrative reform and uniformity engendered considerable dis­
cussion and argument of some heat by the commissioners of Tenasserim
57and Arakan. This was notably so with Colvin*s recommendation for
reducing the expense of revenue collections in Arakan by reducing
the number of kyun-ok and organising their duties to conform with
58those of the thagyi of Tenasserim. The Tenasserim system had
been introduced to Pegu and the government of India decided to
introduce it also to Arakan. Because of the objections of the
commissioners of both Tenasserim and Arakan, however, the latter*s
59proposal was accepted instead. This was a compromise between
the two systems, which the latter thought more suited to the pro­
vince.
Colvin was appointed to enquire into *the general state of the 
civil administration and the constitution of the several courts 
and offices in each province ..., how far the rules prescribed 
in the several departments are adapted to local circumstances, 
whether they are strictly observed, and in what respects they or 
any of the several establishments appear to be susceptible of 
amendment ... and ... the physical, moral and intellectual con­
dition of the people as affected particularly by the system of 
government, introduced among them, and by what means at the com­
mand of the Government it may be improved.' B.P.P., 1832, 30th 
Dec., No.3*
57Many of the points raised by Colvin's investigation are discussed 
j-olater in the thesis.
B.S.B.R.P.,1835* 3rd June, No.3*B. There were in 1852 over 180 
kyun-ok in Arakan, each collecting between 1,000 and 12,000 rupees 
a year. By this time commission amounted to only 7 per cent on 
collections exceeding 3*000 rupees. Colvin wanted to reduce the 
number of kyun-ok to about nineteen and change their status and 
functions to those of the Tenasserim gaung-gyok and to give their 
revenue duties to the rwa-gaung, whose commission would be in­
creased to 10 per cent. Colvin estimated that a minimum of 20,000 
rupees a year could be saved in the Akyab district alone. Ibid.,
No.3 D.
5%bid., Nos. 3E and 4; 30th Aug.,No.51; 9th Dec.,Nos.64 and 6 8;
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In it the existing institutions of kyun-ok and rwa-gaung were 
to be retained but the smaller kyun were to be absorbed into larger 
tracts so that no kyun-ok collected much less than 5*000 rupees nor 
more than 12,000 rupees# The commissioner of Arakan, Captain H* 
Hopkinson, recommended that two or three circles be placed under 
an able kyun-ok, to be titled gaung-gyok or myQ-thagyi. He sug­
gested, however, that the gaung-gyok,of Arakan, unlike those of 
Tenasserim, be paid by commission rather than by salary, as sal­
aries were regarded as the insignia of servants and Hopkinson 
thought the former would provide greater inducement for them to 
improve their charges
The new code, however, contained no explicit provision for
the appointment of myQ-thagyi in Arakan but merely made their exis-
6 1tence legal once such officials came into existence. The code
was, in fact, something of an anticlimax after Colvin's extensive 
investigations. It provided less than an outline of procedure 
and merely confirmed past practices except where amendment was ob­
viously needed. The code thus left much to be desired in assimil­
ating administrative procedure in the three provinces but Colvin's
/Tq
B . S . B . R . P . ,  1853, 9th Dec., Nos.6l, 62 and 66.
61 It was not till 1862 that five gaung-gyok were finally appointed 
in the interior of Arakan^ as well as two extra assistant commiss­
ioners. The tayamgi-thagyi then became known as a sit-ke with the 
same status as an extra assistant commissioner. I.J.P.. 1862,
June No.35*
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work began to pave the way and the code did give the validity of
62law to existing administrative practices. Moreover, within the
course of the ensuing years many of the recommendations made in 
Colvin*s report were to be implemented. For the moment, Dalhousie 
thought that a comprehensive code could be drawn up only when 'the 
Government of India has leisure to attend to the Extra Regulation
63
Provinces.1
The 'Non-Regulation' system of administration had, however,
some advantages which, it seems, Dalhousie was not slow to grasp.
He not only used it as a means 'to unite military strength and
promptitude with civilian exactitude of justice and vigilance in
administrative details' but could also see it as a way of effect-
64ing the rapid modernisation of India. As Eric Stokes put it,
He employed the 'Non-Regulation' system because 
it gave him a personal control over these territ­
ories and because it promised to be more econom­
ical, more energetic, and more efficient in sec­
uring their rapid development. At the end of his 
life he felt that the Lawrences had secured too 
much credit for the Punjab achievement, and be­
lieved his own contribution had been neglected.^
The commissioner of Pegu was sent a copy of the draft of the new 
rules to see if he had any objections to their being extended to 
Pegu. E.S.L.I., 1833, Encl.20 to Letter 34 of 3th Aug. The com­
missioners of Tenasserim and Arakan were also instructed to corres­
pond to discuss intended legislation.
6"?
I.L.P., 1833, 22nd July, No.^3* Due to the fact that the volumes 
of I.L.P.between May 1834 and 1835 are missing from the India Of­
fice Records only the draft of the code has been seen. There is 
evidence elsewhere that it was promulgated.
64
William Wilson Hunter.The Marquess of Dalhousie.(Oxford.1890).
pp.184-3*
65Eric Stokes, op.cit., p.224.
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In Pegu by using the same system he was able to overcome many of 
the obsolescences of the Tenasserim and Arakan systems and initiate 
many new features of administration, which were to provide the basis 
for administrative procedure for the united province of British 
Burma.
Development of administration in Pegu. While the administrative
system developed in Pegu
in the first formative years of British rule owed much to the zeal
of Dalhousie, it also owed much to the knowledge of and sympathy
with the country and its people of the first commissioner of Pegu,
66Captain Arthur Purves Phayre. Dalhousie wrote of Phayre when
recommending him for the appointment,
... his character stands extremely high in every 
respect; he has had long experience of the Bur­
mese in Aracan and at Moulmain; he speaks and 
writes their language perfectly, and is especially 
qualified for the charge of the new province. ^
£ £     1 ' ' '
Phayre had already acquired a reputation for his knowledge not
only of the Burmese language but also for the chronicles and numis­
matology of Arakan.
67
I.S.P.,1852, 29th Dec.No.1. In choosing Phayre for the position, 
Dalhousie had to overlook the claims of Colonel Bogle, Phayrefs 
senior in years and service. It is possible that Phayre's familiar­
ity with the Burmese language was a strong reason for Dalhousie’s 
preference for him. Bogle had once boasted of being able to carry 
on his administration without having any knowledge of Burmese, 
which he thought was too difficult for English gentlemen. G.E. 
Harvey, ’Burma 1782-1852*, p.563* His establishment included only 
people familiar with English and was less efficient1and economical 
than Phayre*s when he was commissioner in Arakan where much of 
the business of administration was conducted in Arakanese. 
B.S.B.R.P.,1832, 2nd Jan.,No.8 8. As Bogle was sorely disappointed 
at missing out on the new commissionership, his salary as com­
missioner of Tenasserim was raised by 500 rupees a month, so that 
his commissionership was more valuable than Phayre's.
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The happy concord which came to exist between the governor- 
general and his new commissioner of Pegu was also of undoubted sig­
nificance in the relatively rapid establishment of British adminis­
tration there which had occurred by the time Dalhousie's term of 
office expired less than four years later. This harmony of minds, 
disrupted but rarely in the years of trial and establishment, was 
also promoted by the massive correspondence which flowed feetween 
the two men and which complemented the equally voluminous official 
correspondence. 68
From the first there was little doubt that the revenues of 
the newly annexed province, unlike those of Tenasserim, would soon 
pay for the administrative costs and, in fact, become a valuable 
asset to the finances of the Company. Crawfurd had stressed the 
economic value of Pegu and the commercial potential of the port 
of Rangoon in 1826 and Dalhousie in 1832 believed that by the an-
t 69nexation of Pegu the British held the 'Kernel of the Burman Empire. 
There seems to have been little anticipation by the British of 
difficulty in 'settling' the new province and establishing a Brit­
ish administration there. They were optimistic that the Mons,
Dalhousie had earlier adopted the practice of having a private 
correspondence with his nates at the time of the 'settle­
ment' of the Punjab. He also conducted one with General Godwin, 
the commander-in-chief of military operations in Burma.
^ B.S.P.P., 1826, 7th April, H0 .3 anc^  12th Hay, No.1 and E.S.L.I.,
1852, Encl. 3 to Letter 33 of 6th Nov. Some effort had been made 
before the decision to annex Pegu was taken to assess its econom­
ic potential. The results had been reassuring.
who still formed the majority of the population in Pegu, would be 
happy to be liberated from their old enemies and oppressors, the 
Burmese, and would accept the new situation and co-operate with 
the new order. Such optimism was supported by British experience 
during the war. The people were generally friendly, offering 
firewood and supplies freely, and crowds of Mon and Karen refugees 
poured into Rangoon as the war proceeded. Furthermore, a group 
of Mons took and held for a time the town of Pegu by driving the 
Burmese out.*^
The original administrative arrangements for Pegu contained 
little provision for dealing with any widespread rebellion ’or 
resistance to British rule, once hostilities with Burma were 
brought to an end. The system of administration Dalhousie out­
lined for Pegu in his Minute of December 1, 1832 contained only 
minimum provisions for the establishment of British law and very 
few for the maintenance of order. However, because it was not 
expected that hostilities with the Burmese would be concluded for 
some time, British troops would obviously be available within the 
province until this happened. And although there was no immed­
iate provision for a regular police force to control civil disorder 
there is evidence that Dalhousie was merely waiting to see what
^Ibid., Encl.7 to Letter 29 of 2nd July and Encl.23 to Letter 36 
of 6th Dec. There was no fear of any opposition from the Karens. 
They had been severely oppressed by the Burmese in the past, and 
had helped the British in the first Anglo-Burmese war and again 
in the second. Harry Ignatius Marshall, The Karen People of 
Burma: a study in anthropology and ethnology, (Ohio, 1922),pp.403-
oST
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police needs would emerge for the new province.
The organisation of the new administration was little differ­
ent in basic outline and function from that of other 1Non-Regulation* 
provinces, though it was modelled specifically on the general ad­
ministrative practices of Tenasserim with revenue rules based on
71those of Arakan. There was to be a small administrative super­
structure of European officials resting, as in Tenasserim and Ara­
kan, on a broad infrastructure of indigenous officials. The pro­
vince was to be divided into districts, each under a deputy commis­
sioner with duties and salaries corresponding with those of their
72
counterparts in Tenasserim. They were all to be of equal rank
73and all on a salary of 1,000 rupees a month. There was also a
magistrate in charge of the town of Rangoon and a number of assist­
ant commissioners on 500 rupees a month to aid the deputy commiss­
ioners and to act as customs officers in Rangoon, Bassein, and 
7kProme•
The subordinate officials were to be muc^ i the same as those
E.S.L.I.,1853< Encl.19 to Letter 5 of 5th Jan. Phayre had con­
ferred with Dalhousie in Calcutta in November when presumably this 
had been discussed. The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter 
1 ,f.n., p.1 ,
72
Effort was made, however, to remove such anomalies as had been re­
vealed in the Tenasserim system.
73Later the deputy commissioner of Rangoon was granted an extra 200 
rupees a month. This was largely due to Phayre*s recommendation that 
it would ’stimulate the exertions of other officers*. E.S.L.I.,1853i 
Encl.37 to Letter 3 of 3th Jan.
7k
The assistant commissioner to the deputy commissioner of Rangoon 
was to receive 600 rupees a month.
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in Tenasserim, except that Dalhousie endeavoured to make these 
officials correspond in function and status to officials in India, 
perhaps, at this stage, as much to illustrate their function and 
status to his India-centred colleagues as to introduce adminis­
trative conformity. Thus gaung-gyok were to be considered as 
analogous to the Punjab extra assistants and sit-ke were made the 
equivalents of indigenous judicial officers in Bengal. Sit-ke 
were to be appointed by selection to principal towns for the trial 
of non-heinous criminal offences and of such civil cases as the 
deputy commissioners transferred to their courts. Gaung-gyok 
were to be appointed in each township and were to have limited 
judicial, fiscal, and magisterial powers, being able to try no 
civil cases exceeding 500 rupees in value. Decisions of sit-ke 
and gaung-gyok were to be appealable to the deputy commissioners. 
Thagyi were to be appointed with fiscal and police powers within
their circles and gaung were to act as police and fiscal officers
75m  the large towns. Beyond defining the functions and status
of these officials, Dalhousie made no attempt to specify their 
numbers and left this to the discretion of the commissioner.
The British officials appointed were comparatively few.
All senior officials were officers from the Bengal and Madras 
armies; most of them were experienced in administration either 
in Tenasserim or Arakan; and most were familiar with the Burmese
75
E.S.L.I., 1853» Encl.19 to Letter 3 of 5th Jan
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language. Their military background was to be useful in the 
first difficult years in ’pacifying1 the population, suppressing 
or expelling trouble-makers, and taking the initiative in estab­
lishing order in unprecedented situations. Lieutenant Fytche, 
the deputy commissioner of Bassein, for instance, was to organise
a force of 600 Karens to attack the bands of resistants led by
76
the former Burmese governor of the district.
The units of administration corresponded with those that 
had existed under the previous regime, though in a simplified and 
standardised form. Thus former provinces became districts, div­
ided into townships, circles and villages. The two southern dis­
tricts of Bassein and Rangoon corresponded roughly with former 
Burmese provinces but in the north the Burmese provinces were too 
small and numerous to be constituted as separate districts. Those 
within the vicinity of the Irrawaddy were first amalgamated into 
two districts, Tha-rawaw (soon known as Henzada) and Prome, with 
each former province retaining its identity as a township, and
later made into three districts when Tha-ya-wadi was separated
77from Henzada as a new district. Taung-ngu became a special
no.
charge under an assistant commissioner. The southern districts
nf.
Albert Fytche, Burma past and present, (London,1878),Vol.I.p.136 
and The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter 11, p.2f?»
77
Ibid.,p.l6 8,f.n.iv and P.A.R.,1855-561 p*7* Dalhousie ordered the 
subdivision of Henzada into two districts to place an extra deputy 
commissioner there to help put down the strong resistance movement 
in Tha-ya-wadi.
?®It seems Taung-ngu may have been formally part of the Rangoon dis­
trict. See J.S.Furnivall and W.S.Morrison, Syriam District Gazet­
teer, (191^), Vol.A, pp.3-^.
were the most extensive, there being 9*500 square miles in Rangoon 
district as compared faith 5*500 square miles in Prome district.
79There was, however, a greater concentration of people in the north.
Martaban was placed in the charge of the commissioner of Ten­
asserim but its separate identity was maintained for the first 
five years of British administration and separate accounts of 
revenue and population were submitted to the government of India.
The rules of administrative procedure were the same as those in 
Pegu whenever these differed from those in Tenasserim. In reality, 
it became only another district of Tenasserim, with a deputy com­
missioner stationed at Shwei-gyin, who was also responsible for 
the more isolated hill country, generally referred to as the Yun- 
zalln. Although Dalhousie had originally envisaged appointing 
an assistant commissioner there, th^&ppointment was not made until
1858.
Many indigenous officials appointed had held office under 
the previous regime but some received their appointments because 
of their services to the British or because they had been with
80the British administrations in Tenasserim and Arakan. Their
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Henry Yule, A Narrative of the Mission sent by the Governor- 
General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855* (London,1858) , p. 28*f 
and P .A .R ., 1855-56, p.3 and 1837-58* P*9* The population of 
Rangoon district, excluding the town, in 1837-58 was given as 
1^1,271; that of Bassein 183*137; that of Prome 19^*230. The 
population of Taung-ngu was, however, only A-1,3^3*
80The basis on which Lieutenant Fytche selected the thirteen gaung- 
gyok of Bassein was that they seemed * to be the most intelligent, 
influential and best effedited to the British rule1. E.S.L.I. ,1833* 
Encl.l^f to Letter 72 of kth Nov., (Encl.Fytche to Phayre,23rd April). 
Presumably many of the indigenous officials appointed in the south 
were Mons, though Phayre claimed it was difficult to find anyone
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charges were left as much as possible within the same areas as
before, though effort was made to impress upon officials that
their jurisdiction was no longer personal but extending only to
83'those people within the territorial limits of their charges.
Even when it was against the interests of efficiency and economy, 
Phayre was reluctant to dismiss former officials with strong here­
ditary claims to office and with local influence and prestige.
This was for fear of antagonising them and swelling the ranks of 
those already disaffected. He therefore considered himself for­
tunate when, in the township of Min-don, many of the hereditary 
thagyi departed before the arrival of the British and saved him
from the 'embarrassment1 of dismissing some, as the village tracts
8 2there were exceptionally small. Phayre had apparently no qualms
at first about dismissing officials, such as gaung and ok, whose 
claim to office was by appointment and not by heredity, as he saw 
no need of continuing the Burmese system of having an agent or
calling himself 'anything but a Burman, so completely has the nat­
ional spirit been extinguished'. P.A.R., 1835-36, p.23. Twp offic­
ials from Tenasserim and Arakan were Maung Khaing, a Mon from Moul- 
njjein, whose father, a former hereditary governor of Svrel^yin, had 
come to Moulmein after the first Anglo-Burmese war, afTdTMaung Kyan 
Doon, who came from a 'respectable Arakanese family'. I.F.P.P., 
i860, 3rd Feb., No.289 and B.H.P.,1873* Sept.Index No.136.
Phayre found there were well-defined boundaries between the village 
tracts. P^A.R., 1835-56, p.25.
He found the remaining thagyi 'were quite sufficient to carry on 
all duties with occasionally the assistance of a Menthaben or in­
ferior constable'. E.S.L.I., l83*f, Encl.20 to Letter 33 of 14th 
Aug.
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83official in every two or three houses.
The proclamation of annexation had called on * the inhabit­
ants of Pegu to submit ... to the authority, and to confide ... in 
the protection of the British government ... '• The south res­
ponded first. Later the north began to follow suit once the fron-
84tier had been firmly demarcated. When a new district was S e t ­
tled* , villagers were assembled at each halting station and offic-
85ials were informed verbally of their duties. The British had
some difficulty in making them understand the changed nature of 
their jurisdiction. They also had difficulty in establishing the 
procedure for revenue collection. Captain T. P. Sparks, the dep­
uty commissioner of Rangoon, wrote,
The Burmese are so unaccustomed to anything like 
system that I have had the greatest trouble in 
obtaining the accounts from the myo-oks, and in 
one district, Engapoo, which has always been in 
an unsettled state, I have not been able to get 
them yet, nor have I yet received those from 
Pegu ... The method of assessing the various 
taxes under the Burmese Government is so complic­
ated and intricate, 9nd varies so much in dif­
ferent divisions of the District •••££
83  . ..........- ■ .
Ibid.,and P.A.R., 1833-38, p.8 . He was latfer to modify his views
on this; see page 99 *
84 .
Ibid.,p.3. Memories of the fierce reprisals taken by the Burmese 
on those who had co-operated with the British after the latter's 
withdrawal in 1826 accounted for some of the caution with which 
the people greeted British annexation. Dalhousie himself presided 
at the formal 'declaring' of-the frontier 'to convince people of 
the permanency of British rule.' E.S.L.I., 1834, Encl.189 to Letter 
7 of 18th Feb.
85
Ibid. ,Encl.7 to Letter 18th Jan.(Encl.0 'Riley to Phayre, 23**d Nov.
1853).
or
Lbid.,1833, Encl.17 to Letter 72 of 4th Nov. (Encl.Sparks to Phayre).
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The Burmese lack of fixed salaries had also allowed local officials 
many opportunities for not accounting for funds received. Although 
the British government soon fixed regular salaries for all its new 
officials, it was to prove difficult to persuade many of them to
Qrj
abandon fcheir age-old, lucrative practices.
The British were also to have .difficulty in achieving some 
measure of uniformity and efficiency in the size of administrative 
units. Not only was there fear of increasing the number of in­
surgents through disturbing old institutions but also there was 
fear of causing a mass migration from British territory. The
need for people to secure the economic development of Pegu had
88been immediately obvious to the British. Only as vacancies
occurred could the British unite the smaller circles. By 1856 
the area of a thagyi * s circle varied from three or four to twenty 
square miles but there were normally 100 houses to each village 
tract, five villages to each circle, and twenty-five circles to
89each township under a gaung-gyok or myq-ok, as he soon was called.
87 I I
Except for the sit-ke of Rangoon, salaries for sit-ke were fixed
at 200 rupees a month. The former received 250 rupees a month be­
cause of the more onerous work in Rangoon. Salaries for gaung-gyok 
ranged between 25 and 100 rupees a month. Thagyi received 10 per 
cent commission on revenue collections. These rates were decided 
on in relation to those prevailing in Tenasserim.
88 By 1856 Phayre was hoping that the provisions in the land revenue
rules for taxation concessions for new settlers would encourage
immigration to develop the country. P.A.R., 1855-58, p*39*
89 -The term myQ-ok rather than gaung-gyok was used in Pegu to avoid
confusion with gaung and the decision to use the term, myQ-ok,
instead of myQ-thagyi, seems to have been based on Phayrefs belief
that the term, thagyi, implied hereditary succession to a position
88
By 1856 the law of the province was much the same as it had 
been in Arakan and Tenasserim* For the time being indigenous 
judicial officials were allowed to pass judgment according to Bur­
mese law in such cases as came before them* None of these were
civil or criminal cases of any great magnitude, the more serious
90cases going before British officers. Later in i860 the British
were to attempt to codify Burmese customary law to make its ad-
91ministration uniform by British and Burmese judges alike. In
this early period, however, the British felt the need only to bring
some sort of uniformity into the way in which land rights could be
established and recognised, as they found the Burmese 'laws refeard-
92
ing rights in land ... uncertain1. In the town of Rangoon, no
sale, mortgage, or lease of land was recognised as valid in the
courts unless it had been registered. And throughout the province
twelve years' unchallenged occupation of land was settled upon to
93give the occupant a title to it. Debt bondage was abolished,
as it had been in Tenasserim, and creditors had to sue for the pay­
ment of debts in the courts*
while the term, ok, implied temporary appointment. As we have 
seen, however, Phayre was reluctant to ignore hereditary claims 
to office.
90Sit-ke were empowered to pass sentence not exceeding one month's 
imprisonment and myg-ok could punish petty theft by sentencing to 
twenty-four hours' confinement in the stocks and petty assaults 
and misdemeanours by fines not exceeding 20 rupees. P.A.R.,1853-38, 
p.9*
91P.A.R., 1859-60i p ^ .  This was, however, only a guide to procedure. 
See also pages 159-6 0.
92Ibid., .1855-56, p.21.
Ibid., pp.21-22
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Procedure in the courts was based largely on the code of 
rules for Tenasserim. As this was little more than a general 
guide to procedure, the Bengal regulations were referred to when­
ever greater and more specific guidance was required. The lang­
uage of record was English whenever it was understood by the pre-
9 h.
siding officer in court. The fee on litigation, which under
the previous regime had ranged from 10 to 20 per cent of the value 
of the property under dispute, was considerably reduced but not 
entirely abolished. It was retained on the recommendation of 
the deputy commissioner of Rangoon to deter people from resort­
ing frequently to the courts for frivolous reasons, as they had
95done earlier in Moulmein. The commissioner was the highest
judicial authority in the province with originally the same powers 
as the commissioners of Arakan and Tenasserim and the same appel­
late jurisdiction over the lower courts. In 1853i however, he 
was empowered to pass the death sentence, subject to confirmation 
by the governor-general, and later in districts extremely torn 
by resistants and dacoity deputy commissioners were authorised
for a time to execute persons convicted of participation in open
96and armed insurrection. Later the maximum sentence a deputy
9^
P.A.R., 1856-57, p.^ f. The record was written by the officer pre­
siding in court. Lawyers were allowed into the courts, their 
presence facilitating the passage of justice when suitors were 
illiterate or ignorant.
^E.S.L.I. ,1853i Encl.19 to Letter 5^ + of 5th Aug. and T.M.A.R. ,
1856-57, pA.
E.S.L.I.,1853» Encl.18 tqietter 5^ of 5th Aug. and P.A.R..1855- 
56 p.9* Dacoity had been normally punished by death under the 
Burmese regime. G.E.Harvey, History of Burma, pp.811 and 258.
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commissioner could impose was seven years* imprisonment with labour
97for cases of dacoity oi? gang robbery*
Development of police administration The provision of such ex­
traordinary powers was but 
one way in which the British endeavoured to counter the unforeseen 
difficulties they were to meet in ’settling* Pegu* These were 
mainly due to the emergence of bands of men who kept the country­
side in turmoil and retarded the establishment of British adminis­
trative control. Many of these were staunch resistants to British 
rule but there were some who pillaged merely because of the chaos
the war had brought and others forced by the economic dislocation
98of the country to plunder for food* Among the resistants were
former Burmese local administrative officials. Qaung Gyl was a
former thagyi in Tha-ya-wadi; MaungLBo was the former myo-thagyi
of Myei-de; and Myat Htun was a hereditary Mon pe-nin in Danu-
•
byu township. Some of these, however, seemed to be more motivated
by the desire to preserve their office and authority than by any
99intrinsic loyalty to the Burmese throne.
97 Except in exceptional circumstances assistant commissioners 
could then pass a maximum sentence of two years* imprisonment 
with labour.
98
The scarcity of food in the first year of British administration 
was relieved by shipments of rice from Bengal. In Prome and Padaung 
British officers formed a special fund to alleviate the foot short- 
age. The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter 59i p*95 and 
P.A.rT, 1855-561 P*7* In 18^4 wheat was imported from Upper Burma.
"e.S.L.I.,1853. Encl.l8_to Letter 22 of 19th Mch. and Encl.17 to
Letter 68 of 4th Oct. Gaung Gyl had refused to co-operate with the 
B urmese king prior to and during the war and, it seems, aspired 
to the governorship of Tha-ya@wadi. Because of these aspirations,
91
All, however, were soon called fdacoitsf, a term used fairly 
indiscriminately from early 1853 on when the Burmese army retreated 
north in response to the steady pressure of the British army and 
left in its wake small bands of men who resisted British occupat­
ion by guerilla warfare. Frequently a strong, defensible
stockade would be built, then the people of the area, together with 
their cattle, would be driven from their fields and houses into the
stockade and threatened with death if tempted to submit to the Brit- 
101
ish. After the border was defined, villagers were driven across
it was thought, he resisted British occupation and it was later sug 
gested that *it would be more correct to regard Gaung Gyi at first 
as the head of an army competing with the British for the possess­
ion of a province abandoned by the Burmese Government than as a 
rebel or outlaw as he is generally described.* Tharrawaddy District 
Gazetteer, comp.n.g.,(1920), Vol.A, p.26. The fact that Gaung Gyi 
wrote to the deputy commissioner of Bassein to declare that he had 
no quarrel with him, as his territory was clearly defined, supports 
this view. E.S.L.I., 1853* Encl.10 to Letter 61 of 5th Sept.
^General Prendergast, the commander of the British military exped­
ition against the Burmese in 1885* noted that the term, 'dacoit*, 
had not been used by Major Snodgrass in his account of the first 
Anglo-Burmese war but that both Laurie and Fytche had used it free­
ly in their descriptions of the second war. Prendergast, himself, 
was highly critical of the way the term was used in 1885-8 6, when 
a month after the Burmese defeat, all Burmese soldiers still at 
large, were generally dubbed *dacoits*. H.N.Prendergast, *Burman 
Dacoity and Patriotism*, A.Q.R., 2nd Series, Vol.V, No.10, April, 
1893* pp.271-77* Dalhousie, however, had recognised that Myat 
Htun was no criminal and should be *regarded as a Chief and a 
Soldier - and a good one too*. The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 
Letter 7 6, p.117.
101
E.S.L.I., 1853* Encl.15 to Letter 26 of 7th April. Dorothy Wood­
man points out that the British records give perhaps a very one­
sided view of the *dacoities* of this period and suggests that seme 
villagers may not have been forced at all. Op.cit., p.166.
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it, making it difficult for the British to effect reprisals or 
rescues* About this time, however, Anglo^Burmese relations be­
gan steadily to improve, so that Phayre was then able to write
102directly to Min-don about frontier skirmishes. It then re­
mained mostly for the British to suppress the troublemakers with-
103
m  their own domain.
Between February and April of 1853 the British actually lost 
ground to the resistance in the north. Because of the continued 
state of war with Burma for the first six months after British annex 
ation of Pegu, British troops were expected to put down internal
1 oA*resistance. Their efforts as well as those of the Arakan local
Battalion which was brought over from Arakan and the ad hoc measures 
devised by administrative officials, such as Fytche's Karen and Mon
10?
E.S.L.I.,185^1 Encl.8 and 9 to Letter 52 of ?th_Nov. and 1853, 
Ends. 19 and 20 to Letter 38 of 3rd July. When Min-don sued for 
peace in his letter of June 1853, which thus provided the means of 
formally terminating the war, he had promised to ban frontier raids. 
Although Min-don denied to the British any connexion with the re­
sistants of Pegu, his predecessor, Pagan Min, had been deposed only 
some months before and Min-don required time to consolidate his 
position on the throne and overcome the faction at court who fav­
oured continuing the war.
103Fortunately for the British both Tenasserim and Arakan remained 
tranquil at this time. Two surprise raids across the frontier in 
1855 made Phayre suspect Min-don*s avowed friendliness but the lev­
el-headedness of Dalhousie saved the situation from acquiring more 
serious dimensions. See Dorothy Woodman, oo.cit.Tpp.166-67.
10*f
The participation of British troops in this was not so great §s 
the civil authorities could have wished, as General Godwin, the 
commander-in-chief of the military campaign in Burma, wanted to 
carry the war into Upper Burma, despite Dalhousie*s known opposit­
ion, and was reserving the troops for this.
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levies, led to some improvement in the situation when the army was
'dissolved1 as an expeditionary force.
Thereafter effort was made to make more long-term arrange­
ments for ensuring the maintenance of civil order. As Dalhousie 
was not willing to tolerate a sitatuion similar to the one which 
had prevailed for almost a decade in Arakan after British annexat­
ion, six months of British administration in Pegu caused him to 
decide that the establishment of a strong police force must be a 
cornerstone of British administrative policy there. He wanted not 
only to maintain a strong force of European troops in the province 
but also to raise a corps of irregular cavalry for the frontier at 
MyeL-de and Taung-ngu, to recruit a local militia, and to organise 
systems of strong frontier, river and district police. Phayre, 
however, thought no police system for Pegu would be complete with­
out reviving the Burmese system of having a representative of the
105government, a gaung, m  every village tract. In this he was
influenced by his experience in Arakan, where indigenous officials
below the grade of thagyi had been incorporated into the British 
administration, and by his observations of the effect of British
106changes on the indigenous administrative structure in Pegu.
10^E.S.L.I., 1854, Encl.18 to Letter 7- 
1 06Fytche had written to Phayre in August 1853 that because myifrok 
had been deprived of their traditional retainers and had no estab­
lished police at their disposal under the British, many 'found 
themselves unable to keep the dacoits in check and concealed their 
crimes from me for fear of being punished for neglecting to appre­
hend the offenders'. E.S.L.I.,1855, Encl.10 to Letter 61 of 5th 
Sept. See also I.S.P., 185^, 31st Mch., Nos. 19 and 21.
The requirements and organisation of police administration
were discussed by Dalhousie and Phayre in their regular correspond
ence and when Dalhousie paid his second visit to Pegu from mid-
107
December 1853 till early January 1854. While Dalhousie and 
Phayre were agreed on the importance of a police force in estab­
lishing and maintaining order in the new province, Phayre was in­
clined to view Dalhousiefs proposals as somewhat lavish. He had 
alv/ays kept a careful eye on expenses and while Dalhousie apprec­
iated this, he regretted it in Phayre!s inclination to keep police 
establishments too small. When, for instance, Dalhousie thought 
four European regiments would be needed in Pegu in 1854, Phayre 
thought three would be quite sufficient• Dalhousie, who had 
presided over the introduction of law and order to the unruly 
Punjab, was not one to quibble over the saving of a few rupees 
when the achievement of law and order was at stake. On one ocaas 
ion he wrote to Phayre, * ... Do not fear the expense. Peace ex­
ternally I hope for; but submission and order I must have, and at
109whatever cost. 1 And again later, he wrote,
I reply to you frankly that I think your leaning
is to keep^^e-tablishments too low. I am aware 
of your/i^ot^s-e and appreciate it, but I think a 
free exp^tiditure to repress outrages, which make 
more and do much harip, is good economy.
107Dalhousie had made his first visit to Pegu in June 1852. He re­
ported the progeess made in the organisation of a police force in
a Minute of Jan.11,1854. E.S.L.I.,1854, Encl.189 to Letter 7 of 
18th Jan.
108The Dalhousle-Phavre Correspondence. Letter 48,p.10. Letter 53* 
p.80, and Letter 55* p.88.
^^Ibid., Letter 64, p.100.
By 1856 the police system of Pegu consisted of a local 
militia, the Pegu Light Infantry Battalion; a river police; 
four battalions of district police; and a village police organ* 
isation. Although troops were stationed in the province at fron­
tier cantonments and at Rangoon and Moulmein, they did not form 
part of the regular police force of the province. Their services 
were to be called on only in time of emergency, as Dalhousie dis­
approved of the use of small detachments of troops for police pur- 
111poses*
Dalhousie had considered the need for a local battalion in 
Pegu as early as September 1852 but only in April 1853 did he fin­
ally sanction recruiting for it. It was to be under the order?of
the commissioner, unlike the Arakan Battalion which was under mil-
112itary authority. Like the latter, the Pegu battalion was to
be composed mainly of local indigenous peoples, although Dalhousie 
initially wanted a strong Malay contingent included in the new 
corps because of their distinguished record in Ceylon and because 
■the Burmese dread them1. He had little faith then in the Mons 
because he. was not impressed by their performance in the Talaing
^_Q
William Lee-Warner, The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie,(London, 
1904), Vol.II, p.8 .
111E.S.L.I., 185^, Encl. 189 to Letter 7 of 18th Jan.
^ ^ E.S.L.I..185^. Encl. 38 to Letter 7 of 18th Jan. The organisation 
of the Pegu Light Infantry Battalion was similar to that of the 
Punjab Irregular Force in this respect. Only when the battalion 
was to serve with regular troops was it to come under the author­
ity of a military commander rather than the civil commissioner.
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Corps and because he believed them to have a 'notoriously unwarlike
113character' and an 'inability to face Burman troops'* Presumably
this opinion was later modified when he heard of the Mons' exploits 
in the town of Pegu and in Fytche's levies. He was eventually 
forced to rely mostly on the indigenous peoples of Pegu, as the 
vigorous recruiting campaign undertaken in the Straits Settlement 
met with little response*
At first the recruiting campaign within Pegu met with almost 
as poor a response. The term of service was three years and men 
were expected to serve in any part of the province where they were 
needed* Discipline was strict and, according to Captain Nuthall, 
the commander of the battalion; the rate of pay offered was no more
11 Zf
than that for a cooly in Pegu* Already the government of India
was confronted by the fact that in a country so lightly populated 
as Pegu, the people could command much higher wages than their 
counterparts in India* Although many later governor-generals and 
their colleagues were to prove difficult to convince that this was 
so, Dalhousie took heed and raised the rate of wages so that by 
1836 the numbers in the Pegu Light Infantry Battalion had reached
^^Ibid., 1832, Encl*19 to Letter kZ of 7th Sept*
11 ij.
Ibid*, 185^, Encl*11 to Letter 7 of 18th Jan* The basic rate was 
raised from 8 to 10 rupees within less than 12 months 6f the be­
ginning of the recruiting campaign* By August 1833 there\3?e£ja no 
more than 200 recruits, less than half the number wanted* The 
Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter 39* P»93*
the level initially set by Dalhousie.
He had also decided early on the need in Pegu of district
police but had apparently been dissuaded by Phayre from pursuing
116
this further during the discussions in Pegu in 1853-5^* &
sudden rising in Bassein in March 185^ revealed the inability of
district civil authorities to deal with such situations without
117the aid of armed police* When Captain Fytche shortly after­
wards suggested the granting of extraordinary authority to deputy 
commissioners to punish such insurgents and the levying of an 
armed police to replace the detachments of regular troops he had 
had to rely on to suppress the rebellion, these suggestions were 
taken largely as the basis on which the further development of 
police administration in Pegu was to proceed*
The recruitment of 600 armed police for Bassein was immed­
iately sanctioned and soon after two other battalions of district
^ ^E.S.L.I., 185^, Enel.11 to Letter 7 of 18th Jan* The rate of 
wages in Pegu was higher also than in Arakan. By mid-1856 there 
were 580 non-Europeans in the battalion, of whom 114 were Malays. 
There were eight European officers. P.A.R., 1853-58, p.10.
116
There was no mention of district police in the Minute of January 
11, though mention had been made earlier of such a body. See The 
Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter Glf, p.100.
117
Dalhousie was rather irritated by the fact that the rising took 
place not long after he himself had been in Bassein when he had 
complimented Fytche on its tranquility. The Dalhousie-PBayre 
Correspondence, Letter 10^, p.l67»
118
I.S.P., 185^, 31st Mch. Nos*19» 20 and 23* Later people in dis­
turbed areas were also disarmed. P.A.R., 1855-5 6, p.11.
98
police were being enlisted for the more troublesome districts of 
Tha-ya-wadi and Prome. By 1856 a fourth battalion had been re­
cruited for the Taung-ngu district. Their recruitment was achieved 
more easily than that for the Pegu Light Infantry Battalion, as 
discipline was less strict and duties were confined to the district 
of enlistment. These duties were mainly the^uppression and de­
tection of dacoity. The police battalions had the additional 
tasks of garrisoning the frontier posts in conjunction with de­
tachments of the Pegu Light Infantry. By mid-1856 almost 1,600 
men were enlisted in district police battalions. These were
under the control of European non-commissioned officers who were,
119in turn, subordinate to the deputy commissioners.
As the rivers were the main arteries of communication, river 
police were recruited for both the Irrawaddy River in Pegu and the 
Sit-taung River in Martaban. Although British possession of the 
latter province removed the opportunities for raiding that the 
Burmese had had prior to the annexation of 1852, it was still con­
sidered necessary to retain the Salween river police as well as
-  120to organise v police for the Sit-taung. During 1856,
119 /This arrangement was the same as in the Punjab. A§/fchis had only
recently been brought under British control, many administrative
devices used there were also introduced to Pegu. In 1856 there
were 80 men in the Taung-ngu battalion, *f80 each in the Bassein
and Tha-ya-wadi battalions and 6*f0 in the Prome battalion. P.A.R.
1855-56, p.8 .
1PO
E.S.L.I., 1852, Encl.20 to Letter 50 of 25th Oct. and 1855, Encl.
3 to Letter 61 of 5th Sept.
however, the Irrawaddy river police was disbanded as the declin­
ing incidence of dacoity indicated that its purpose had been
j 121served.
When Dalhousie and Phayre had discussed the organisation
of the village police in 1853-5^* Phayre had suggested carrying
on with the Burmese system virtually unchanged. In each village
tract he wanted a gaung or headman with one or two constables
under his orders. As under the Burmese regime, the gaung was to
be both revenue and police officer and *to report to his superiors
everything of importance that occurred within his village1.
Phayre stressed that
... Without these village officers which the
people have been accustomed to, we break up
the existing system when we require it; that 
is, at the outset of our rule, we leave num­
erous remote villages without any functionary 
to represent our Government and by dismissing 
from employ those Goungs who were employed 
under the late Government, we scatter discon­
tent among the influential hamlets and leave 
no one to impress on them a sense of our pres­
ence and authority.^22
Because of the expense involved in implementing Phayrefs 
scheme it was modified to the extent that constables were appointed 
to aid gaung only in the frontier districts and Tha-ya wadi.
Gaung were appointed in every village tract but on Dalhousie*s de-
1
P.A.R., 1856-57, p.11.
122E.S.L.I., 185^, Encl.18 to Letter 7 of 18th Jan. The fact that 
the British were then about to * settle* the north of the province 
added weight to Phayre*s argument.
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cision were paid a fixed salary of 10 rupees a month in return for 
the execution of village revenue and police duties which were to be 
carried out under the supervision of the thagyi. ■. ; Together 
gaung and thagyi were considered to be the detective police of the 
province.
British achievements by 1856 Towards the end of 1855 when Dal-
housie paid his last visit to Pegu
the province was notably more tranquil than on his previous visit,
when the arrangement of measures to impose order in the province 
was of paramount importance. On this visit it seemed as though
124
these measures had been largely successful. Phayre noted soon
after,
.. the people appear well contented with our 
rule. The forest laws are the only unpopular 
part of the system; that is, because we must 
stop the utter ruin which went on under the
Burmese, when everybody might cut young trees
or old as they pleased.
Effort had also been made to woo the good will of the people
123Ibid., Encl.20. Phayre had suggested that gaung be paid by com­
mission as in Arakan with the commission being 5 rather than 7 per 
cent on revenue collections. Constables were to receive 6 rupees 
a month. Dalhousie found that the scheme would have involved about 
23 per cent of the entire estimated provincial revenue. As it was, 
the modified scheme involved slightly more than 20 per cent of the 
estimated revenue. At that stage, however, Phayre was optimistic 
that district police would be unnecessary.
124
Dalhousiefs impressions of the province were recorded in his Min­
ute of November 27, E.S.L.I., 1856, Encl.6 to Letter 8 of 22nd Feb.
125The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, Letter 201,p.401. See also
page 200 *
and win their confidence, Dalhousie attempted to show the people
of Pegu that they were in the hands of a permanent and firm but
much less capricious and more benevolent government than before.
As much to inspire respect from the people below the border as
from the kingdom above, he insisted on not surrendering a 'tittle
of real dignity' to the Burmese and with Phayre's able assistance
took a firm stand in all British dealings with the Burmese kingdom.
When in late 1853 Min-don wished to send 'the usual Royal offerings
to the Pagodas of ,,, Pegu', the mission was refused.* This was
because the British suspected that these
ministers of the king, ,,, dressed in their robes 
of State, and carried in a Royal Golden Boat, were
to parade through the whole length of the province
of Pegu ••• in nothing less than a Triumphant 
Procession, symbolizing the future restoration of 
the King's supremacy•
At the same time some effort was made to mollify the feelings 
of outrage among the people at the desecration of pagodas by Brit­
ish soldiers searching for booty. Min-don's request for permission 
for the passage of the mission to the pagodas had been accompanied
by an enquiry into the reports of the profanation of the Rangoon
Shwei-dagon Pagoda by the British. Phayre had already attempted 
to stop the pillage of pagodas but Min-don's letter prompted him
<1
E.S.L.I.. 1853, Ends. 5 and 9 to Letter 72 of 4th Nov. Later 
a formal letter from Man-dalei, sent via Phayre, to the governor- 
general, was twice returned as Phayre decided that the matter of 
the letter was one used towards an inferior and not towards an 
equal. I.S.P., 1855i 26th Jan., Nos. 1 and 2.
*Annexation, of course, ended the formal disciplinary control of 
the Buddhist primate over the hpon-gyi of Xower Burma.
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to inform the governor-general immediately of what had been happen­
ing, He assured him that the ’profanation1 of the Shwei-dagon 
Pagoda, though intensely disturbing to the people of Rangoon, had 
not been ’wanton but part of the offensive operations’ with no act­
ual damage done# He did, however, point out that 'the British name
has ••• become a bye-word throughout the length and breadth of the
127country from the sacrilege committed under our rule, 1
The governor-general’s reaction was prompt. Stern measures 
were to be taken against such offenders. He stated peremptorily,
The Government of India should request that 
officers in command will preserve all temples 
and pagodas from injury for whatever object un­
less the security of the troops should indispen­
sably require it.
I would propose to issue a Notification, dir­
ected against those who may injure these Pagodas 
from wantonness or for the sake of plunder, and 
intimating that all such offenders in futurq^hall 
be most severely dealt with.
The Commissioner should cause it to be trans­
lated into Burmese, in order that the people of 
the Province may be made aware of the desire of 
the Government to protect their place of worship 
from injury, and in order that they may be able 
to complain against any party contravening the 
order.
Some British officials, trying to stamp out Burmese resist­
ance, resorted to burning and destroying villages. Dalhousie
^ ^ E.S.L.I., 1853i Encl.3 to Letter 76 of 18th Nov.
128Ibid., Encl.^f, Later after his last visit to Rangoon in 1855 
Dalhousie made a personal contribution of 250 rupees for regild­
ing the Shwei-dagon pagoda as well as 500 rupees to the Rangoon 
Protestant Church fund. The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 
Letter 2^ -9* p.^01.
strongly disapproved of this. He stated that this was 'only an
extreme and last resort1, which was possibly justified against the
hill tribes, as it was likely it was then the only effective weapon
but mostly it 'only annoys the people - and further inevitably
129hurts Government•'
Although it was necessary that provinces should pay their 
way as soon as possible, particularly during Dalhousie's governor- 
generalship when there had been great expansion of empire and con­
sequently greater expense than usual, in the first year of the 
British regime in Pegu taxes were collected only from those people 
not in 'distressed circumstances'. Those able to pay the capitat­
ion tax that the British introduced were obliged to pay. This 
was as much to impress upon the people the permanence of British 
rule as to gather revenue.
Despite the economic dislocation caused by the war and Brit­
ish annexation, by 1856 when Dalhousie sailed finally for England 
the economic viability of the province had been proved. In that 
year Phayre reported a revenue intake of 30 lacs of rupees against 
a general expenditure of 17 lacs. He wrote, 'The ordinary civil 
expenditure is now not three-fifths of income - and while land rev­
enue will probably increase rapidly, there is no prospect of a
"e.S.L.I.. 1853, Encl. 8 to Letter 61 of 5th Sept.
130The people of Shwei-gyin, Taung-ngu, and Henzada were almost ent­
irely exempt from taxation in the first year of British rule.
E.S.L.I., 18331 Encl.17 to Letter 72 of 4th Nov. and Encl.3 to 
Letter 83 of 17th Dec.>
131corresponding increase of expenditure. 1 Martaban, however,
proved to be less of an economic asset, as by 1857-58 its revenue
132amounted to less than 3 lacs of rupees. Its m a m  value was
strategic, as British possession of it sealed off both the eastern 
flank of Pegu and the western one of Tenasserim from Burmese milit­
ary penetration.
The main taxes affecting the indigenous people in the British
regime were those on land and fisheries and the capitation tax, which
133was the same as in Arakan. The very minor taxes of the previous:
regime, regarded as vexations to the people and troublesome to the
administration, were abolished. Land tax was at first levied 1 on
each yoke of cattle according to the custom of the country1 but
later effort was made to introduce the same system of revenue ad-
13^ministration as had been established in Arakan. Without trained
surveyors and with the limited numbers of British personnel, actual 
surveying was not possible. Phayre was later to point out, fAs no 
thugyi knew what an acre was, and the great majority had never prob­
ably before in their lives thought about square measure, it will be
131P.A.R.. 1855-5 6, p.2 2.
T.K.A.R., 1857-58, p.8 . It had been estimated in 1852 that the 
Burmese revenue of Martaban was lacs and that of Pegu 25 lacs of
rupees. E.S.L.I., 1852, Encl.3 to Letter 30 of 2nd July. It was 
later established, however, that the Burmese revenue for Pegu 
amounted to less than 16 lacs of rupees. P.A.R., 1855-58, p.22.
133Fisheries were let annually at a rate fixed by the district officer. 
There was also a tax on fishing equipment and on the production of 
ngapj., the fish paste, which features so strongly in Burman diets.
P.A.R., 1855-58, p.27* See also pagesl^-A-^7,
^ E . S . L . I . , 1855, Encl.19 to Letter 3 of 5th Jan.
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understood that fixing rates was for the most part mere guess 
135work. 1
Even with such imperfections in the revenue system it was
not thought that British taxes caused any great hardship to the
people. In fact, most British officials thought they were much
better off. Although the tax demand was apparently higher than
in the previous regime, this was offset by the greater stability
of the regime and the expanding economy. The removal of Burmese
restrictions on the export of rice, the abolition of the transit
tax, and the restoration of peace had led to rice production more
than doubling within two years* Moreover, the introduction
of a fixed currency into the country was decidedly one boon the
British had conferred upon the people, as prior to 1861 there was
no standard currency in the Burmese kingdom, only silver bullion
137or alloys of silver. Every transaction had necessitated the
135
Quoted m  Report on Settlement Operations m  the Bassein Dis­
trict, 1883-$4-,p » 15* Rates were based mostly on those tracts in 
Arakan where it seemed the rice yield was comparable. Enquiries 
were also made of individual cultivators and some consideration 
was taken of the distance from markets.
136This statement is based on the figures for land revenue for 1853- 
5^, 185^-55, and 1855-56. Although no revenue was collected from 
some areas in the first year, land revenue increased from 363*620  
rupees in 1833-54 to 935*988 rupees in 1835-56. P.A.R.,1835-56, 
p.24. In the same period known exports in rice and paddy had 
grown from 17*344 tons to 126,674 tons. Ibid.,p.viii. How much 
more was crossing the border away from the customs houses at 
Taung-ngu and Thayet-myo is impossible to say. Phayre noted at 
the same time that people were already starting to appreciate the 
value of land, to which before they hactv'Been oblivious. Ibid.,p.44. 
Cultivators were also receiving greater prices for rice. In 1848- 
49 paddy rice had been sold for 8 rupees a hundred baskets; in 
1835-56 the same quantities were commanding prices of 33 rupees. 
Ibid., p.viii.
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assaying of the metal, which was troublesome, costly, and open to
From their own point of view, the British in 18^6 regarded 
the result of their four years of administration in the new prov­
ince with considerable satisfaction. The Burmese frontier prob­
lem seemed at last to be settled and internal order in the province 
was well on the way to being imposed. The economic viability of 
the province was abundantly evident. Rangoon, which had been 
largely destroyed during the operations of war in 1852, had been
137Bo-daw-hpaya had attempted to introduce a standard coinage into 
Burma when Colonel Symes was there in 1802-3 but the scheme had 
come to nothing. There was a system of minted currency in Arakan 
prior to the Burmese annexation. Richard Temple, fNotes on Cur­
rency and Coinage among the Burmese1, The Indian Antiquary,Vol.37« 
Jan.1928, p.13.
138Introducing this currency, the Company rupee, and inducing the 
people of Pegu to use it was difficult. Although a large number of 
rupees was thrown into circulation monthly in many parts of Pe£u 
by the payment of the troops, it took time for the transition to 
be effected from one system to another. In some parts of the coun­
try, however, there were at first not enough rupees about for rev­
enue to be paid in them. Accordingly it was decided that the 
alloy with the highest silver content used by the Burmese would be 
accepted by the British government. As the quality of this varied 
from place to place, government assayers were appointed but to 
encourage the people to pay in rupees, taxes were made slightly 
higher if paid in bullion. This provision was necessary as it 
was found that large numbers of rupees were being melted down in 
Prome and other parts of the province. This was due to the facts 
that people were accustomed to using bullion, that bullion was 
easily exchangeable all over the country, and that in Upper Burma 
discovery with possession of Company rupees meant possible penalty. 
E.S.L.I., 1852, Encl.3 and 6 to Letter of 2nd July and Encl. 6 
to Letter 39 of 19th August. By December 183^» however, the transs- 
ition to British currency had been effected and the Assay Office 
in Pegu was closed.
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replanned and rebuilt in the symmetric design favoured by colonial
139administrations at that time. The port was flourishing with
trade in British manufactured goods and produce from Pegu and the
1^0regions beyond. Although trade with these regions was size­
able, it gave little substance to the already established legend
of the riches of trade with western China. This, however, was
1*f1
to retain its strength till after the end of the century.
Of more substance and significance was the fact that by
18^6 the foundations of a modern communications system had been 
laid. Dalhousie who had presided over the beginning of the trans­
formation of India in this respect was not slow to introduce simil­
ar innovations to Pegu. To link the new province to India by
^ ^ P.A.R., 1855-36, pp.32-33 and xxvii and B.R.Pearn, A History of 
Rangoon, (Rangoon, 1939), pp.18^-89*
1^0Captain H.P.Keighly, the executive officer in charge of laying 
out the town of Rangoon reported enthusiastically, 1 Already the 
river teems with ships bearing the colors of all nations; the 
banks are lined by a dense crown of boats plying between the shore 
and the shipping ... * P.A.R., 1853-36, p.xxvii. In 185,5-36 the 
total value of goods exported by sea was ^2 ,37 ,366 rupees and that 
of goods imported by sea was 109,05,869 rupees. The value of trade 
through Thayet-myQ and Taung-ngu was 40,57,861 rupees. Ibid., 
Appendix.
1A1
Phayre had declared the only hope of increased trade was in the 
increased consumption by the inhabitants of the province and of 
the countries immediately adjoining them. A prohibition was in 
force against the entry of manufactured goods to fun-nan but even 
without this, existing transport facilities^kould not have allowed 
a trade of any significance to develop. Sit/James Scott dis­
cussed the attempts to open the China trade in his introduction 
to Joseph Dautremer1 Burma under British Rule, (London and 
Leipzig, 1913), pp.22-27*
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land Dalhousie ordered the construction of a road from Dacca to 
Prome, which by 1856 was passable by bullock cart. Effort had 
also been made to break the isolation of remote places difficult 
of access within the province. A road was under construction be­
tween Rangoon and Prome and Rangoon and Myei-de were linked by
electric telegraph. A similar linkage between Rangoon and Taung-
142ngu was also under construction. The existing and natural
system of communications - the waterways - had also received at­
tention. - A sea-going steamer had been placed at the disposal of 
the commissioner to ensure connexion- with Calcutta and the Irra­
waddy Flotilla had been organised to convey troops, passengers, 
and supplies between Rangoon and Myei-de and the intervening
. 1^3river ports.
Despite the military and economic importance of Dalhousie!s 
communications, little was done in the next few years to continue 
them. Although this was largely due to the troubles which beset 
India in the yaar after Dalhousie's departure from India, no other 
governor-general was to have such a wide vision of the significance 
of communications in the administration and development of Burma. 
The trunk road connecting the Indian sub-continent with Burma was 
allowed to revert to the wilderness from which it had been carved
142 ; ------------------------------
Rangoon and Calcutta were linked by electric telegraph in 1861.
14 3
PWUR^, ,1855-5 6, pp.31-32 and William Lee Warner, op.cit. ,Vol.II, 
p.15* Dalhousie had also been interested in building a canal to 
link the branch of the Irrawaddy delta on which Rangoon stood to 
that on which Bassein was situated.
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a n d  m a n y  o t her p l a n s  D a l h o u s i e  h a d  for P e g u  w e r e  n e g l e c t e d .  
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  w i t h  his a b i l i t y  to mak e  use of m o d e r n  t e c h n o l o g y  
a nd to p l a n  an d  o r g a n i s e  e f f i c i e n t l y ,  D a l h o u s i e ,  w i t h  P h a y r e fs 
a bl e  s u p port, h a d  l a i d  the f o u n d a t i o n s  of B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
in Pegu. W i t h i n  four y e a r s  he h a d  also l a r g e l y  a c h i e v e d  his 
o b j e c t i v e s .
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Chapter III
FISCAL POLICY AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS 
WITH INDIA.
The abolition of the East India Company following the out­
break of the Mutiny a year after Dalhousie's departure from India, 
had little immediate effect on the British Burmese provinces, but 
eventually led to changes which were to have considerable conse­
quences for all areas under the administration of the British Indian 
government. The assumption of control of Indian affairs by the 
Crown was followed by a close scrutinisation of the whole British 
structure of government in India. It was then subjected to con­
siderable reorganisation and reform with a view to effecting the
greatest efficiency and economy. Hardly a branch of the adminis-
2
tration was left untouched.
This was largely necessitated by the condition the finances 
of the government of India were in at this time. The rapid ex­
pansion of British India that had occurred under Dalhousie and 
his vigorous administrative and public works policies had resulted
The most immediate reaction in the British Burmese provinces to the 
events in India in 1857 was fear of a renewal of hostilities by 
Upper Burma. Despite some sabre-rattling by the war faction at Man- 
dalei and the consequent placing of a gun boat on the Irrawaddy at 
the frontier, Min-don avowed his friendship for the British and re­
lations between the two Burmas remained pacific. The Indian troops 
in Burma remained loyal and except for minor disturbances in Prome 
and Bassein*, the latter being an extension of the Karen Min-laung 
rebellion in the Yun-zalin in 1856, the province was quiet. 3B.A.R., 
1856-57, p.7* T.M.A.R., 1856-57, p.19.
John Strachey, India: its administration and progress, (London,1911), 
p.119.
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mostly in years of deficit for the Indian government and it
had been one of the immediate tasks of his successor, Lord
3
Canning, to remedy this state of affairs. His early efforts 
to effect economies and retrenchments iiv^xpenditure, however, 
had been largely lost in the storm of 1857* Once this had sub­
sided the new scheme of reform was to be much more comprehensive. 
It involved the establishment not only of an efficient system of 
public accounts and of strict financial control throughout the 
provinces administered by the Indian government but also of a
greater and more efficient degree of centralisation than had
if
hitherto existed.
Union of British Burmese provinces In July i860 a special com­
mission was appointed to
examine administrative establishments of all provinces in relat-
5
ion to costs and revenue. It was also concerned with intro­
ducing reforms and economies into all departments of administ­
ration. In its preliminary review of civil charges and district 
establishments for Pegu, the commission had found that 'the
^According to Michael Maclagan in Clemency Canning,(London,1962), 
there had been an average deficit of £1,402,772 from 1838-9 to 
1848-9 (chiefly owing to the Afghan war). From 1848-9 to 1852-3 
there had been a small average surplus of just under half a 
million pounds but in 1853-4 there had been a deficit of two, 
and in 1854-5 of two and a half million pounds, p.64.
4
The financial effects of this centralisation are mainly dis­
cussed in this chapter, the other effects being discussed in 
the following chapters.
^I.Fin.P., (Estabs.),1860,Nov.Na1.
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charges appear high, as compared with the standards in India*.
Later in the year Lieutenant Colonel H. Bruce and Mr* Richard 
Temple were deputed to proceed to the three British Burmese pro­
vinces to make more detailed enquiries into the administrative 
systems there and, in consultation with the three commissioners, 
to formulate proposals for effecting improvements.
In general their recommendations for reforms and reorganis­
ation in the British Burmese provinces corresponded with those 
made by the Commission for all India. Their most significant 
proposal for improving executive administration, however, was 
that the three provinces be amalgamated into one, under a chief 
commissioner. Aided by a secretariat and a suitable establish­
ment, he was to be set over the three former provinces, each of 
which was to remain under a commissioner. Such costs as were to 
be incurred in establishing the central administrative system were
to be offset by rigorous reorganisation, redistribution, and re-
7
ductions effected elsewhere.
Such a development was no more than the logical conclusion 
to the process Dalhousie had set in motion in 18^2. Since his 
departure there had been growing co-ordination of administrative
g
policy not only in Tenasserim and Pegu but in Arakan as well. 
feIbid.
7
Bruce and Temple*s reports and recommendations are discissed more 
fully in the following chapters.
g
By i860 revenue and taxation, policies were much the same in all 
the British Burmese provinces and Arakan was gradually being 
prised from its position as an integral part of Ben­
gal. And because of the differences between
Moreover, it was obvious that the authority vested in the ex­
isting three commissioners was too limited to enable them to 
deal adequately with measures of importance and that the control 
exercised over them by the governments of India and Bengal was 
weakened by the geographic remoteness of the provinces. The 
creation of an intermediary local authority of high position 
capable of weighing the opinions of the provincial commissioners
to present a comprehensive and informed picture to the govern-
9
ment of India could only be an improvement to government. In 
addition to this, union and the introduction of the various re­
forms and reorganisations recommended by Bruce and Temple prom­
ised to reduce administrative expenditure while increasing
• 10 efficiency.
Although some of the reorganisation recommended by Bruce 
and Temple had been effected in 1861, it was not until early the 
following year that Arakan was transferred to the charge of the
society in Bengal and Arakan, education in the latter province 
had been transferred from the charge of the Bengal education 
department to that of the local Arakan authorities as the officers 
of the former found that these differences made it impossible 'to 
work the two systems together satisfactorily.' B^A^R.,l857-58,p.117
9 B.P.P., 1862, Feb.No.21.
10Bruce and Temple had estimated a reduction of 35 lacs of rupees 
alone in military expenditure and 182,600 rupees in police exfe 
penditure. R.Temple and H.Bruce, Report upon British Burma,i860, 
Elgin Papers, M.S.S.Eur.F.83» Cat.No.83, Docket ^7, pp.12 add 20.
By September of 1862 the net decrease in civil expenditure was 
62,279 rupees. I.F.P., (Pol.), 1862, Sept.No.192.
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Governor-General in Council and that the formal union of the
11three provinces was declared# Rangoon became the administrat­
ive capital of the new province as it was midway between the 
other two provinces, and, situated on the mouth of the Irrawaddy, 
offered easiest access to the interior. The commissioner of 
Pegu, Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Phayre, was appointed chief com­
missioner over the three provinces, which were now termed div­
isions. According to the resolution of the Governor-General in 
Council, the main objects of the appointment were to provide a
central administrative officer to direct the affairs of the
three divisions
on a generally uniform system, to control the public 
expenditure in all Departments, to exercise a close 
and watchful supervision over the proceedings of the 
Local Officers of every class, and to devise such
measures as may be best calculated to promote the ^
material welfare and moral advancement of the people.
The new chief commissioner had no legislative powers;
Indian acts could be extended to Burma only by the Governor- 
General in Council and laws with special reference to Burma were 
enacted by the governor-general. The chief commissioner could 
merely propose that certain acts be enacted or that legislation 
be &*fended to Burma. He had direct control over the public 
works department, police, forests, prisons, Port Blair, marine
11The early reorganisation was mainly that of police administrat­
ive arrangements in Pegu and Tenasserim. Only in 1863-6** was 
the civil administration of Arakan completely assimilated to 
that of the rest of the new province. B.B.A.R.,l865-6*f,p.^f1.
12B.P.P., 1862, Feb., No.21.
115
affairs, communications with the Burmese government, and all
arrangements and correspondence with the commander of the mili-
13tary division in British Burma. He also exercised the powers
of judicial commissioner for the whole province but had no power 
to authorise any expenditure other than that authorised by the 
government of India.
Financial Relations with India. This was in keeping with the
determination of the govern­
ment of India to ensure that the administration of the various 
provinces be conducted with maximum efficiency and economy.
The imposition of such stringent financial control over such 
vast and diverse areas as made up British India was not ultim­
ately to be the most efficient or economical means of adminis­
tration, particularly as this coincided with an expansion of gov­
ernment activity and interest into areas of economic and social 
life from which it had previously remained aloof. As Sir John 
Strachey noted, * no central authority could possibly possess the
knowledge or find the time* to undertake and conduct efficiently
15such an administration. Eventually this stringent financial
13 Port Blair, a penal settlement on the Andaman Islands, was for 
a time administered by British Burma, although it was mainly a 
settlement for Indian convicts. It was later removed from the 
jurisdiction of British Burma.
1^fBruce and Temple had recommended that a separate judicial com­
missioner be appointed for British Burma but no action was to 
be taken on this for more than a decade.
15Op.cit.,p.121. See also below in Chapter IV for greater dis­
cussion of the expansion of government activity in this period.
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control was to be somewhat relaxed but not completely and the 
vast proportioxxbf provincial revenues was still to form a central 
and single fund, from which the government of India was to dole 
out portions, according to the requirements of the provinces.
This arrangement, at least as far as British Burma was concerned, 
was to be far from satisfactory.
Under such conditions the growth and changes that occurred 
in government activity from i860 to the end of the period under 
review, were governed largely by the availability of funds and 
the condition of the general finances of the Indian government. 
Although administrative policy was influenced by political and 
social developments, the usual procedure was to give priority to 
financial considerations unless situations assumed emergency pro­
portions. Within this period the returns from revenue collec­
tions its. British Burma continued to grow at a steady rate but 
because the province was subordinate legislatively and fiscally 
to the Indian government, it did not necessarily benefit from the 
satisfactory state of its revenues. To the government of India 
British Burma was only another province and, being mostly quiet 
and peaceful, and physically apart from the Indian subcontinent, 
not a very important one. Expenditure was kept to a minimum and 
the surplus revenue went to swell the funds in the central treasury
16of the Indian government.
|£
Leland Hamilton Jenks pointed out that the revenue from India sup­
ported not only the <mbvious expenses of administrative staff and 
offices at central and provincial levels in India and in London 
but also the expenses for several enterprises not obviously relative
to India, e.g.,gifts to a Zanzibar mission and consular and diplomatic
117
The chronic financial difficulties of the government of India 
at this time made this more or less inevitable but British Burma 
suffered particularly because of the fact that the cost of living 
was higher there than in most other provinces under the government 
of India* The reluctance of the latter to make concessions for 
these circumstances for either European or indigenous officials 
brought repercussions to the standards and calibre of administrat­
ion, especially in police administration which had assumed increas­
ing importance by the iSSCVs* Although British Burma reaped with 
India some of the benefits from British engineering skills, the 
public works projects that received priority at this time were 
primarily those of military and strategic importance and second­
arily those that would bring an increment in revenue* Thus there 
were extensive projects for the reclamation of land by embankment 
works while roads for basic communication were largely neglected 
unless they were of military value.
To some extent, attempt was made to remedy this situation by 
raising local funds to be devoted to improving facilities and ser­
vices of no direct bearing on provincial and imperial revenues. 
These included not only local roads and public works but also pub­
lic health and educational measures* Despite the fact tha^ar 
greater attention was paid to these matters in this period, it 
was a principle of the government of India that these services 
should be paid for as much as possible by the people themselves 
through local taxation* Although, in fact, grants were made from
establishments in China and Persia* The Migration of British Cap­
ital to 1875. (U.S., 1927), p.22*f.
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imperial and provincial funds to aid these services, they were 
never very large and when the Indian government's financial diffic­
ulties grew to any size were the first to be cut.
The fiscal subordination of British Burma to the government 
of India was of course not new. Prior to amalgamation, various 
provincial administrators had been frustrated on occasion at the 
degree of control exercised over them and by the very connexion 
itself, but after 1862 when the chief commissioner had considerably 
more responsibility, the tight fiscal control of the Indian govern­
ment was to become more daunting. 17 j. ^ •° At a time when efficiency
was a general keystone of administrative policy, provincial 
efficiency could not but be affected by the need of submitting 
all accounts of expenditure to the scrutiny of the finance de­
partment of the Indian government. Moreover, long-term develop­
ment projects were liable to suffer by sudden restrictions on 
expenditure.
Until 1871 the central government retained complete control 
over finance and made grants of money to the provincial govern­
ments according to its judgment of the merits of the latter's
17An early assistant commissioner of Tavoy on finding a favourable 
balance in his local funds, obtained the consent of the commiss­
ioner of Tenasserim to make the people a grant to buy fireworks 
for the New Year festival. The government Qf India, however, 
warned that all officers would be held personally responsible 
for all items of unauthorised expenditure. J.S.Furnivall, 'As 
it was in the beginning', J.B.B.S., Vol.XVIII, pt.ii, (T928), 
p.57* In the years immediately succeeding the Indian Mutiny, 
the only expenditure on public works allowed was on works of 
primary importance. In i860 the commissioner of Pegu submitted
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demands. As the local governments had no vested interests in 
the collection of revenue or independence in expenditure, the 
government of India felt that provincial governments tended to 
act without responsibility towards both revenue and expenditure. 
Accordingly, in 1871 in the interests of general economy the 
governor-general, Lord Mayo, introduced a new system of pro­
vincial-central relations in an attempt to induce reform and 
greater responsibility by the provincial governments. Under 
the new arrangement certain heads of expenditure, such as 
police, education, printing, medical services (but not medical 
establishments), roads and civil buildings, were transferred 
to the provincial governments. Fixed annual grants were made 
over to the latter by the central government on estimates based 
on previous expenditure under these heads. The provincial 
governments were then free to distribute expenditure within
18these limits. From that time on, accounts were classified 
into three categories - imperial, provincial, and local.
As it seemed that the objectives of these reforms were 
still not attained, further changes were made again in 1878 in 
the governor-generalship of Lord Lytton. Receipts and charges 
on those departments which were under the direct control of the
two budgets for public works, one in arrears for 1859-60 and 
one in advance for 1860-61. P.A.R., 1859-60.
sj g    “
Tainan Govind Kale, Indian Administration,(Poona, 1913),pp« 160- 
161 and B.B.A.R.. 1&71-72, p.9^.
government of India, such as posts and telegraphs, political and 
accounts, remained so. Revenue derived from other sources, such 
as land and capitation tax, was divided between the central and 
provincial treasuries in the proportion of five-sixths to the 
former and one-sixth to the latter. In British Burma revenue 
from fisheries, salt, excise and the export duty on rice was re­
served for the central government but the remaining revenues and 
expenditure were exclusively provincial. There was also the 
allotment of a lump sum from the central government. Interest
on capital expended in the provinces on productive works was to
19be met by the provincial funds. It was hoped this new arrange
ment with its calculated provision for containing increases in
revenue would give the provincial governments the incentive for
economy and careful management. Revision of the arrangement was
to occur every three years.
As the revenue assigned to most provincial governments
proved inadequate for their growing needs, further revision was
made in 1882, four years later. Under the new settlement still
larger proportions of the main heads of revenue were transferred
to the provincial governments. Provincial revenue now comprised
one-sixth of land revenue, capitation tax, forests, export duties
and salt tax, and all revenue from fisheries, public works and
railways. Responsibility for expenditure came in the same pro-
20portion. This again was not to be the happiest arrangement.
19B.B.A.R., 1878-7 9, Intro., p.13.
20
Yaman Govind Kale, op.cit.pp.162-35 B.B.A.R.,1881-2,p.116 and 
1882-83, p.127. ---- -------
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Until the revision of revenue arrangements in 1878 the local 
administration in British Burma constantly claimed the province 
was unfairly treated by the central government and continually 
urged the uniqueness of British Burma in the Indian revenue sys­
tem. In 1865 Phayre represented that though British Burma
3 1brought in a revenue of 93 lacs of rupees, only 38 /2 lacs
were expended on provincial items, including police, as com­
pared with the Central Provinces which had revenue collections 
of 8*f /2 lacs but expenditure of lacs. He claimed:
••• There has been for some years an apparent feel­
ing or opinion at Head Quarters, that the territ­
ories comprising British Burma might be left pretty 
much to get on as best they could, as long as they 
paid revenue. Indeed, the fact of the revenue be­
ing so large, has been, as now practically ignored.
It would almost seem as if because the peopld paid 
quietly and largely it was considered they might 
be made to pay more still; while the return in 
the shape of outlay for their benefit, which a 
sense of the mutual duty of governor and governed 
teaches us, should be suitable and generous, has 
rather been in an inverse ratio to the amount of 
the people*s payments. While strenuous efforts have 
been made by the authorities to reduce expendit­
ure, and to increase the revenue, a deaf ear has 
b;een turned to earnest representations made for 
sanction to outlay necessary for the benefit of 
the country.
The theme of his complaints was taken up by his successor,
Colonel Fytche (1867-71), who claimed that on the basis of 
gross revenue the incidence of taxation on the pgopleiof 
British Burma was three times greater than that on the people
21 I.Fin.P.(Expend.), 1865, Jan., Ncu31&«
22' *I.Fin.P., (Sept.Rev.), May 1867, No.^8. Fytche also submitted 
the following table:
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of the Central Provinces, Oudh, or the North Western Provinces*
He urged,
This is no argument that the Central Province 
get more than is due to them as the geographical 
accident of their being the highway between Calcutta 
and Bombay, in a great measure accounts for the large 
grants which have been made to them.* * Nor does Oudh 
receive more than she is entitled to* The claims 
for British Burma are not that any other Provinces 
may obtain less, but that she may have at least a 
fair proportion* A dependency which has doubled its 
revenue from all sources in ten years (from 1855-56 
to 186^-65) •*• and whose area of cultivation has 
gained ground from 1,000,000 acres to 1,600,000 acres, 
is surely worthy of some special consideration*
Beyond the mere fact of our Military possession 
of the country, beyond the existence of a Police, 
most inadequately paid, there is hardly anything 
in the length and breadth of the Province to testify 
the presence of any rule superior to the one from 
which it has been wrested. As for Public Works in 
the true sense of the term, they are only now being 
called into existence. Of barracks, of gaols, of 
court houses, we have not a few. But their con­
nection with the prosperity of the country is of 
quite secondary consideration, their presence be­
ing necessities, contingent on our possession of
the country.22
Between 1861-62 and 1870-71 British Burma had contributed
t
an annual average of almost half its gross revenue as net sur-
Province 
British Burma 
Cent. Provs. 
Oudh
N.W.Provs.
Population Gross Annual Revenue Tag per head
2,250,000
6,600,000
8,000,000
30,000,000
2gB.B.A.R., 1868-69, p.ix.
million*
it
£1 
£1
£1,300,000
£5,500,000
9/10
3/-
3/5
3/8
j£1 =s 10 rupees
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plus to India. The position did not improve after the new
financial arrangements of 1872. The gross charges in British
Burma grew from 49,67*000 rupees to 75,52,000 rupees between
1870-71 and 1878-79 while the net surplus to India grew from
2559,37,000 rupees to 99*13*000 rupees. After the revised 
allocation of provincial funds in 1878 there was* however* a 
considerable increase in the funds available for provincial 
expenditure until the revision of provincial settlements in 
1882. This was largely fortuitous, as there was a large in­
crease in rice production and overseas rice exports at this 
time. Total revenue demands had risen from 2,21,86,000 rupees
2*f
B.B.A.R.,1871-72,p.106. Below are the figures for revenue ex­
penditure, and surplus for the period between 1861-62 and l870-7Tr
1861-62 1868-89 1869-70* 1870-71
Gross Revenue Rs.lacs Rs.lacs Rs.lacs Rs.lacs
Imperial and provincial 76.33 120.65 120.49 125*^4
Public Works Dept. .35 1.25 .47 .47
Total 76.68 121.91 120.96 125.91
Civil Surplus 47.93 71*20 70 .79 75.77
Net charges for
public works 11.34 24.12 13.92 16.40
Net surplus 36.59 47.08 56 .87 59.37
*1869 was a year of financial crisis for Indian and reductions
in expenditure were made wherever possible.
25b.b.a.b., 1884-85, p.61.
12
in 1878-79 to 3 ,0 8,06 ,000 rupees in 1882-83 and to 3 ,12,71,000
rupees in the following year. Gross revenue collections were
never equal to revenue demands but figures always corres-
ponded^^^jGross charges rose to 1,0 7,10,000 rupees in 1882-83
and to 1,1^,41,000 rupees in the following year. The surplus
26
to India was approximately equal to the gross charges.
Neither the Indian nor the provincial governments had es­
timated such a favourable outcome for British Burma of the settle 
ment of 1878. The revenue contract of 1878 had contained pro­
visions for allowing greater civil expenditure for the creation 
of the new administrative units, and for better salaries for 
the lower ranks of police and executive officials. The admin­
istration was, however, not only able to cover increased charges 
but was also in the position to make a large and much needed
Below are the figures for revenue, expenditure, and surplus for
the period between 1877-78 and 1885-8 6:
1877-78 1880-81 1883-84 1885-86
Gross Revenue Rs.lacs Rs.lacs Rs.lacs Rs.lacs
Imperial and provincial 17^.45 218.64 263.97 234.69
Public works dept. 5 .9 8 15.22 18.10 24.29
Total 178.43 233.86 282.07 258.97
Gross Charges
Imperial and provincial 66.86 92.34 114.41 112.45
Public works dept. 15.06 36 .96 51.35 41.35
Total 81.92 129.30 165.76 153.80
Civil Surplus 107.59 126.30 149.56 122.24
Net charges for
public works. 11.07 21.74 33.25 17.06
Net surplus 96 .52 104.56 116.31 105.18
From B.B.A.R., 1884-85. p . 61 and L. B.A.R., 1885-8 6, p.59.
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expansion in public works expenditure both in actual projects and 
in basic establishments*
The new contract between the central and provincial govern­
ments in 1882 was based on an estimate that the future revenue 
increases in British Burma would accrue at the same rate as in 
the past few years* On the assumption that revenue would in­
crease by 10%  lacs of rupees a year, a diminishing proportion of 
the land revenue was then assigned to British Burma* It was 
estimated that 8 / 4  lacs of rupees would be left of the increase 
for provincial expenditure. By February 1883* however, it was 
obvious that this estimate was a miscalculation and that if the 
government of Indiainsisted on the terms of the 1882 agreements 
being carried out, public expenditure would have to be drastic­
ally curtailed.
These financial difficulties of the province were then en­
hanced by an unexpected fall in revenue receipts. From March
1883 the price of teak fell by 40 per cent, causing the estimated
27receipts to decline by 2 lacs in 1883-84. Furthermore, between 
April and September of 1884 receipts from the duty oh rice fell
27
The following are the figures for revenue demands for the period 
between 1871-72 and 1883-86 in thousand rupees:
Year Total Demand Imperial Provincial Local Municipal
1871-72 137555
1875-76 20,058
1878-79 22,186
1880-81 16,350
1881-82 29 ,969
1882-83 30 ,806
1883-8^ 31,271
1885-86 29 ,173 „„
12,170 373 1,091
17,558 521 1,210 958
10,515 9,679 904 1,089
12,285 10,311 2,395 1,350
15,156 11,353 2,526 1,965
16,035 9,957 3,059 1,755
26,115 2,658 2,599
„ 25,998
,2lIIB-86
1,955
, p.3* and L.B.R.A.R. p.2.
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considerably short of the receipts for the corresponding period 
of the previous year- This was largely due to a decrease in 
rice exports from Akyab and to an increase of rice imports from 
British Burma into Upper Burma because of a sudden scarcity 
there. Rice imports into Upper Burma had been duty free since
pQ
1862. As well as this, land revenue did not increase as ex­
pected, because good harvests in Asia and Europe had lowered 
the price for rice in 1882 and caused a consequent drop in the
expansion rate of rice production in British Burma for the next 
29season or so. Moreover, the results of the cadastral survey, 
begun in 18799 in order to secure accurate surveys of land hold­
ings and hence larger revenue yields, had been disappointing. 
Revenue demand had increased only by an average of 3*98 per cent 
in the areas surveyed, while the cost of the survey had come to 
over half a lac of rupees.
These financial developments placed many administrative
reforms in jeopardy. Some of these, indeed, had been recommended
professional
by the government of India. These included h/. cadastral survey.
28
I.F.C.P. (Accts. and Fin.),1885*Jan.Nos.113 and 115* Upper Burma 
normally imported a small amount of rice each year but in 1884 
7^,000 tons of rice were imported compared with 20,000 tons in 
the previous year.
29B.B.A.R..1881-8 2. Intro., p.3-
30
I.F.C.P.,(Accts. and Fins),1885,Jan.No.115* This was the first 
professional survey in the province. It had been known for some 
time that land holdings had been mostly under-assessed. Because 
the prices for rice had risen recently the government also ant­
icipated increasing its rates. See below.
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While increased salaries for indigenous officials had long been
urged by the local government, when the increases were actually
sanctioned, in some cases they were higher than the provincial
government had originally proposed because a standard rate was
31introduced throughout all the British India provinces*
Furthermore, the governor-general, Lord Ripon, had on a recent 
vice-regal visit to British Burma stressed the need and import­
ance of public works in the province* Under the new financial 
conditions, however, the total allotment for public works was 
22 lacs of rupees, compared to the annual expenditure of 40 to
32
4-3 lacs of rupees established in the previous two or three years*
A series of urgent telegrams and correspondence between
Calcutta and Rangoon ensued* The chief commissioner claimed
that all the items involving increased expenditure had been
proposed or sanctioned before March 1882 when the new provincial
33contract had been made. Because of its own over-estimate in
31Ibid.
32See footnote 86 of Chapter IV.
^ I.F.C.P.(Accts.and Fin.),l885»Jan.No.113« The Rangoon Chamber of 
Commerce also became involved in the issue. At a meeting in July 
1884 a resolution was passed expressing dissatisfaction with the 
government of India’s insistence on economy in expenditure to 
the detriment of administration. An exchange of letters followed 
between the Chamber of Commerce and the chief commissioner which 
the intervention of the government of India attempted to end. 
Alleyne Ireland, The Far Eastern Tropics: Studies in the adminis­
tration of tropical dependencies.(Westminster,1903)iP.98 and 
I.F.C.P.(Accts.and Fin.),l885tJan.No.133* John Nesfield reported 
that the Chamber tried to pej£suad<the various Chambers of Com­
merce in Great Britain tp p^r.es s u**i the government to separate 
British Burma from the Indian—€RS£|i£je and make it into a crown 
colony. ’The Development and Trade of Burma*,A.Q.R.,3rd Series, 
Vo.25,No.94,Jan.1908,p.78.
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1882 of future revenues in British Burma, the government of India
acknowledged some responsibility for the condition of its finances
but its policy was not to allow expenditure in excess of revenue,
even though it approved of improving the administration in Brit- 
34ish Burma.^ Conceding that sanction had been given for the 
increased expenditure in British Burma before March 1882, the 
government of India stressed that that approval did not relieve 
the local government from the responsibility of keeping its total 
provincial expenditure within the bounds set by its total pro­
vincial revenue. It also stated that the revenue assigned to
British Burma under the contract of 1882 was ’not incommensurate’
35with the position occupied by that province.
Provincial expenditure was trimmed to the barest minimum, 
but as the branches of administration had grown so much it was 
impossible to call a complete halt to further growth and expend­
iture. Despite all attempts on the part of the provincial gov­
ernment to observe the most stringent economy, the central govern­
ment was forced to contribute additional sums of 66 lacs of rupees
in 1884-85 and 77 lacs in 1885-86 to support the provincial gov- 
36
ernment. The arrangement was scarcely satisfactory to either.
^ I.F.C.P.,(Accts. and Fin.), 1883, Sept. Nos.1^62 and 1366.
35Ibid. , 1885, Jan. No.135.
36
' B.B.A.R.,l884tf85« Intro.,p.9 and L.B.A.R.,*885-86.Intro..P.11.
No reflection of the changed circumstances of the province ap­
peared in the figures for public works expenditure in 1883-84 
because of the consumption of balances from previous years. 
Expenditure dropped, however, from kk% lacs of rupees in that 
year to 34 lacs in the following year and to 24 lacs in 1883-86.
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Provincial revenue raising No further taxation could be imposed
at this time to help the administrat­
ion out of its difficulties as the rate was considered already 
high. People were paying two to three times more in taxes than 
the people in India. This high incidence of taxation had, in 
fact, drawn fairly frequent protests from the provincial adminis­
tration throughout this period. In 1862 Phayre claimed that he 
had made Pegu pay every farthing it could and that there was need 
for some relaxation in taxation, either in the form of the abolit­
ion of frontier customs or in the reduction of some of the direct 
37taxes. Though the former was achieved under the treaty with
Upper Burma in that year, the government of India proposed rais­
ing taxes again in 186^ by increasing the excise duty on salt 
manufactured within the province. To this Phayre protested 
that 'the safe limit of direct taxation has now been reached'.
His successor, Colonel Fytche, (1867-1871), reiterated the same 
point three years later when the government of India proposed 
imposing a licence tax on people whose annual net income ex­
ceeded 200 rupees. Stressing that the new tax should depend 
on the amount of taxation already in existence, Fytche stated 
that the object of such a tax had been more than attained in 
British Burma as most people were paying double what the new
37I.F.P.(Pol.). 1862, May No.130.
7Q
I.Fin.P.,(Sep.Rev.), 1865, Jan. N0 .316.
39tax was expected to yield*
This protective attitude among British Burmese adminis­
trators was due to several factors. There was a genuine desire 
to prevent British taxation in Burma developing into a machine 
of exploitation. The fact that British rule had brought •lib­
erty, security, and general prosperity* to the province was val­
ued by many British officials, especially those who had wit-
ko
nessed the transformation of the province since 1852. A more
weighty consideration, however, was perhaps the fact that a
harsh taxation system would scarcely attract many people to the
province to promote its development. British experience in
Tenasserim had already established that.
When the cadastral survey had first been considered, Rivers
Thompson, the chief commissioner then (1875-78)i had expected to
4-1be able to double land revenue receipts as a result. Although
39 *The * licence Tax) was intended to be a duty on 'persons engaged
in lucrative occupations and traoEes who contributed little or 
nothing to the revenue'. People already paying a tax on their 
professions were to have the amount due on that deducted from 
the new tax. In British Burma, however, no such taxes were paid 
but people earning over 200 rupees a year were normally resid­
ents of towns and though exempt from capitation tax paid con­
siderably more in municipal and land assessment taxes. I.Fin.P. 
(Sep.Rev.), 1876, May No.*f8 . When the new tax was imposed the 
land assessment taxes were, however, remitted. Ibid.,Aug.No.$1. 
The latter taxes were imperial taxes until 1873 when the govern 
ment of India allowed them to become purely municipal. I.Fin.P. 
(Accts.),1875» May Nos.21 and 30.
ZfO
Albert Fytche, Burma Past and Present,Vol.1,(London,1878),p.351 , -
I.F.C.P.(Accts. and Fin.),l885,Feb.No.221.
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the survey indicated that the people, heavily taxed as they al­
ready were, could pay this, it was decided that 'the true measure 
of an assessment • •* is not the utmost paying power of the land, 
but the customary resources of the people.1 Because of this and 
fears of demoralising the people, and of reviving their 'migratory'
habits, the actual increase in taxation receipts was only 3*98 
42per cent.
At this time most people seemed able to spend comparatively
lavishly on jewellery and imported luxuries and on the traditional
works of merit but there were indications that the limits of ex-
43 iipansion and prosperity in the province were not endless. Xxi 
some areas, notably in Akyab, it was found thgt the existing rate 
of taxation was oppressive so that revenue was paid only with
44
difficulty and sometimes only after coercive processes were taken. 
Moreover, the cadastral survey revealed the existence of a grow­
ing amount of agricultural indebtedness and rural tenancy in the 
44a
province. This was not correlated with the incidence of tax­
ation and those in the latter class frequently seemed to be in 
only slightly less prosperous circumstances than those who had 
7f2
Report on Settlement Operations in Hanthawaddy and Bassein 
Districts, 1879-80,p.14 and I.F.C.P.(Accts. and Fin.),l8§3<
Jan.No.113*
43
In 1881 it was estimated that the average family in British 
Burma spent 120 rupees a year on jewellery and imported goods. 
B.B.A.R.,1880-81, Intro., p.16.
44
Resolution on the Report on Settlement Operations in the Akyab 
District 1§85-86,p.1.When this was discovered taxation was re- 
duced. Elsewhere in the province the rate of coercive pro­
cesses taken to secure revenue payments was comparatively low, 
the incidence in 1880-81 in the whole province being one in
132
their own holdings, It was considered, however, that the relative­
ly low enhancement in land revenue taxation 'left the way clear for
any measures* possibly needed later 'for the protection of tenants
45
from rack-renting by landlords*.
Reforms and changes in the taxation system could be introduced 
only with caution as the people appeared to value the fixity of Shit 
ish taxation. Each innovation in taxation had met with suspicion 
and sometimes opposition. The Indian government's proposal to in­
troduce fixed quinquennial land revenue settlements in Arakan in 
1853 was dropped for a time because of the strong 'disinclination'
46of the people. When, at the end of the decade such revenue 
settlements were introduced, considerable opposition and unsettled­
ness were reported among the people, even though such settlements
47provided a better deal for both people and government. The
every 200. B.B.A.R.,1880-81, Intro.,p.16. See also below*
44a_ahe various settlement reports reveal that it was not uncommon to 
find more than half the cultivators in debt, although only a com­
paratively small proportion were hopelessly so. Government loans 
were available to agriculturists and although some had recourse 
to them, it seems many were defeated by the apparently complicated 
machinery of official forms and sanctions. The rate of government 
interest was lower than that of the local moneylender but frequent 
ly the latter's money seemed more accessible. B.B.R.A.R.,1880-81, 
Pegu Report,p.79 and G.E.Harvey, British Rule in Burma,(London, 
1946),p.56.
45^Report on Settlement Operations in the Hanthawaddy and Bassein Pis 
tricts,1879-&),P.9. In 1885-86 no rack-renting had appeared in the 
province and the chief commissioner thought there was still too 
much land available for this to happen for some time. About 14 per 
cent of landlords had no interest in common with their tenants. 
L.B.A.R.,l885-86,pp.6-7. Although tenancy was only a transient 
state for many before they acquired their own holdings, in some 
areas 20 per cent of the cultivated area was occunied by tenants.
46
B.S.B.R.P., 1833, 20th Dec., No.37.
^ I.F.P.,(Rev.), 1862, Dec. No.16 and June No.14.
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proposal to introduce a salt tax to Arakan in i860 led to at least
9 2 2  p e o p l e  g i v i n g  up  t h e i r  salt l a n d s  e v e n  b e f o r e  the tax h a d  b e e n  
48i m p o s e d .  E v e n  the c e n s u s  of 1872 a nd tha t  of 1881 a r o u s e d  s u s ­
p i c i o n  that s u c h  e n u m e r a t i o n s  w o u l d  l e a d  o n l y  to furthe:/taxation.
In t h e  l a t t e r  y e a r s  of the p e r i o d  t h e r e  w a s  n o t  o n l y  the 
1881 c e n s u s  b ut several, d i s t u r b i n g  c h a n g e s  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  in 
t a x a t i o n .  T h e r e  w e r e  the c a d a s t r a l  s u r v e y  of 1879 w i t h  c o n s e ­
qu ent n e w  l a n d  r e v e n u e  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of s u p p l e m e n t ­
a r y  s u r v e y s  to f o l l o w  t h e s e  up, s u m m a r y  e n h a n c e m e n t s  of l a n d  r e v ­
enue in 1 8 7 9-80, a n d  the d o u b l i n g  of the l o c a l  cess on this.
P a r t l y  b e c a u s e  of the u n e a s i n e s s  t his h a d  caused, a s c h e m e  t h e n  
b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  for a b o l i s h i n g  t he dut y  on r i c e  e x p o r t e d  b y  s e a  
a n d  r e p l a c i n g  it w i t h  a  s l i d i n g  s c a l e  a s s e s s m e n t  on l a n d  r e v e n u e  
w a s  d r o p p e d .  It w as c o n s i d e r e d  a m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  a n d  just m o d e  
of t a x a t i o n  t h a n  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  one, but as it n e c e s s i t a t e d  r e ­
m o v i n g  the e x i s t i n g  c e r t a i n t y  f r o m  taxation, few t h o u g h t  the p e o p l e
49w o u l d  a p p r e c i a t e  it.
T h e  m a i n  s o u r c e s  of r e v e n u e  b e t w e e n  1862 a n d  1885 w e r e  s t i l l
the l a n d  a n d  c a p i t a t i o n  taxes, a l t h o u g h  c u s t o m s  a n d  excise d u t i e s  
b e c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  i m p o r t a n t .  R e v e n u e  fro m  f i s h e r i e s  r e ­
m a i n e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  but that f r o m  sal t  d w i n d l e d  to c o m p a r a t i v e
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
B . R . P . , i860, Ap. No.39*
^I.F.C.P.,(Accts. & Fin.), 1885? Jan. No.118 and 132 and Feb.No.221
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insignificance.^0
The capitation tax retainedl the same form it had had when it 
was first introduced into Pegu. Only migrants newly arrived in 
the province were entirely exempt from the tax and then for only 
two years. People living in the larger towns were also exempt 
from it but had to pay in lieu of it a land rate on the value of 
their allotments. Hill people, however, paid only a nominal 
annual fee on each family, unless they moved to the plains and 
assumed economic parity with the bulk of the population. The 
income tax, introduced after the Mutiny and abolished in 1865, 
and the licence tax, which lasted from 1867 until 1873* were 
confined to the larger towns only. Because of this, the cap­
itation tax was increased by 25 Ver cent in 1861-62.^ Except 
for this, the income and licences taxes affected so few people
50Statistics for net revenue demand from 1961-62 to 1885-86 are 
in thousand rupees:
1861-62 1865-66 1870-71 1875-76 1880-81 1885-86
Land Revenue 2,614 2 ,9 6 5 3,319 4,451 6 ,630 7,381
Capitation Tax 1,733 2,102 2,211 2,596 2,906 3,193
Land rate - - 136 164 92 97
Fisheries 506 524 661 760 1,391 1,168
Salt 73 51 51 46 44 33
Customs 1,965 1,911 2,848 4,705 5,957 5,766
Excise 790 843 988 1,550 2,414 2,100
Forests 684 903 818 1,837 1,517 1,97^
Income Tax 333 13 212 - — -
Stamps,Jud. 242 368 474 631 787 938
Stamps,Postage 4o 67 206 392 617 665
Marine 285 36 56 84 151 228
Others 215 242 340 292 637 267
Total 9 ,627 10,023 12,321 21,008 2 3,1^3 23,810
from B.B.A.R.,1861-62 - 1880-81 and L.B.A.R., 1885-86.
51
B.B.A.R., 1861-62, p.17. It was also to compensate for the licence 
tax on professions not being introduced to British Burma.
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in Burma, that their imposition or abolition made comparatively 
little difference to the mass of the people or to the general 
revenue*
Throughout the entire period, however, the capitation tax
remained subject to considerable criticism* It was regarded as
52
a form of income tax, yet by no means pressed equally on people*
In Tenasserim, for a time the tax was graded according to other
53taxes paid and the general prosperity of the district* Yet
for all its disadvantages, the people became accustomed to it
and reluctant for any change to be made in it* Colonel Sladen, 
the commissioner of Arakan, presented the typical Burman attit­
ude to the tax as follows:
If you abolish capitation tax, you are sure to sub­
ject us to some new impost. We are accustomed to 
capitation tax; it does not vary; we know what we 
have to pay; we are disturbed at the idea of any new 
tax because there is uncertainty as to amount, time 
of collection, of inequality in incidence; we would 
rather pay capitation tax than wait and pay any
other uncertain demand, though you say that such new
demand is specially designed for our benefit*^
52In Arakan prior to 185^ the British administration had objected 
to the fact that a tax on bachelors was an unjust hardship to 
them, as most Burmese married, and such bachelors as there were 
were merely youths living under their fathers* roofs. B*S*B*R*P*. 
1853» 30th Dec., No.68. Colvin*s report of 1053 had, however, 
aroused the suspicion that the lower rate for bachelors would 
discourage people from marrying, which in an underpopulated 
country was considered undesirable. Ibid., 3rd June, No.3
5:5t.m.a.r.. 1858-6 9, p.612.
I.F.C.P.(Accts. and Fin.), 1885, Jan. No.122.
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Land taxation was not regarded as an income tax but as a
share by the government in the profits of cultivation for its
maintenance. Until the inauguration of the dadastral survey in
1879 government demand was still 20 per cent of gross produce
but thereafter in the major surplus paddy-producing districts it
55was commuted to 50 per cent of net produce. Yet until a de­
tailed and accurate survey, such as that begun in 1879» was 
undertaken, with the known inaccuracies of the thagyi and 
their general ignorance of surveying, there could be little
real relation between the theoretical demand of government and
56the actual taxation paid. The cadastral survey revealed 
that sometimes there were discrepancies of as much as 80 and
51
90 per cent between its own measurements and those of the thagyi.
In such instances and under the new rates government could 
have doubled and even trebled its current demand. Because of 
its reluctance to disturb and even antagonise the people, the 
government ruled, however, that in no case was the ne^emand to 
be more than double the old, even when there had been large
55Except in the hilly and sparsely cultivated areas of them. 
These districts included Han-tha-wadi, Tha-ya-wadi, Prome, 
Bassein, Henzada, Thon-gwa, Akyab, and Shwei-gyin. I.F.C.P. 
(Accts.8c Fin.), 1885, Feb.No.221. There was also a cess on 
land revenue which was raised from 5 to 10 per cent in the 
period under review. There was, however, a special rate for 
fallow land. Garden lands were also included in the cadastral 
survey.
^ Report on Settlement Operations of Hanthawaddy and Bassein 
Districts, 1879-80, p. 5* See also below.
57More usually the discrepancy was about 2-0 ger cent, but in 
Henzada in 1885-86 it was found that thagyi1s measurements on 
paddy land were out by 90 per cent and on garden land by
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58areas unassessed* Care was also taken to ensure that the net
or gross surplus produce, of which government claimed half, was
only that which was left after an ample allowance had been made
not only for the basic costs of food, clothing, and cultivation,
but also for the costs of the capitation tax and pagoda and
59other religious offerings obligatory on the people. The
size of the holdings, the richness of the soil, and other fac­
tors such as distance from markets, were also taken into consid­
eration. The new rates on paddy land ranged between 3 rupees. 8
60annas and 12 annas an acre.
Prior to the cadastral survey, cultivation had been neither
so extensive nor so established as to warrant such a detailed and
expensive survey, but by the loose assessments of the past and by
generous concessions to cultivators government had encouraged set-
61tlement and cultivation. For the first years all immigrants
254 per cent. Report on Settlement Operations in Henzada District,
1883-86, Review, p.2.
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Report on Settlement Operations of Hanthawaddy and Bassein Dis­
tricts, l879-Sotp.12. Such increase in revenue as was yielded by the 
cadastral survey was as much due to the new areas brought under 
assessment as to any enhancement of rates. These were raised, how­
ever, by as mucfc as 20 per cent in some areas, although in some 
the rates were reduced.
59Ibid.»pp.9-11 * Cultivation costs included an allowance for cattle 
mortality and also for hiring labour.
^Rates on garden lands ranged between 2 rupees 8 annas and 4 annas 
an acre.
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For 1883-84 the settlement and survey charges came to 9»34,077 
rupees, almost all of which was considered a new charge since 1878. 
There had been an increase of 3*98 per cent in revenue demand in 
areas newly settled. I.F.C.P.,(Accts.& Fin.),1885.Jan.No.115.
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6 2were execmpt from land tax* Moreover, under the long term land
revenue settlements arranged in the late 1850's and after, people 
could extend their cultivation during the limits of the settlements 
without being required to pay additional revenue on it. These 
rules were incorporated in the Land and Revenue Act of 18?6 but 
conditions had changed so much that the law was soon out of date
63
and after 1879 the old system was abandoned.
Cultivation had extended so rapidly that there was less need 
of providing such incentives for expansion and greater need of reg­
ulating it and registering accurately the nature and limits of land 
tenures. Often these were not clearly defined in the thagyi * s 
registers nor was the status of land occupants - as to whether they 
were lease-holders, tenants, or grantees. As there was less land 
available for cultivation, this situation bred more frequent lit­
igation with which the courts were unable to deal until holdings 
were better defined and more systematically registered. By the 
introduction of the cadastral survey and provision for supple­
mentary surveys this situation would be eliminated. The new 
land revenue settlements were then made for fifteen year per­
iods at a settled rate, subject to remission in case of
floods or crops failure, but also subject to the proviso
62
This was not changed after 1879 • The period of exemption varied 
according to the amount of clearing and drainage that had to be 
done.
63J. S. Furnivall, An Introduction to the Political Economy of 
Burma, 2nd ed., (Rangoon, 1938), p.6l. By 188Q thagyi were no
longer allowed to make grants of land.
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6k
that any expansion in the holdings was to be assessed. The
nature and extent of the tenures were all recorded.
though the old methods of assessment were extremely loose
and therefore mostly very generoud, the incidence of rl'&ftd;;. tax had
tjeetfi Tar from even. Under the early system in Arakan large tracts
of land from 300 to *f00 square miles in area were placed under the
same rates, which were imposed according to the estimate of the
65thagyi of the fertility of the holdings. Phayre had considered
that it was !only the peculiarly favourable circumstances of the
Akyab district which ... (had) ... rendered the system tolerable
and concealed from general view its blighting effects on other
districts of that province.1^  After 1858 a more equitable
assessment had been made when the kwin system of assessment was 
67introduced. By this areas of between only 50 and 300 acres 
6kB.B.A.R.,1879-80,p.10. The supplementary survey would record such 
expansions. More provision had been made for registering land 
holdings in 1879 when sub-registrars* offices were established 
at township headquarters under the charge of the township offic­
ers. Ibid., 1878-79, p.20.
65Report on Settlement Operations in Bassein and Henzada Districts, 
1&83-84 ,pp.1^-15. There were 3 rates levied on each 1doon* or 
area that a yoke of oxen could plough. This was equal to 6% acres.
66Quoted in ibid.,p.15* This was the system introduced into Ten- 
asserim though at higher rates and later into Pegu.
67
Colvin had recommended this in his report of 1853 and Phayre had 
favoured its introduction even earlier. B.S.B.R.P.,1853,3rd June, 
No.3d. A kwin was a tract, naturally defined by streams of hills 
with relatively homogeneous soils and conditions, and recognised 
by the inhabitants. The nearest English equivalent to the kwin 
was the 1 block*.
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were placed under the same rates but, c c r;r , only a field by 
field survey such as was undertaken in the cadastral survey could 
eliminate such margins for error as there were still under this 
system.
Revenue from customs was collected under the same policy as
in India. This was designed purely for the raising of revenue.
Consequently when import duties were gradually reduced to the point
of practical non-existence due to the strength of pressure from
Lancashire and other groups in England with vested interests in
free trade, the government was forced to rely on increased export
68duties for customs revenue. The uniform rate of 10 per cent
ad valorem on imported goods, established in i860, was reduced in
691875 to 5 per cent and in 1882 import duties were abolished.
This meant that although the value of imports by sea rose from
1,2^,76 ,0 00 rupees in 1861-62 to 5 *2 8,73*368 rupees in l88*f-8 5
in British Burma, the revenue from export duties contributed most
70to the growth of customs duty. The major proportion of customs
revenue came from the export duty on rice, levied at a rate of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yaman Govind Kale, Introduction to the Study of Indian Economics, 
(Poona,1917),p.23* As revenue from imports became almost neg­
ligible and as the subject of the import trade, though important 
in its effect on the way of life of the people of British Burma, 
has wider significance in the relations between the two Burmas 
and in the observation of the commercial treaties of 1862 and 
1867, the subject has only been briefly touched upon in the thesis.
69
B.B.A.R., 1881-82,p.110 and Romesh Butt, India in the Victorian 
Age, an economic history of the people, (London,190^),pp.^0^-05.
^B.B.A.R. , 1861-62,p. 18 and B.B.A.R.,l88*f-85«P*cxxiii. The value 
of imports for the previous year was 6 ,5 7*61 ,000 rupees.
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713 annas a maund.
Revenue from excise included the receipts from the sale of
opium and from the fees paid by licensees of liquor shops. Under
the Burmese regime the legal penalty for the use of intoxicants
was death, but both alcohol and opium had been consumed liberally
72
and, at times, to excess. Under the British, excise on al­
cohol and opium constituted such a substantial proportion of gross 
provincial revenues that when the increasing eonsumption was 
correlated with the growing crime rate and the administration was 
placed under pressure to restrict it in the 1880's, possibly be­
cause of the financial difficulties of the province then, the 
administration acted only slowly* It expressed concern for 'the 
comfort, prosperity, and morality of the people' but was reluc-
73tant to 'jeopardise' or 'sweep away large sums of annual revenue'.
71A maund - an Indian standard of weight approximately equal to 82 
lb. When the abolition of the duty on rice exports and its re­
placement by a sliding scale on land revenue was under consider­
ation, the rice duty was regarded as being paid indirectly by the 
cultivator through lower prices from the rice merchants. I.F.C.P., 
1885,(Accts. and Fin.), l883iFeb.No.221. In 1881 it was estimated 
that the total taxation paid by agriculturists in British Burma, 
including capitation tax, land revenue, local cess and rice duty, 
was approximately 3 rupees 1*f annas an acre. B.B.A.R. ,1880-81, 
Intro.,p.16.
72
G.E.Harvey, History of Burma, (London,1925), pp.31^-15*
^  %l88*f.Oct. Index No.28 and Nov.,Index No.35* Phayre had
been dubious about the advantages to government from sanctioning 
opium sales in Pegu in 1856-57. He doubted whether the increase 
in crime and loss of energies of men to the development of the 
province through opium smoking were worth the relatively small 
profit from opium sales. P.A.R.,1856-57,pp.22-23*
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From the very first the government attempted to control
firmly all sales and licences but opium smuggling both into Burma
from Gengal and Upper Burma and into Siam from British Burma was
a constant challenge to British control, as was the existence of
7killicit stills within the province. Opium, made at govern­
ment factories in Bengal, was sold at public auction to licensed 
vendors. Alcohol came from a variety of sources. In 1885 
there were four central distilleries at Rangoon, Moulmein, Taung- 
ngu, and Bassein and forty-three licensed outstills for the sale
of imported alcohol. Licence fees for that year amounted to
75^2^,750 rupees. By that date the government was taking strong­
er measures to control and restrict alcohol and opium comsumption. 
In 1881 the number of opium shops was reduced by half and the
price increased by 30 per cent. Alcohol prices were also in- 
76creased. And in 188^ - an excise commissioner was appointed to 
control excise matters more systematically.
Revenue from timber also comprised a relatively substantial 
part in the gross revenue from the province, but unlike excise, 
which was a relatively stable source of cincome, dependent on 
internal consumption and increasing population, revenue from tim­
ber was liable to fluctuate because of the sensitivity of the
nh
I.Fin.P. (Rev.), 1866, Ap.No.20 and Oct. No.4-50, and B.B.A.R., 
1870-71, p.46, . ..
75B.B.A.R., 1884-85, p.59.
7 Ibid.. 1880-81, Intro., p.20 and 1881-82, p.110.
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timber trade to world prices* Revenue came not only from timber 
produced in British Burma but also from that imported from Upper 
Burma and the Siamese province of Chiengmai*
Because of its conservation policies, government gradually 
assumed greater control over the industry in British Burma in 
this period. Initially the government had controlled the gird­
ling of trees for felling but in 1862 it relaxed this control so 
that in some of the poorer forests leases for a term of years
. 77were made and lessees were allowed to arrange their own girdling.
In 1872-73* however, when it was discovered that permit holders 
were flagrantly abusing the forest rules, the system of permits 
and leases was abolished and the decision was taken to bring all
rp O
forests under direct government management. These included
not only teak forests but all others as well. Conservation costs
increased considerably thereafter, so that revenue from timber was 
offset by the comparatively heavy charges associated with the for­
est department and the establishment of teak plantations. In
1883-8^, for instance, although timber revenue increased by 10 lacs
79of rupees, expenditure on forests increased by 5 lacs.
Revenue from salt came from two main sources - an excise
^ B.B.A.R., 1861-62, p.3^» See also page 200.
^Ibid.,1872-73* P«73 and ibid., 1878-77* Intro.,p.18. Permit hold­
ers had been girdling teak trees in forests leased by other permit 
holders. A divisional commissioner had been involved in the^candal.
79i .F.C.P.,(Accts.& Fin.),1883,Jan.No.113 and B.B.A.R.,1880-81t 
Intro.p.25*
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duty on the manufacture of salt within the province and an im­
port duty placed on salt imported into the province. The salt 
tax was not a major source of income and compared with India,
80the tax was relatively light. Early in British rule silt had
been manufactured extensively all along the coastal periphery of
the province, although the Kyauk-hpyu area in Arakan and the
Bassein coasts were the main salt-producing areas, from which
81salt was exported to the rest of the province. Competition
from the cheap salt carried as ballast by the rice-trading ships 
to British Burma and the imposition of the tax on salt manufac­
turing caused a considerable decline in the local industry, as
82
the province became increasingly reliant on imported salt.
The government had anticipated this but regarded those dis­
placed from the salt industry as better employed in rice cultiv­
ation. In the latter part of the period locally manufactured
go---------------------------------------------- —— —    -------
In 1884 the salt tax was levied at the rate of 4>£d a maund in 
British Burma, compared with 4 shillings a maund in India. B.B»,A.R. 
1883-84,p.71. According to J.S.Furnivall, and W.A.Morrison the 
lower salt tax in British Burma was due to the fact that the peop­
le paid capitation tax. Syrian District Gazetteer.Vol.A, (1914)«p.135* 
S1
B.B.A.R., 1873-76,p.106. At one stage Kyauk-hpyu had exported salt 
also to Chittagong.
82
In 1880-81 there were 8 ,362 tons of salt manufactured locally 
while 56,434 tons were imported. Revenue from the former amounted 
to 43,650 rupees while that from the latter amounted to 193>390* 
B.B.A.R.,1880-81, Intro.,p.23. By this time Upper Burma was also 
reliant on imported salt, though in the 1860's it had produced 
its own salt. A Considerable amount of imported salt also 
found its way through Upper Burma into China and the Shan States.
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salt came to be used almost exclusively in the preparation of 
dried fish, known in Burma as ngapj* Many salt makers moved be­
tween rice cultivation and salt-making according to the fluctuat­
ions in the rice and local salt markets. In times of good har­
vest and high rice prices the demand for ngapj and local salt was 
high, so that salt production tended to be profitable in good 
years only.
Fisheries yielded a considerable revenue to government each 
year but the revenue was liable to fluctuate and the entire indus­
try was prone to considerable instability. This was mainly due 
not only to the vagaries of the ngapj market but also to govern­
ment administrative and taxation policy. At the beginning of 
British rule in Burma fishing was practised all along the sea­
boards and in the main waterways, although the Thon-gwa district 
in the Irrawaddy delta was the major fishing area with its exten­
sive inland and sea fisheries. Because of the extension of cult­
ivation and the embankments policy of the government, the number 
of fisheries in the Thon-gwa area was considerably diminished 
throughout the period, as were many other fisheries in the prov­
ince. The government regarded this development in much the same
light as it had the decline of the local salt making industry -
83that people were better employed in rice cultivation.
Moreover, until comparatively late no attempt was made to 
impose any sort of conservation policy on the fisheries. Under
83B.B.A.R., 1876-7 7, pp.1^0-1^1.
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regime
the Burmese/fisheries had been under the strict control of the
ln-thagyi, who was the sole agent for the sale of fish. For
a set annual fee of about 1 rupee, the public could take fish
for their own consumption but not for sale. No fish traps were
8*fallowed in any of the main streams. During the British regime
the annual fee on the general public was removed, as well as the 
ban on dams in main streams. In Arakan in 1875 there was no 
taxation on fisheries ai^ll, despite the fact that Kyauk-hpyu was
85
an important salt-making centre and fishing a traditional industry. 
By 1878 it was feared that the fisheries would become totally un­
productive in a very few years, as even the smallest fish could 
be used in ngapj production and there were no restrictions on 
fishing in the breeding season.^
The actual revenue from fisheries came from fees for lic­
ences for sea-fishing nets and boats and from leases of inland 
fisheries by professional fishermen. For most of the period 
these were sold by auction but because of the high demand for 
fish and the exploitation of the fisheries frequently bidding
Q rp
bore little relation to the actual value of the fisheries. 
Consequently government frequently experienced difficulty in
Bk
Francis Day, Report on the Fresh Water Fish and Fisheries of 
India and Burma, (1$73) 1
85
B.B.A.R., 1861-62,p.17 and I.L.P., 1875. Feb.No.93.------
B.B.A.R.,1877-78,p.53* At times the demand for ngapj was so 
high that it could be met only by importing dried fish.
O rj
Ibid.,186^-6 5<p.17 and l.B.A.R., 1885-86, p.5^* There was also 
considerable demand in Upper Burma for ngapj from the south, 
but this fluctuated according to conditions there.
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collecting the revenue due from fisheries and many fishermen were 
so heavily in debt that in 1881 the government considered * the 
total extinction of the industry a possibility.* In order to 
introduce more stability to the fishing industry and to fisher­
ies revenue, the administration attempted to aid the industry in 
various ways. Money was advanced to fishermen to help them out 
of their difficulties, provision was made for storing fish at
fishing settlements, and public auctions of fishery leases were
88mostly abolished. To eliminate speculation entirely from the 
industry, fisheries were carefully re-valued and leased on new 
terms to the existing lessees for periods of five years in 1885- 
86.89
Revenue from local taxes was never very large compared with
the sources mentioned above but it was all available for disposal
within the province, subject to its being spent on items specified
90by the government of India. The principle behind the levying
00
B.B.A.R.* 1881-82, pp.108-09 and 1882-83, pp.125-6.
89L.B.A.R., 1885-8 6, p*5^» The number of coercive processes taken 
against fishermen for payment of revenue had declined, however, 
by this time.
90
The revenue from towns not having full municipal status under 
either the Acts of 187 -^ or l88*f was included in general local 
funds, which in 1878 were divided i£to categories - incorporated 
local funds and excluded local funds. The former included dis­
trict and cess funds, while the latter included revenue from 
towns, posts, cantonments, Dalhousie Park, and the Rangoon Port 
Trust. B.B.A.R., 1881-82, pp. 121-2. District funds included 
education fees, rents, ferry tolls and fines. Below are the
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of these taxes was the relief of the main revenues from the 
greater demands placed on them by the expansion of administrat­
ion. Local funds were spent on items, such as municipal ad­
ministration, education, public works, postal administration and 
other comparatively minor but necessary miscellanea of provincial
figures for local revenue between 1867-68 and 1885-86
Year
1867-
1868-
1869-
1870-  
1871-
1872-
1873-
1874-
1875-
1876-
1877-
1878-
1879-
1880-
1881-
1882-
1883-
1884-
1885-
Local Funds 
Receipts
Incorporated Local Excluded Local
Total'
68
89
70
71
72
73 
7^
75
76
77
78
79 5
80 "5
81 7 
82 10
83 9
84 11
85 19
86 9
Rupees
,44,740
,95,320,66,550
,20,780,67,360
,97,250
,62,030
,09,220
9,87
10.89
12,20
10,60
10.90 
12,94 
14,19
10,24
12,10
15,08
12,51
,120
,120
,050
,944
,790
,720
,290
,170
,270
,060
,430
Rupees Rupees
9,04,050
10,27,620
10,86,120
13,08,460
7,69,600
5,86,280
5,45,250
5,67,340
10,18,
9,58,
10,10,
11,85,
10,88,
12,79,
21,19,
19,60,
17,56,
24,82,
21,52,
22,26,
950
320
090
120
910
200
600
020+
190
160
600
480
Rupees
9,87,120
10.89.120 
12,20,050 
10,60,944 
10,90,790 
12,94,720 
14,19,290
2 0.43 .120  
21,68,590
25.18.150 
24,36,550 
25,37,700 
29,02,140 
39,72,270 
42,89,260
34.93.150 
42,65,690
37.03.040
37.03.040
Compiled from B.B.A.R., 1867-68 to 1884-85, and L.B.A.R.,1885-86. 
This can only be regarded as an approximation, as within reports 
there are frequently two different sets of figures, particularly 
for municipalities, and between reports of different years there 
are often discrepancies also.
♦Added J.N.
+Rangoon Municipality ceased to bank with the government from 
1st January, 1882.
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administration.
Local taxes had been collected by executive order in the 
major towns of Pegu soon after its annexation. They were ex­
pended on town police, drainage, conservancy, and street repairs. 
Before the introduction of the first Municipal Act for British 
Burma in 1874 there were forty-five towns paying special rates, 
including tax on the area of land covered by buildings, rents
from bazaars and market stalls, and various licences such as
91
those for passenger boats, carriages, and carts. A further
source of local funds was created in 1866-67 with the imposition
92
of a local cess of 5 per cent on land and fisheries revenue.
This was doubled in 1879• More funds were also made available 
for local expenditure after the passage of the municipal legislat­
ion of 1874 and 1884.
Under the orders of the government of India, the revenue 
from the local cess fund on land and fisheries was divided into 
set proportions for expenditure on specified items. The allocat­
ions were made according to the importance of each; thus over
half went to rural police and the rest was divided on education,
93public works, district posts and the local hospital fund. Such 
. allocation were due to the administrative priorities of the gov­
ernment of India, public works and education being considered much
^B.B.A.B., 1872-73* Intro.,p.13* Nineteen of these towns had a 
population of over 5*000.
^Ibid., 1866-6 7, p.49.
95r a W . , (Expend.) , l870,Feb.No.65. Eleven tenths of the cess went 
to rural police and one-fifth back to public works and education.
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9^less items of obligatory expenditure than rural police. Within 
such a framework of priorities the administration of British Burma 
had to develop.
ok
7 I.Fin.P.(Accts.), 1872, July, No.32
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C hapter IV
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL 
ADMINISTRATION - 1862-1885
While the basic objectives of British administration through­
out the nineteenth century were the comparatively negative ones 
of the maintenance of law and order, the waning ofothe influence 
of laissez-faire as a political and economic philosophy in the 
latter half of the century led the government of India to assume 
growing responsibility for the material welfare of its subjects - 
by framing policies for famines and rural indebtedness, and wider 
education. As this was accompanied by a general widening of ad­
ministrative interests, the enlargement of the administrative 
organisation of the government of India was necessitated. This 
entailed not only the appointment of more personnel with more 
specialised knowledge but also some reorganisation of the old 
system of administration. As this coincided, at least in Brit­
ish Burma, with an expansion in executive and judicial work, there 
was even greater need for such a reorganisation of the adminis­
trative structure. It was effected largely by the creation of 
separate departments with specialist functions and all controlled 
centrally - first from provincial headquarters and finally from 
the central administrative headquarters of all British India.
By 1885 there were in British Burma departments of education, 
public works, forestry, and agriculture, a medical service com­
bined with the prison service, a separate railway establishment,
and a growing judicial department. There were also separatee'de­
partments of accounts, of telegraphs, of ports and customs, and 
of postal services, as well as several other smaller departments.
Such developments necessarily had repercussions on the roles 
and responsibilities of the executive officials, as officials 
from most departments were/ippointed in all districts. At dis­
trict level, however, the deputy commissioner retained his suprem 
acy of authority in all matters occurring within the district and 
the chief commissioner remained the supreme authority in the 
province in all aspects of administration until 18?2 when he was 
relieved of his judicial duties with the appointment of a special 
judicial commissioner. The latter came to head what amounted 
almost to a separate judicial department, as there was a growing 
number of purely judicial officials appointed within the province 
There was not, however, complete separation of judicial and exec­
utive functions, especially at district level and below. Al­
though the debate in India at this time on the desirability of 
continuing to combine executive and judicial powers in one offic­
ial affected British Burma, it had comparatively little to do
2with the development of a separate judicial department.
The Judiciary The growth of the judicial establishment in
British Burma stemmed from two main causes.
1 “   -----
Only the major departments are discussed below, with the excep­
tion of the police department. This is dealt with in a separ­
ate chapter.
2
This is discussed further in the next chapter.
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The growing number of Europeans and other non-indigenes involved 
in commercial activity in the province necessitated the provis­
ion of adequate judicial facilities for them. And the consolid­
ation and expansion, of administration brought the nnerlid for 
greater conformity of rulings in the lower courts with the es­
tablished judicial codes, especially as more responsibility 
was delegated to indigenous officials by the end of the period. 
This led to the situation where the work of the judicial estab­
lishment was divided between its supervisory role and its purely 
judicial role.
The appointment of specifically judicial officials was be­
gun in 18^9 when a deputy judicial commissioner was appointed 
in Rangoon to relieve the deputy commissioner of the heavy jud­
icial work accumulating through the large community of Euro­
peans engaged in commercial activities there. Until the ap­
pointment of a judicial commissioner in 1872 all other specif­
ically judicial appointments were piecemeal ones, made in the 
attempt to alleviate the growing pressure of judicial work on 
executive officials in the large seaport towns. In 1863 the 
deputy judicial commissionership of Rangoon was abolished and 
replaced by recorders’ courts at Rangoon and Moulmein under 
Act XXI of that year.^ Although the act allowed for the ap­
pointment of three recorders, initially only one, the former
^I.F.P.(Pol.), 1862, Sept., No.192. Registrars were also ap­
pointed at the three main ports and dealt with small causes.
deputy judicial commissioner of Rangoon, was appointed* The 
inadequacies of having a peripatetic recorder travelling to and 
from Rangoon and Moulmein prompted the chief commissioner to
if
recommend in 186^ the appointment of the two other recorders.
It was not, however, till 1866 that a second recorder was appoint­
ed for Moulmein, the government of India deciding that Akyab had 
no need for one.
Although the Burma Courts Act of 1872 catered further for 
the needs of the commercial community, the appointment of a jud­
icial commissioner was of considerable administrative and constit- 
ional importance. Not only was the chief commissioner, as chief 
executive official relieved from the burden of judicial work and 
from the embarrassment of being 1 in many cases a Judge in his
own cause1; it also provided the mechanism for a constitutional
5
countercheck to executive actions at provincial level. The
latter was also to be the cause of some embarrassment to the
executive, as in the 1880's when there were several instances
£
of conflict between executive and judiciary. The appointment
I.F.P. (Jud.). 186A-, May, No. JO.
^1.J.P.. 1870, Jan. Index No. 8^ -.
^In 1882 there was a regrading of extra assistant commissioners 
with a changed system of nomenclature. As the words of the Burma 
Courts Act of 1873 had not been altered to meet the new circum­
stances, the judicial commissioner challenged the legality of 
their courts even though such an action threatened to disrupt 
the flow of regular administration. (I.J.P,,1883* Sept. Index 
Nos.213 and 219)* In 1883 a thagyi was given, in exceptional 
circumstances,judicial powers to handle civil cases up to the 
value of 150 rupees. The judicial commissioner again questioned
of a judicial commissioner also enabled much more thorough super­
vision of the lower courts than had been possible before, when 
this was the responsibility of the chief commissioner.
The Act of 1872 also provided for the replacement of the 
recorder of Moulmein by a judge and the establishment of a court 
of small causes in Akyab. A Special Court, consisting of the 
judicial commissioner and the recorder of Rangoon, was also
7
created, chiefly for hearing appeals from the judge of Moulmein. 
Two other courts were created with the powers of a high court. 
These were the court of the judicial commissioner, which was the 
high court of appeal, of reference, and of revision for the whole 
province outside Rangoon, and the court of the recorder, which 
was a high court for European British subjects throughout Burma 
and disposed of all civil cases in the town of Rangoon, except 
for small causes which were dealt with in the small cause court 
of Rangoon.^
the legality of the action, despite the fact that sanction had been 
given to the appointment by the government of India. The chief com­
missioner was forced to apply for a special clause of amendment to 
the Burma Courts Act giving him the power ’to appoint any person he 
pleases to preside in any Civil Court subordinate to the Judicial 
Commissioner1. (I. J.P., Index Nos. 170 and 172 and B.H.P., 188**, Feb 
Index No.1.) The judicial commissioner’s ruling in 1885 that magis 
trates with first class powers were not subordinate to deputy com­
missioners in judicial procedure was regarded by the chief commis­
sioner as possibly weakening the executive supremacy held by the 
deputy commissioners at district level. The matter was referred to 
the government of India and the judicial commissioner was upheld. 
(B.H.P.,1885» Mch.Index Nos. 1 and 8).
7b.b.a.r.. 1872-7 3, p.11.
Ibid.. 1882-83, p.7.
The existence of three high courts in Burma and the apparent 
need of a chief court had caused some unease in 1872 hut the fin­
ancial difficulties of the government of India at the time pre-
9
eluded the establishment of a better arrangement. Mr.Chapman,
a member of the Indian Legislative Council, had expressed then
the hope that the incongruous yoking together of the recorder
and judicial commissioner in a Special Court did not upset the 
10coach. Although this did not happen, the two did not run to­
gether completely harmoniously and by 1880 there was considerable 
agitation for a reorganisation of the high courts of the province 
and the establishment of a chief court. The Burma Courts Act 
of 1872 had been revised in 1875* chiefly to allow the appoint­
ment of a second judge to the Rangoon court of small causes, a
11Burman, and there had been further amendment in 1880. The
basic cause of contention remained. The fact that the judicial
commissioner and recorder had to sit, on occasion, to try cases
of appeal on their own decisions in a lower court gave little
satisfaction to anyone. Further appeals for criminal cases
against European British subjects and for certain civil cases
could be lodged only with the High Court of Fort William in
12Calcutta. This was both expensive and time-cogsuming.
9
'John Jardine, * A Chief Court for Lower Burma*, A.Q.R.,3rd Series, 
Vol JDC,No.10, Apr.1900, p.28j
10
I.L.P., 1872, May No.501.
11
B.H.P..1877. Aug. Index No.k and Note on the principal measures
of administration under consideration in the Home Department of
the Government of India during the viceroyalty of the Marquis
of Ripon. (l88*f). (B.M.I.S.. 290/13). p.63.
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The remaining half decade of the period under review was 
filled with plans for removing the anomalies in the high court 
system of the province. Most of the difficulty lay in the need 
for providing adequately for the dual function$6f the judicial 
commissioner - as judge and supervisor of judicial administrat­
ion. By the 1880,s the judicial commissioner had acquired the
character more of a minister of justice than of an English
13appellate law court judge. The process of according Burman 
officials more responsibility in administration was then gather­
ing momentum and necessitated much more careful supervision of 
their judicial work by the judicial commissioner. Furthermore 
the experiment of appointing benches of honorary magistrates in
all municipal towns to exercise summary jurisdiction in minor
In­cases also required careful supervision and guidance. More­
over the increase in the crime rate caused the executive to 
place greater pressure on the judicial commissioner to ensure 
that all subordinate courts meted out the correct judgments to 
deter criminals and would-be law-breakers from their course.
By 1883 the pressure of judicial and appellate work had
become so great that temporary additional recorders had to be
15appointed from time to time. Both Sir Charles Aitchison
^ 1. J.P., 1882, Feb. Index No.46, No.91»
13B.H.P., 1885» Dec.Index No.4. The registrars of this time were 
concerned only with work of a ministerial nature.
14
B.B.C.J.R.« 1880, Resolution.
^B.H.P.t 1884, Feb. Index No.6, Prog. 3*
(1878-1880) and his successor, Charles Bernard, (l880-83» 1884-87) 
had. submitted plans for reform based on a chief court composed 
of three judges. Both of these were rejected and the period 
closed with the province awaiting the outcome of the submission 
by the government of India to the Secretary of State of a modif­
ied version of a plan of reform proposed by Bernard’s successor, 
Charles Crosthwaite (1883-84). In this the chief court was to 
be composed of four judges, two of whom were to be barristers 
and others either members of the British Burma Commission with 
experience as district judges or as commissioners of the divis­
ions. One of the latter was to continue the work of supervising
16and inspecting the courts of the interior of the province.
It was not until the opening of the new century that a chief
17
court was provided for British Burma, then known as Lower Burma.
Until the system of providing thorough supervision of the
courts of indigenous officials was developed, the effect of the
expanding British judicial system on the indigenous people was
limited. Many of them still preferred to have recourse to the
traditional methods of arbitration outside the established courts. 
Even within them, so long as the Burman officials were ignorant
of British law, the judgments of the lower courts were made within
Note on the principal measures during the viceroyalty of the 
Marquis of Ripon. pp.66-67.
17John Jardine, op.cit., p.279* A. Bill had been introduced on the 
basis of Crosthwaite*s suggestion but had been abandoned because 
the scheme was too costly.
18
I.J.P., 1870, Jan. Indes No.84 and 18759 Sept. Index No.19*
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the Burmese legal traditions* Once indigenous officials were 
expected to become familiar with British law and translations 
of the various codes were made available, the British judicial 
system began to make a greater impact, particularly as these 
developments coincided with the growth of a comprehensive sys­
tem of inspection and supervision by the superior judicial 
officials, headed by the judicial commissioner, who normally 
had a legal background*
The fundamental difference between the Burmese legal trad­
itions and the British was the fact that the former contained 
sanctions that were customary and adaptable to compromise for 
individual circumstances, while the latter stemmed from a fixed 
written law, unvarying and impartial to all circumstances and 
conditions* The existence of the d^iamathat served to confuse
the British who regarded them as fixed codes of law instead of
19being merely rules of conduct. Until 1878 only one l&amathat, 
the Manu-gye, had been translated into English. This had been 
done as early as l8*t7 by a Dr. Richardson. This remained the 
sole book of reference for the British in matters relating to 
Burmese law for most of the period under review* It provided 
the basic reference in the code of Burmese law on marriage, in­
heritance, titles to land and other aspects of indigenous law, 
published by Major Sparks in i860. Deciding that the Manu-gye
19J*S.Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 19^8), 
pp. 132-4.
was mostly out of date, he had attempted to combine the written
law with the local customs, on the assumption that recent Burmese
codifiers had dealt only with written law and had ignored local
20custom altogether* Because of this, it was widely believed
that the Burmese had never attempted to compile a complete code 
of current law* Furthermore, the wide discrepancies within the 
texts and between one damathat and another, due to the fact that 
they had been written over wide periods of time to meet the chang­
ing needs of society and that they described special contracts 
and compromises, also contributed to British confusion.
Not until towards the end of the period under review was 
there a greater appreciation and understanding of the Burmese 
legal system. The observation of the British agent in the 
Mixed Court at Man-dalei of the Burmese legal system in action 
as well as the greater interest displayed in Burmese legal and 
other customs by people, such as the archaeologist, E. Forchhammer, 
and the judicial commissioner, John Jardine, helped create a more 
favourable environment. Jardin6fs close study of Burmese law 
in 1882 revealed many British misconceptions about it. By this 
time, however, British attitudes towards Burmese law were becoming 
entrenched by being confirmed and upheld by the courts. Moreover,
20 r_
John Jardine, Notes on Buddhist Law, (1882), Pt.v., p.1. The
Manu-wun-nana Damathat was translated in 1878.
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there was a decided preference for the rationality and certainty
21of the British judicial system#
Furthermore, the development of a commercial economy and
the legislative connexion with India:.-facilitated the encroachment
of British law and legal interpretation on Burmese customary law#
Laws relating to land had been among the first to be defined and
codified# Later John Jardine considered,
The greater portion of the Burmese law is now 
abrogated# British Indian statutes of general 
incidence make up the law of crimes, procedure, 
evidence, contract, and relief in equity#
Tort and damages are dealt with on English 
principles# Adultery is a penal offence, and 
slavery is abolished# Privileges and sump­
tuary laws are done away with. 22
In addition to this, the British courts confirmed new and differ­
ing practices, such as the compound interest system. Under the 
Burmese regime rates of interest were fixed by law, so that they 
could not exceed prescribed limits. Interest on gold and
21See T.P.Sparks, Select Decisions of the District Court of Ran­
goon, 1859-1860, (Rangoon^ 1S?2), p#10S#In 1$73 when the fish- 
eries of British Burma were under review, the chief commissioner, 
Ashley Eden, (1871-75)1 had dismissed the idea of being influ­
enced by practice in Upper Burma. He believed that 1 there noth­
ing is settled or certain; the administration of the country is 
without method or system, and practically the only right is 
might ... it is hardly he hoped the intention of the Govern­
ment of India to introduce practices into Lower Burma because 
they may be found to exist in Upper Burma #..f I.L.P.t 1875,
Feb. No.93*
22Introduction and Notes to A Description of the Burmese Empire, 
5th ed. (by Father Vincentius Sangermano, London and Santiago de 
Compostela, 1966). $#299*
silver could not accumulate beyond the principal though interest
22a  , . ^ ,
on grain could be fourfold the principal. This was to have bear
ing on the economic changes that occurred in the province towards
the end of the period when land speculation, absentee-landlordism,
and agricultural indebtedness became increasingly prevalent.
Education Until 1866 there was no separate education depart­
ment in British Burma and no comprehensive scheme 
for general education. Government schools had initially been 
established at Akyab, Ramree, and Moulmein to provide a local 
source of clerks and surveyors. These were Anglo-vernacular 
schools. No attempt was made to establish government vernac­
ular schools or classes until 1856 when a government school was 
opened at Rangoon with only a third of the school learning 
English. Because of competition from the number of small pri­
vate and missionary schools which soon sprang into existence to 
meet the growing demand for English, there was a consequent lack
2 Pa
Maung Htin Aung, Burmese Law Tales - the legal element m  
Burmese folklore, (London, 1962), pp.33-3^ and G.E.Harvey, 
British Rule in Burma, 182^-19^2t (London, 19^6), p-5^-
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of patronage for the government schools which weaae soon forced to
23
become anglo-vernacular too*
At this stage the government tended to rely mainly on the 
various mission schools rather than on its own for the propagat­
ion of the principles of European education* The number of 
government schools dwindled to three after the closure of the 
Rangoon government school in 1862* For want of a general 
plan ctf its own for vernacular education, the government was 
also forced to support mission efforts in the interior by 
grant s-in-aid•^
The fact that proselytisation was the main purpose of 
mission education made government support somewhat inconsis­
tent with the general policy of neutrality in religious matters 
adopted after 1837 by thefeovernment of India* Furthermore, 
the majority of mission schools were for a minority of people, 
the Karens, as the Burmese proved highly resistant to efforts 
of conversion* These were Karen language schools* Not until 
186^ when Major Laurie was appointed as inspector of the seaport 
town schools was any definite effort made to increase government 
participation in and surveillance of education* Measures were 
also taken to introduce to the kyaung of more rural areas books
^ P*A.R. * 1835-36* p*28 and ibid. ,1838-39» p*382f* It was origin­
ally planned to have only a third of the school learning English*
2.W
B*B*A.R,, 1862-63* p»22. Attendance at the Moulmein government 
school had become so poor that its closure was also considered*
25
Ibid*, 1861-62,pp*20-21* Government aid amounted at this stage 
to several thousands of rupees*
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in Burmese of an elementary standard on such utilitarian subjects
26
as western-style arithmetic and land-measuring* It could per­
haps be argued that such a step was an equally dubious interpret­
ation of British neutrality towards religious and social instit­
utions but it was little more than a continuation of the process 
/ by which the British adapted indigenous institutions to their own 
ends*
The education department was founded, in fact, on such prin­
ciples as had already been established in education policy in 
British Burma. These, being largely derived from education 
theories prevailing in British India, were, in turn, based on 
Macaulay's 'filtration theory' and on the principles contained in 
Sir Charles Wood's despatch of 1854. The scheme of education
for British Burma was developed by Phayre in a series of letters
27to the government of India between 1864 and 1866. The whole 
system was to be based on the monastic schools. By inducing 
the hpon-gyl to accept books supplied by the government on sub­
jects not taught by them, such as geography and land-measuring, 
and to accept the help of visiting circuit teachers in using the
books, 'the great cause of sound European education' was to be
28furthered and the system of education in the gyaung improved.
26
Ibid.,1864-63«P»21. Although the Burmese system of arithmetic 
produced the same results as the British one, the British dis­
approved of the former and tried to replace it with their own.
27
The scheme had been germinating since at least 1859* I.F.P.P., 
1859, 30th Sept., No.269.
28
I.F.P.(Accts.)11866« Jan.No.544, and U Kaung, 'A Survey of the
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Such a scheme supporting the existing monastic schools had the
attractive advantage, especially for Phayre, of being the most
23
economic plan as no new buildings would need to be provided.
Phayre also undoubtedly wished to allow the element of continuity 
in education which he had endeavoured to preserve in other as­
pects of administration. In this way the new learning would be 
introduced in the least disruptive manner possible and the monks 
would be left as the agents of education they had been in the 
past.
Any idea of founding government vernacular schools in every 
village was rejected for fear such would be considered antagon­
istic to the monasteries. Only at the principal towns were 
central Anglo-vernacular schools to be established. English 
was to be the main language of instruction there, though Burmese 
was not to be neglected. These schools were 'to spread abroad 
knowledge, and the desire for increased knowledge', as well ae'io
30testify to the good will of the British government in this respect.
Bistory of Education in Burma before the British Conquest and 
After*, J.B.R.S..Vol.giyi,Pt.II. Dec.1963, p.80.
29This also conformed with the requirements specified in Wood's 
despatch which recommended a more comprehensive and systematic 
promotion of general education through the vernacular. Wood had 
specified that 'no government Colleges or Schools are to be 
founded where a sufficient number of institutions exist capable, 
with the aid of Government, of meeting the local demands for 
education; but new schools ... are to be established and temp­
orarily maintained when there is little or no prospect of 
adequate local effort being made to meet local requirements.
Yaman Govind Kale, op.cit♦, p.228.
3°I.r.P., (Accts.), 1866, Jan. No*5^«
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Mission schools were still to be supported by grants-in-aid.
Vernacular Education after 1866 Phayre stressed that the suc­
cess of the scheme for vernac­
ular education rested on the manner in which it was carried out*
He attached great significance to the appoiintment of a director 
of education endowed with sufficient tact and sympathy to eglist 
the co-operation of the hpon-gyi. He recommended for the pos­
ition a Mr. Hough, who had been in the province for ten years
or more and whom Phayre considered to have the requisite qualities
31for the position. Later critics, notably Hough*s successor, 
Peter Hordern, pointed out that the weakness of Phayre*s scheme 
lay in the fact that it pivoted on the necessity of one man 
possessing the qualities that * disarmed prejudice among the
Elders of the monasteries' and 'inspired an awakening interest
32among the younger members'. The death of Hough not long after 
his assumption of duties, the virtual impossibility of procuring 
anyone with his capacities to replace him, and the retirement of 
Phayre from Burma necessitated a reappraisal of Phayre's scheme 
for vernacular education and for advancing the cause of general 
western education.
■•^ 'b .B.R.P.I.. 1868-6 9, Appendix C. 
52Xbid., 1867-68, p.10.
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Hordern believed that the concepts on which western educat­
ion and hpon-gyi kyaung education were founded were fundamentally 
opposed. Of the kyaung, he wrote,
It is a school for the education of the character not of 
the intellect, and it is the principle of the superiority 
of the moral to the intellectual, pushed to the extreme 
of denying the value of wisdom at all, which governs the 
Monastic School.,,
Pointing out that there was no examination standard for those who
wore the yellow robe and taught the Buddhist boys, Hordern favoured
3k
the promotion of the growing number of village lay schools. That 
they had no prejudice against accepting girls was a further factor 
in favour of Hordern's argument. Furthermore, he believed that 
in advocating the cause of the lay schools, he was not advocating 
the ruin of the monastic schools, which were purely religious.
He thought the time when the monastic schools could offer an ex­
tended and improved curriculum lay in the future, when a system 
of sound secular education had taken root in the country and when
a consequent rise in the intelligence of the monastic community
35had taken place.
As a result of this, subsequent government efforts to foster 
a system of vernacular education in British Burma were to be dir­
ected towards incorporating both the monastic and the lay schools
3 3
Ibid., p.56. Hordern was influenced by the Roman Catholic Bishop 
Bigandet in his scepticism of the educational value of the 
Buddhist kyaung.
3k
These were originally founded by pious lay men and women. Al­
though their numbers were originally very small, they had grown 
considerably by 1886. Min-donfs examination system did not apply 
■zc in kyaung of British Burma.
B.B.R.P.I., 1867-68, pp.62-63- U Kaung suspected that the
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into its education system* The immediate outcome of Hordern's 
stand in 1868 was that the government of India directed that both 
schemes of vernacular education be implemented at the same time* 
Gradually, however, Phayre's scheme was modified untiL both mon­
astic and lay schools were placed on the same footing in govern­
ment vernacular education policy* This was implemented some­
what fitfully largely because of the periodic retrenchments in 
expenditure necessitated by the various financial crises of the 
government of India* The consistency of policy also varied to 
some extent* This was because of the frequent changes of the 
persons who were chief commissioner and director of public ins­
truction and because their interests and beliefs varied consider­
ably in the degree to which they shared Hordern's beliefs or in­
clined towards Phayre's for the best means of establishing a 
viable system of British vernacular education in the province*^
British education officers, except for John N'esfield (see page 
knew nothing of Pali education at the monastic schools* Op*cit* * 
P-?6*
36For instance, John Nesfield, who acted as officiating director 
of public instruction while Hordern was away on leave from the 
province between 1871 and 1873* held ideas quite the opposite 
tcT Hordern's about kyaung education* B*B.R*P*I*,l871-72,p*iii* 
Nor did Ashley E d e n (1871-75) always agree as chief commissioner 
with Hordern or Nesfield in education policy* And Eden, who had 
favoured the continued survival of the kyaung (see below), was 
succeeded by Rivers Thompson^(1875-78), who saw no reason to 
regret the passing of the kyaung if lay schools were to take 
their place. B.B*A*R*,1875-76,p*130« The varying degree of ig- 
norsuice or knowledge about Burma and the kyaung by officials 
was also reflected in vernacular education policy* An example 
of misunderstanding caused through this was Peter Hordern's be­
lief that badin was the type of arithmetic taught in the 
hpongyl kyaung* While correct in claiming that the strictest 
orthodox hpon-gyi disfavoured badin, he was unaware that badin
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During the chief commissionership of Ashley Eden (1871-1875) 
a major departure was taken from Phayre’s original scheme for:vern­
acular education policy. Eden regarded the system of general
education existing in the kyaung as far in advance of any in India
37and urged their encouragement if only to ensure their continuance. 
He did, however, believe that they could benefit from some mod­
ernisation but considered that pressure for this should be exerted 
by the people themselves rather than by the government. For 
this reason he was willing to accept Hordern’s proposal of mak­
ing grants-in-aid according to the results of yearly examinations
■» —  "z Q
in kyaung where the hpon-gyi consented to such examinations.
These examinations were to be carried out by deputy inspectors 
who were to take the place of the four circuit teachers appoint­
ed under Phayre’s scheme. Unlike the latter, they were to
inspect not only the kyaung but also the lay schools and
39any mission schools which invited inspection. For those
was the word for astrology and calculatiQns^upon the stars and 
as such, anathema to Buddhism. The arithmetic taught in the 
schools had no connexion with this. P.Hordern, ’Buddhist Schools 
in Burmah’, Fraser’s Magazine, Vol.XVI, 1877, p.630 and B.B.R.P.I. 
1870-71, Appendix xvi.
^ B.B.R.P.I., 1871-72, pp.ii & iii and 1870-71, p.xi.
38A scheme was devised whereby kyaung could benefit from money en­
dowments, as the vows of the hpon-gyi had made this impossible 
before. Lay patrons were then enabled to handle such endowments, 
although grants of books were still continued in the new grants- 
in-aid system. Alfred Croft, Review of Education in 1886 with 
special reference to the Report of the Education Commission, 
(Calcutta, 1886), $.205.
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desiring to go beyond the course of instruction given in the mon­
asteries Eden favoured the founding of higher cla&s vernacular 
cess schools in the larger towns, rather than forcing the mon­
asteries into a pace with which they could not keep up* Normal 
classes were also begun in Rangoon to supply teachers for these
koschools* Later government began to open its own lower class
vernacular schools in areas where the indigenous schools were
considered by the education department to be incapable of meet-
41
ing the education requirements of the locality*
From then on government policy for vernacular education 
developed largely on these lines* By 1885 over 5,000 vernac­
ular schools with over 150,000 children were being inspected by
k2the government* Although this was nearly twice as many as
reported in the census of 1881, this represented an increase in
government inspection rather than any major spread of British 
education ^  ^^82-83 only 0*1 per cent of the pupils at
B.B,R*P.I,, 1870-71 , p.vi. British Burma wgs one of the last 
provinces in British India to have a staff of inspectors, as in 
1869 the North West Province had 197* Bengal 52, and the Punjab 
57. Ibid., 1868-69, piv*
40 ft -
Ibid.,1871-72,p.iii* Kyaung could also send pupils there to
train as future masters for the kyaung*
^ B.H.P*,1884, Feb.Index No *16* It was still government policy, 
however, not to open new schools in opposition to existing 
schools, which were capable of 'development' with the aid of 
government•
42
L.B.A.R,,1885-86,p *67* The types of government education aid 
available are clearly listed in B.B.A.R*,1882-83, pp•1^5-1^7•
43
B.B.C.R.,1881,p*58* In all 88,553 children were then attending 
schools under government inspection*
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vernacular schools succeeded in passing one of the prescribed 
examination^ even though standards had been lowered in the pre­
vious year# Furthermore, less than one-third of the schools 
inspected were able to qualify for any grant# Most children 
were still educated at the kyaung but in 1881 only 5^8 kyaung
were actually receiving government grants, though 2,645 kyaung
45with 65,320 pupils were under government inspection# Only
196 lay schools were then receiving government grants but these
schools, particularly those in the towns, were more receptive
than the kyaung to government education policy and obtained a
higher percentage of examination passes. In 1879-80 12 per
cent of the pupils at lay schools earned government * rewards*,
46compared with 2 per cent of pupils at kyaung.
The reasons for this limited success of government vernacular 
education policy were several# On the whole people were reluc­
tant to abandon their own system of education unless they were 
sure their children would receive an education which would secure 
them a coveted position in the administration# This, to some 
extent, explained the increase in the number of lay schools but 
it was the Anglo-vernacular schools which attracted most indigen-
4.4 " ' - rTrT r"T’ irr",~ 1
B.B.A.R#, 1881-82, p.131 and 1882-83, p.149.
5b.b.c.r., 1881, p.58.
lc-------
B.B.A.R., 1879-80, p#102 and Alfred Croft, Review of Education 
in 1886 with special reference to the Report of the Education 
Commission, (Calcutta, 1886), p#205*
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ous support because of the predominance of English in the cur­
riculum there. Moreover, it was mostly the townspeople and 
government officials who were interested in British education,
rural people, indeed, seeming to have often only seasonal inter-
2*7
est even in kyaung education. For this reason, Eden’s attempt 
to establish superior vernacular schools in the main towns met 
with little success. Only one of the ten schools established, 
that at Henzada, remained as it was intended; the others all
48became Anglo-vernacular schools.
Had the hpon-gyi not suffered a moral and intellectual! 
decline following the loss of the discipline and stimulus of 
the Man-dalei Buddhist primate and the development of anarchy 
within their ranks, the hpon-gyi could perhaps have reacted 
more coherently and positively to British pressure on their ed-
2*9
ucation than they did. As it was, it seemed there was a
general decline in the traditional education given in the kyaung.
2*7
B.B.R.P.I., 1870-711 Appendix xvi and B.H.P.,1873* Nov.Index 
No.7 8. Education was free in the kyaung and people were reluc­
tant to pay the fees required in lay and government schools 
unless the education could be put to some practical use.
2*8
B.B.A.K., 1878-79i p.82. The government considered closing them 
as they were not filling the role for which they were established. 
They were, however, finally transferred from the charge of the 
district cess funds to that of the town funds, as it seemed un­
fair that country people should pay for what benefitted the towns­
people only.
^B.B.R.P.I.,187Q"71* p.xii and C.J.F.S.Forbes, British Burma and 
its People, (London, 18?8), pp.325-26. Tfee .-British-refused to rec- 
ognise tne Buddhist code and so prevented the appointment of a sup­
reme Buddhist authority in the province with disciplinary powers
QY^ r.. the hpon-gyi. Such guidance as they had still came from Man- 
dalei.*
The census of 1881 revealed that in the districts where the birth
place statistics indicated that large numbers of immigrants from
Upper Burma had settled, the proportion of people able to read
and write was greatest. This was attributed to the fact that
’the phongyees [there!maintain their hold with a firmer grasp
than they do here1 so that the people of the Burmese kingdom
were ’already on the average better educated than the Burmese
50of the English province.*
The government’s system of inspecting kyaung instead of 
inspiring innovation, frequently gave only offence. As John 
Nesfield pointed out, in Burma hpon-gyi were primarily priests 
and only secondarily school teachers while inspectors were lay­
men, often aliens in race and creed, and certainly regarded as
31inferior socially, notwithstanding their official capacity.
And although most kyaung reacted conservatively and negatively 
to British efforts thus remaining beyond their direct influence, 
such kyaung as did co-operate with government education policy
30B.B.C.R., 1881, p.6 3. James Low noticed a similar development 
in early British Tenasserim when many hpon-gyi there became lax 
in the observation of Buddhist precepts, because of their remov­
al from the discipline of the Burmese capital. ’History of Ten­
asserim* , Jnl.of the Asiatic Society 1Vol.II,1836.Cfrpt.V,pp.327-30•
^ B.B.R.P.I., 1871-72, p.51 and B.H.P..1872, Aug.Index No.116. It 
was urged on all examiners and inspectors that they were admitted 
to the kyaung ’by courtesy and not by right.*
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had difficulty in reconciling the basic conflict between their
52
philosophy and that of the administration.
Higher education Monastic and lay schools, while providing
the basic education for the population as a 
whole, were also regarded as feeders to the Anglo-vernacular 
schools. The former, according to the general system of class­
ification established throughout British India by 1886, were 
classified as primary schools while the latter were mostly mid­
dle stage (secondary) and high schools. But in Burma, at 
least, the system of classification retained elements of the 
original system when schools were classified according to the 
class of people who used them. Thus town schools were middle
52
This was especially so in the case of geography, although un­
doubtedly the difference in economic concepts was also impor­
tant. A visiting Russian orientalist, I.P.Minayeff, commented,
1 the monk, who was yesterday bragging about the geographical 
map in the school, does not suspect what kind of poison he has 
brought into his monastery; the boys looking at this map will 
learn to lose faith in the truth of the words of the Great Tea­
cher: in vain they will search for Sumeru and Jambudwipa on 
this map and no kind of resourcefulness and no manner of Jesuit­
ism can reconcile the inconsistency between the truth and the 
geographical testimony of the three pitakas*. Travels in and 
Diaries of India and Burma, (Calcutta, 1962), p-185*
class schools and the vernacular schools were the lower class;
53schools, catering for the masses. Some of the former were
government schools but most were mission schools aided by govern- 
5k
ment grants.
It was the middle class schools which imbibed most of the 
principles of British education policy. Both government and 
middle classes benefitted from this. The former came to re­
cruit most of its indigenous personnel from the middle state and 
high schools. The examination system, introduced into all 
schools in the government system, ensured that some standards 
were reached and as the curriculum was virtually geared to the 
needs of the administration, after 1879 the administration came
to prefer successful examination candidates for government pos- 
. . 55ltions. The middle class, by complying with government
53
A few vernacular schools were, however, classified as middle 
class schools and a few Anglo-vernacular schools as primary 
^schools. Despite British comments on *the classlessness of Bur- 
man society*, it would seem that indigenous officials, at least, 
were almost a class separate from the rest of society. See 
B.S.B.R.P.,1853» 9th Dec.,No.65* Mi Mi Khaing claimed that under 
the British regime the officials of the Burma Civil Service,
Class II, became a type of a££er middle class. Burmese Family, 
(Iiondon, N.Y., and Toronto, 19^ -6), p.18.
3kThere were 37 aided secondary schools in 1885-86 as opposed to 
eighteen managed by the education department or local government. 
Alfred Croft, op.cit., p.163*
55B.B.A.R.,1879-80, p.103* Arithmetic, mensuration, and geography 
remained the main subjects in government schools at most levels, 
with English important in the Anglo-vernacular schools.
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educational requirements, were thus able to preserve their trad­
itional positions of prestige and importance* Because of the 
greater emphasis on success in examinations and on a knowledge off 
English to qualify for the administration, the transfer in the 
1880's to the new municipal committee of all responsibility for 
education in the municipalities, except for Rangoon High School, 
was followed by such a growth in the number of middle grade 
schools that there was little revenue left for improving the 
primary schools. This brought the intervention of the chief 
commissioner, Charles Crosthwaite, who commented on the folly of
56
'starving or leaving unimproved the primary schools' in the towns*
By the end of the period under review there were high schools
in the four largest towns and Rangoon High School had been given
collegiate status and affiliated with Calcutta University as
Rangoon College under the control of an Educational Syndicate*
Composed of representatives of the main educational bodies in the
province, the government, the missionaries, and the hpon-gyl,
this had been established in 1881 to organise and control public
examinations and advise on curricula and text books* In 1886,
however, it was given corporate status under Act XXI of i860 to
undertake its new role of managing Rangoon College, which was
57the origin of the later Rangoon University. By 1886 a score
^ B.H.P.. 188^, May Index No. 16.
57B.B.A.R..1881-82. p.132; L.B.A.R.. 1885-86, p.68; and John 
Jardine, 'A University for Burma', A.Q.R.. 2nd Series, Vol.VII, 
No.13, Jan. 189^, pp.72-73-
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or so of boys, the majority Europeans, had matriculated but appar­
ently only one received a B.A. In fact, the percentage of children 
at higher grade schobls was low, there being at the end of the per­
iod only 0.1 per cent of pupils at schools on government lists at
58
high schools and 1.1 per cent at middle stage schools.
By this time it was evident that British education policy even
in the higher grade schools was not meeting with great success. This
was attributed largely to the stress placed on English to the detr-
ment of other subjects. This had also caused a decline in the
59quality of spoken and written Burmese. Moreover, stress on suc­
cess in examinations was also considered detrimental to British 
education efforts, as the ideal of scholarship and culture was not 
generally associated with English education. Possession of this 
was regarded only as a means of achieving material gain and pos­
itions of political and social eminence.^
The predominance of English in the curriculum of the higher 
grade schools had not been accepted without some qualms by the Brit­
ish. John Nesfield had proposed in 1873 that English be taught 
only as a classic and that all European teachers in government
schools should be compelled to pass both standards of the examination,
61in Burmese, as was required of administrative officials. Though 
Alfred Croft, op.cit♦, p.9^*
59Ibid., p.168. I.P.Minayeff also noted that children preferred to 
take ’sanitation1 to Pali, as an optional subject. Op.cit., p.180.
60
Taw Sein Ko, Burmese Sketches, (1913)1 p.223 and J.S.Furnivall,
Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 19^8), pp.21^-36.— —  _ _ _ _ _ _
B.H.P.,1873»Feb.Index Nos.3^-36. The British had begun to examine 
Burmese teachers in their own language in 1873*B.B.P.P.I.,1872-7^1
p.16.
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this rule was introduced, it seems to have been rarely observed 
and by 1885 few European teachers had passed the examinations.
The people, in fact, preferred teachers not to know Burmese, so
62that their children might acquire the maximum of English.
Although some British officials were conscious of the cul­
tural heritage of the Burmese, the heedless insistence of the 
people on English and their willing neglect of their own language 
made it easier for the government to allow education policy to 
drift with the tide of popular demand and with government needs.
The process of training more indigenous people to take over more 
positions in the administration made it imperative that some 
principles of British cultural, social, and government traditions 
be acquired. The pressure of administrative work and the complex­
ities of these traditions made translation difficult, if not im­
possible. Moreover, the higher up the administrative echelon 
indigenous officials were placed, the more necessary it was for 
them to know English, the common language of the Indian and 
British empire.
Karen education Largely for linguistic reasons education for the
linguistic minorities in their mother tongues 
received little government support. For a large part of the per­
iod the official attitude was that two languages, English and
J.S.Furnivall, A Study of the Social and Economic History of 
Burma (1957)* Part IV, p.62. ’
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Burmese, were enough for the administration to cope with in the 
province* Though acknowledgment was made of the advantages of 
administrative officials knowing minority languages, it was thought
there was little advantage in perpetuating linguistic differences
63 *m  the government education system* Accordingly the minority
peoples received a western education only if they learned Burmese 
or English or were willing to receive instruction from missionaries.
Only the Karens responded in significant numbers to mission­
ary efforts and because of them, Karen was reduced to a written 
language* Their work also brought peace and knowledge to the 
previously down-trodden but endlessly feuding hill people^* v’This
was at first appreciated by the British administration, particul-
6 if
arly as this reduced its own responsibilities in this respect*
And as we have, seen, Phayre advocated in his original scheme for
B.H*P,tl873« Feb.Index No.l6(a). See also below* The government 
of India did in the 1870's query the wisdom of not incorporating 
the Mon-speaking kyaung into the vernacular education system when 
it became aware of the large number of Mon-speaking people in 
the province but no action seems to have been taken* ffhli was 
later recognised as an examinable subject but it was not a 
spoken language. The government did attempt in 1875-76 to pro­
vide a department for H&lammedan education in the Rangoon High 
School but the scheme came to nothing* In the 1880's however 
Mohammedan schools became eligible for grants-in-aid*
Gk
Under the Burmese the Karens had been an illiterate and backward 
people, mostly practising taung-.ya cultivation in the hills.
Such social and political organisation as they had was based on 
the clan and allegiance to the clan chieftain* They were div­
ided into two main groups, the Sgau or Burmese Karens and the 
Pwo or Mon Karens, each having a distinct and separate dialect* 
Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of Burma, (London, 
1887), p.229 and Harry Ignatius Marshall , The Karen People of 
Burma* (Ohio, 1922), pp*297-8. See also Chapter ~V, pages^Q^^
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education in British Burma the continuation of the system of 
government grants to schools run by missionaries.
Shortly after Phayre's departure from Burma the advisabil­
ity of continuing this policy was questioned. The conversion 
and the education of the Karens in their own language by the 
Missionaries and the practice of holding annual meetings were
welding the Karens into a strongly self-conscious and increas-
65ingly articulate community. This development caused problems 
for the administration, for which the indigenous language was 
Burmese, which was the language used in most of the courts and 
in most rural commerce. Moreover, the emergence of a doctrinal 
schism among American Baptist missionaries at Taung-ngu and its 
bitter nurture for seven years, which undermined much of the 
missionaries1 good work, made some British officials doubt the 
desirability of allowing the missionaries to have so much influ­
ence with the Karens.^
In 1869 the government of India ruled that no schools 
under missionary superintendence were eligible for assistance 
either by grants-in-aid or from the educational cess fund and a
Cn
yearfs grace was given to them to prepare for the change.
Although this rule was subsequently modified, only children
65The missionaries had sponsored the idea of holding Karen meet­
ings in the l850fs. I.F.P.P.,1859. 15th April, No.583. These 
later led to the definition of Karen nationalism by the Karen 
association in the l880fs.
66
Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, op.cit.,p.216; I.F.P.,1873.Aug.No.250; 
and G.G.Pascoe, Two Hundred Years of the S.P.G.,(London,1901),
p.6^2.
7B.B.R.P.I., 1869-70, pp.17-18.
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passing examinations in the prescribed Burmese were eligible for 
aid, under the payment by results system. Ashley Eden, des­
cribed the new system as follows:
It is the policy of the Government to foster vern­
acular education in such a way that the Burmese 
shall become the spoken vernacular of all the in­
digenous or semi-indigenous races inhabiting Burma.
In the interests of the people themselves, espec­
ially of the Karens, this is desirable.^g
Although he admired the education system developed by the mission­
aries and was sympathetic to the inconvenience changing from Karen 
to Burmese would cause them, he thought 'a great mistake had been 
committed in teaching Karen instead of the language of the country'.
He gave 'strong political and social reasons' for breaking down
69the differences between Karens and Burmese.
A small minority of Karen schools began to offer syllabuses 
in Burmese but the majority continued unchanged and unaided. It 
was reported, however, that the Karens resented that their con­
tributions to the cess fund were spent on Burmese education and
not on &aren and that they were expected to be bi-lingual while
70the Burmese were not. Only in 1879-80 was there some relaxat­
ion in government policy towards Karen education when new regul­
ations were framed. In these, lower standards were offered to 
Karens to encourage and assist them to secure government aid.
Karens were also admitted for the first time to the normal classes
CQ
B.B.A.R., 1872-73, p.177. 
^ B.B.RJP.I., 1871-72, p.xxii. 
B.B.A.R.. 1873-7^, p.61.
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71of the Rangoon High School. Later a Karen deputy inspector 
of education was appointed to replace Burmese deputy inspectors 
in predominantly Karen areas, as it had been found that Karen 
children responded better to Karen inspectors. Further concess­
ions to the Karens came in 1881 when the education rules were 
again revised, so that candidates for the upper and lower primary 
examinations could be examined through the medium of their own
72
language, although only the Sgau dialect of Karen was recognised;
During this period too the missionaries regained some of 
their favour with the authorities, as in 188^ the government con­
sented to support mission schemes for educating the non-Christian
73Karens of Han-tha-wadi and Bassein. As a result of all this, 
the number of Karen primary schools under inspection increased 
from 139 in 1881-82 to *f26 in 1885-86 and the number of children 
at these schools from 2,5^2 to 10,796. There was a correspond­
ing increase in the number of Karens passing examinations for
7*f
government grants.
Vocational Education From the very first the education offered
in schools absorbed within the British 
education system was vocational in the sense that boys mastering 
the much-stressed arithmetic and land-measuring were fitted for
^ Ibid., 1879-80, p.101 and Intro., p.15*
72B.H.P., 1882, Jan. Index No.14.
7^Ibid.. 188^, June Index No.30.
7kAlfred Croft, op.cit., p.220.
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service in the executive departments of the administration. Not 
until comparatively late in the period, however, did the govern­
ment attempt to introduce technical and specialised education to 
provide a local supply of men with specialised knowledge to meet 
the growing demand caused by the proliferation of departments. 
Because of this the ranks of the public works, medical, and 
forestry departments were filled mostly by Indians.
It was the various missionary bodies who first established 
normal classes and schools and until 1879 the Karen Normal and
Industrial Institute at Bassein was the only successful technical
75institution in the province. Apart from its normal clhsses, 
such attempts as the government made in the 1870's to introduce 
specialised education - in law and medicine - came to nothing.
A similar fate befell the attempt to introduce classes teaching 
land surveying. Although a knowledge of this was needed by 
every revenue collector in the province, few boys could be found
with enough knowledge of arithmetic to enable them to understand
,, 76the course.
The government had a greater measure of success in establish­
ing vocational education after 1879 when the chief commissioner, 
Charles Aitchison, revised the system and standards of education. 
Although the art school established at Rangoon in 1881-82 and the
75Vivian Ba, 'The Beginnings of Western Education in Burma - the 
Catholic Effort', Journal of the Burma Research Society, Vol. 
XLVII, Pt.II, Dec.1964, pp.313-16.
B.B.A.R.. 1877-78, p.8 3.
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law lectures introduced by the Education Syndicate in 1883 came to 
nothing, there was greater public response to other schemes. 
Veterinary classes were begun in 1880 and proved both successful 
and popular. Surveying classes were introduced to three of the 
main schools but later were replaced by field training by the 
land revenue settlement staff. This was more successful, es­
pecially with the sons of thagyl for whom in 1882 twenty survey
77scholarships were made available. Scholarships were also pro­
vided for Burmans for the newly established forest school in Dehra.
Effort was also made to attract more Burmans to the work of 
the departments of public works and of medicine. Until 1881 a 
special overseas allowance had been offered to Indians in the 
medical department, although the cost of living was just as high 
for Burmans. Few were interested in a monthly salary of 25 
rupees when there were better opportunities in other government
78
departments or with the various mercantile interests in Burma. 
Salaries for Burmans were made equal with those of Indians and 
arrangements were made for Burman boys to receive medical ins­
truction at Calcutta and Madras. To promote educational oppor­
tunities for the public works department, an apprentice school 
for Europeans and others was established in 1882 at the Insein 
railway works which attracted both Europeans: and Karens. An
77Ibid., 1881-82, Intro, p.12. These classes were the main res­
ponsibility of the district officials and not of the education 
department.
^B.H.P., 1881, April Index No. 12.
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industrial school was also established at Akyab and two scholar­
ships were created for the Engineering College in Calcutta*
Despite these efforts, there was little change in the situation
and both the departments of public works and medicine remained
79staffed largely with Indians.
Education Expenditure As a result of government education policy
the number of children receiving some sort
of government supervision at the end of the period was over 
80162,000. Almost 9,000 of these were at middle stage schools.
The number of schools on government lists was 5*203 there
81
were 48 government schools, including 28 primary schools. By 
1882 there were three normal schools in the province turning out 
from 50 to 70 certificated teachers a year and by 1885-86 there 
were ten deputy inspectors of education, graded into three classes,
82
as well as a senior and junior inspector of secondary schools.
To meet the cost of all this expenditure on education had increased 
from 151i780 rupees in 1870-71 to 808,480 rupees in 1884-85. A 
considerable part of this, however, went to paying for the costs
79It was thought that the general tendency of confining Burmans to 
working on the more limited projects financed by local funds 
rather than on the larger ones by provincial funds deterred 
Burmans from joining the public works department. B.H.P..1881. 
June, Index No.25*
80
L.B.A.R.,1885-86.p.67. Over 1590 children of European descent 
were included in this. After 1882 the ordinary grants-in-aid 
were doubled for European children to encourage their education. 
B.B.A.R.,1880-81.Intro.p.13. In 1883—84 over 11,000 girls were 
at schools under government supervision. These represented about 
4.3 per cent of the total number of girls of school age in the 
province. B.B.A.R..1883-84,p.92.
of inspection, of the normal schools, and of scholarships, the
83proportion being almost 20 per cent in 1882-83*
Although a large proportion of revenue for education expend­
iture came from private sources in the form of fees and donations,
8^ f
the bulk of education revenue came increasingly from local taxes* 
And with the transference in the 1880's of most government schools 
to the care of the municipalities, the government was released 
from much of the burden of educational expenditure* Because of 
the crisis in the provincial finances at this time, local revenue 
was made to bear even more of the burden of education expenditure* 
The comparatively large increase in government education expend­
iture in the 1870*s and early 1880*6 had considerably increased 
the demand for government grants* Consequently once the finan­
cial crisis occurred the government had to retrench in its com­
mitments* Thh numbers admitted to and released from the normal 
schools were reduced, as: was the rate of grants, and in 1886 all 
charges in connexion with deputy inspectors reverted to the dis­
trict cess fund.^
81 -qat) Included as government schools are thos
hmti*a.k. , loop-oo, p*©/. managed by local governments
Ibid*,p*66; B.B*A*R., l88l-82,Intpcr*«p*12; B.H.P*,1881,May Index 
No*9» Deputy inspectors inspected primary schools, while the 
inspectors inspected secondary (middle stage) schools.
83
B.B.A.R.,1882-8 3* p.152. A senior inspector of schools earned 
916 rupees a month while the junior inspector earned 750 rupees.
8Zf
In 188^-83 private expenditure amounted to 22^,000 rupees.
8s
L.B.A.R*, 1885-8 6, p . 67 and B.H.P., 1885, June Index No.6*
To offset these retrenchments, however, the proportion of the 
cess fund devoted to education was doubled.
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Public Vorks Despite the energetic start made in public works
projects during the first years of British rule in 
Pegu, the development of the public works department and of pro­
jects thereafter was comparatively slow in British Burma, and only 
briefly towards the end of the period under review was there any
major departure from the general policy of austerity pursued in 
86public works. This was largely due to the basic administrat­
ive priorities of the government of India, and, to a lesser, ex­
tent, to the financial difficulties of the government of India
Orp
in this period. Such major works as were sanctioned were
mainly for military and strategic purposes, commercial consider­
ations having only secondary importance. As far as communicat­
ions were concerned, the major towns and frontier posts were all 
linked by electric telegraph by 1863* Apart from this, until 
the two railways were built, the province had to be largely con­
tent with the fact that it was well-endowed by nature with water 
communications through its network of rivers and creeks. Although 
the government reclaimed large areas of land by building embankment 
works to increase the land available for rice cultivation along
86 This, as explained in Chapter III, was due to the fortuitously 
happy results for British Burma of the financial agreement with 
India of 1878. Expenditure on public works between 1861-62 and
1861-62 15,26,404 rupees
1867-68 33,08,732 "
1873-74 21,07,620 '»
1883-84 44,45,160 "
1884-83 34,07,320 "
1885-86 24,16,550 11
from B.B.A.R., 1861-62 to 1883-84 and L.B.A.R.,1885-86.
87
See J.S.Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p.49-
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the river beds, there was little provision of local roads and 
bridges to improve the condition of the people. Moreover, fam­
ine, which played an important role in determining public works
88policy in India was unknown ih the province of British Burma.
Bruce and Temple had recommended a substantial increase in
the salary of the chief engineer of Pegu once his circle was
89extended to all of British Burma. This was in expectation 
of a number of important public works being implemented, but 
apart from the comparatively small allocations made for this, 
the high cost of labour also inhibited the growth of public 
works in the province. Except for the fact that the early 
British Burmese provinces had a system of extra-mural labour
by which convicts did much of the drainage of the swamps and
Rangoon
construction of roads round, the major towns of Akyab/and Moul-
mein, the achievements by public works in the province would
90have^ been much less. It was only because the finances of
British Burma were briefly improved after 18?8 that any consid­
erable increase in basic public works establishments and projects 
was possible. A superintending engineer was then appointed, as
88Burma*s first railroad was begun, however, to provide famine re­
lief for the people of Bengal. See below.
89
R.Temple and H.Bruce, Report upon British Burma,i860, I.O.L.,
Elgin Papers,M.S.S.Eur.F.83, Cht.No.83, Docket 47* p*36.
90
The withdrawal of extramural labour in 1863 caused a decline 
in the general standards of the towns, especially in conser­
vancy, on which convicts were also employed.
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well as five additional executive engineers, seven assistant 
engineers, and considerably more subordinates* Furthermore, 
opportunity was taken to restore the special allowances for 
engineers in Burma which had been sanctioned in 1869 but with­
drawn in 1875 following the crisis caused by the demonetisation 
91of silver.
Within the provincial administration there was not always 
complete acquiescence to the public works policy of the govern­
ment of India in British Burma* Many provincial administrators 
believed that the successive governments of India thought that 
the revenue returns from British Burma increased sufficiently 
to warrant as little expenditure in capital investments and im­
provements as possible* The chief commissioner in 1868, Lieut­
enant Colonel Fytche, claimed the administrative policy of the 
public works department in India was 'of the most intensively 
selfish character'• He stated,
The Imperial Government will spend lakhs of money on 
a grand barrack or hospital for their European sold­
iery, fearful of the great outcry of the British people, 
and the small moan of the wretched ryot or cultivator 
who really pays the chief revenue of the country, and 
who wants a road here or a bund there, or a bridge in 
another place, is lost among the chattering cries of 
the Liverpool or Hull Chamber of Commerce for grand 
outlets to their goods as a means of making money ...
Only the embankment works had been begun at this stage and
although these benefitted the people by allowing them to expand
91B.B.A.R.. 1880-8 1, Intro., p.32. 
92I.Fin.P..(Expend.), 1868, Oct.No.5
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by
their land holdings and/encouraging settlement, they also bene-
93fitted the government by bringing in increased revenue returns. 
Although there were occasions when the embankment works caused 
flooding, this was usually relatively small in extent and the
Qlf
net result was an increase of thousands of acres of paddy land.
By the 1880*s the embankments were additionally useful in help-
95ing to meet the growing demand for rice land.
Similarly the construction of the railways between Rangoon 
and Prome and between Rangoon and Taung-ngu led to the opening 
of areas previously difficult of access. The former, passing 
through the Irrawaddy valley, had been urged since 1868. Work 
was begun only in 187^ when the famine in Bengal prompted the 
government of India to inaugurate a state immigration scheme to
Burma and to order the commencement of earthworks for the rail-
96way as relief work. While hopes of tapping the fabled trade 
and riches of western China had aroused interest and contention 
in the route of the first rail line, both lines were ultimately
93There were approximately 200 miles of public embankments by 
18?7»I«L.P.,l877»July,No.9« In 1869 those cultivators who bene- 
fitted directly from the embankments works paid an annual rate, 
according to the amount of benefit received per acre. It was 
added to the sum due as land revenue. I.F.P.(Irrigation)«1869* 
Oct.,No.3* See also Papers relating to a railway between Rangoon 
and Prome in British Burmah,(London,1868), p.24.
94
It was reported in l88*f that two major embankments protected 
75*377>63 acres in one area while 8 ,630.^9 acres had been thrown 
out of cultivation by them. Report on Settlement Operations in 
Bassein and Henzada Districts, 1883-8*4-, Review^ pV2.
95It was estimated in l88*f that the 205 per cent increase in the 
area under cultivation in nineteen years in part of the Henzada- 
Bassein districts was largely due to the embankments. Ibid., 
Resolution, p.1.
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planned for their strategic and military value, Prome being near 
the frontier town of Al-lan-myo and Taung-ngu being also a front­
ier town* The economic development of the areas thus opened up 
was a happy side effect* The railway to Prome was completed in 
1877 and the survey of the Rangoon-Taung-ngu line in 1876. The 
latter was opened in July 1885, only several months before the 
war with Upper Burma.
The briefly happy financial circumstances of British Burma 
in the early 1880's allowed a considerable increase in road mile­
age in the province, mainly in feeder roads to the railways to 
facilitate the expansion of the areas newly opened by them.
From at least as early as i860, when Bruce and Temple had sub­
mitted their report, the provision of feeder roads to the navi­
gable natural waterways had been widely recommended in the prov­
ince. This was to secure its rapid development, to promote the 
expansion of trade, and to facilitate administrative work, part­
icularly that of the police department* Little, however, was
done towards this and by 1869 there were only 655# miles of
97roadway in the province. The position was not much better
96b .b .a .r .. 1875-76, p.85.
I.F.P.,(Gen.), 1869, Deo.No. 65 and R. Temple and H. Bruce, 
Report upon British Burma, i860, I.O.L., Elgin Papers, M.S.S. 
Eur .F .83 Cat.N0.8 3, Docket V?, p*35*
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by 1881. Of the nineteen districts into which British Burma
was then divided, there were at least eight districts which did
not possess a mile of metalled or bricked road outside the head- 
98quarter towns. The discovery of laterite on the Irrawaddy
railway provided a source of metal, which had been previously
lacking, and together with the improved financial position of
the province, enabled the road mileage to be increased to 2,264
miles by 1885* Even so, the need for roads in the province was
scarcely satisfied and as late as 1913 it was reported that the
roads of Burma were few and poor, being mainly 'country roads'
or spaces where the jungle was cut down, so that in the rains
99Burma was virtually roadless.
Bruce and Temple had also recommended that canals be built 
to improve the natural system of communications and stressed the 
need of linking Rangoon with the Irrawaddy River This was
98
B.B.A.R.,1880-81, Intro.,p.29» It was reported in 1886 that out­
side the town of Akyab in Akyab district there were only foot 
tracks between the villages. Report on the Settlement Operations 
in Akyab District, 1885-8 6, p.5»
99Joseph Dautremer, Burma under British Rule, (London,1913),P»14. 
The plight of Arakan and Tenasserim was worse even than that of 
Pegu and Irrawaddy, as far as public works were concerned. Al­
though the government had attempted to link Sandoway with Prome, 
the project was abandoned because of the expense. W.B.Trydd, 
Sandoway District Gazetteer,Vol.A,(1912) p.41. In 1875 it was 
noted that the people of Arakan had had little opportunity of 
seeing 'what English engineering can do for a country': Report 
on the progress of Arakan under British rule,(1873)«PP«10-11•
A similar observation was made on Tenasserim. B.B.R.-A.R.,1869-70« 
p.107. Among those who pointed out this comparative neglect 
were John Ogilvy Hay, Charles Bernard, Colonel Sladen and 
Dautremer.
100„ .. _.Op.cit., p.34.
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finally done in 1883, the Pegu and Sittang Rivers having been
101linked in 1864-65* The main river transport in the province
was conducted by the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, to which the gov­
ernment had disposed the flotilla it had organised on the Irrawaddy 
at the time of the annexation of Pegu* It received an annual sub­
sidy from the government, and extended its service into Upper 
1D2Burma. Communication with India, except for the electric
telegraph, was only by sea, no attempt having been made to imple­
ment Dalhousie's scheme of linking Burma with India by road.
Public Health The public health service in British Burma began
with the appointment of medical officers to the 
various prisons and with the establishment of government dispen­
saries at the larger administrative centres, mainly for the treat­
ment of British personnel* A number of lock hospitals was also 
established for the British troops. By the 1880's a civil bur­
geon was appointed to each district and the civil medical service
had its own head, who was also the head of the prison service, the
103sanitary commissioner, and inspector of vaccination. The
101B.B.A.R.. 186^-65, p.28 and 1882-83, P-113. ^  Twa£!tiiaoanal, 
102B.B.A.R., 1880-81, Intro.,p.34. The company had twenty-nine 
steamerg&nd forty-four river flats in 1881.
103Prison health and the relatively high mortality rate of prisoners 
caused the authorities in British Burma some concern, especially 
after the cessation of extra-mural labour when overcrowding be­
came a serious problem. By 1886 there was accommodation for 7*46? 
prisoners with a daily average of 6 ,896. There was still over­
crowding, however, as some jails were rarely filled while others, 
notably those in the Irrawaddy areas, were usually overcrowded. 
L.B.A.R..1885-86.p.14.
number of dispensaries had grown between 1875 and 1886 from sev­
enteen to thirty-two and the number of outdoor patients from
104
55,000 to 184,000.
By this time the dispensaries were expected to be largely
self-supporting but from the first the Burmans proved unenthus-
iastic about western medical treatment, except for its surgery,
and the government was continually disappointed that the number
of and yield from private donations remained low* The Chinese
were the most responsive, the Burmans mostly preferring their
traditional remedies and practitioners* It was believed that
the fact that most doctors could not speak Burmese prejudiced
the people against British medical practice, yet, as already
noted, the attempt to establish a Burman subordinate medical
service by the establishment of scholarships to Madras and Cal-
105cutta met with little public response.
Similarly there was little response to the governments cam­
paign to introduce vaccination against smallpox. The Burmese 
traditionally practised innoculation and proved difficult to
By this time there was also an asylum for the insane and a re­
formatory for juveniles, both the insane and juveniles having 
previously been locked indiscriminately with the adult and 
normal prisoners*
104
B.B.A.R.. 187^-75, p.25 and L.B.A.R.. 1885-86, p.63.
105
See below page The combination of the offices of civil sur­
geon and superintendent of the district jail was also perhaps 
an unfortunate one. See James F* Guyot, ’Bureaucratic Trans­
formation in Burma*, Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from 
the British Imperial Tradition, (ed. Ralph Braibanti, Durham,
N.C., 1966), p.363.
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convince that vaccination was better, despite the efforts made 
by government to popularise the process. These included induc­
ing district officials and private people of standing to use their 
influence, allowing vaccinators to distribute quinine and other 
drugs, and encouraging missionaries to train Karen vaccinators. 
When the inocculators were suspected of antagonising the people 
against vaccinations, the administration proposed to break such 
antagonism by instructing them in the vaccination method. It 
was thus as much due to official pressure as to increased public 
belief in the efficacy of the method that the number of vaccinat­
ions increased, the number rising from 1,970 in 1862 to 89-923 in 
1885.106
Indigenous suspicion against the virtues of vaccination, as 
carried out under government auspices was for long largely just­
ifiable. The number of successful vaccinations was comparatively 
low and not infrequently unpleasant complications set in. Ignor­
ance and inefficiency characterised many of the vaccinators, who 
were mostly dispensary officials, and it seems that the quality 
of the imported lymph was questionable as well. The administrat­
ion finally heeded indigenous scepticism when the introduction of 
the 1880 &ct to make vaccination compulsory was delayed in 1881 
because of public opposition. The government also conceded that 
it would be unwise to introduce the dct until the quality of the
106
B.B.A.R.. 1861-62, p.37 and L.B.A.R., 1885-86, p.6*t
lymph was more certain and the vaccination staff increased and 
improved*
Compared with the general standards of public health in 
other parts of the world, the standard of public health in Brit­
ish Burma was considered good* References to the healthy pop­
ulation and plump children were frequent and the infantile mort-
108ality rate was low compared with that in England. Yet
cholera was endemic and ignorance and carelessness abounded in
matters of public hygiene and sanitation* Government attempts
to remedy this were largely directed towards improving sanitary
conditions and educating the public. Sanitation was introduced
as a subject in the schools. But such success as thee government
had was confined mostly to the larger towns where there was a
European population to support them and where government pressure
was greatest* Even then success was limited as funds were always
limited and the granting of virtual autonomy to municipal committ-
109ees in municipal affairs did little to increase public interest.
B.B.A.R. * 1880-81 * Intro.,p*15» By 1884, however, the Act had been 
introduced to Akyab and Rangoon and the government seemed better 
satisfied with the progress made by the vaccination department. 
Ibid*,1883-84, pp.88-89*
10£bid.. 1872-73, p.159.
109 '
In 1875 the funds available for essential sanitary services in 
Rangoon were so inadequate that the Chief Commisfidion_ts:dforced the 
government of India to improve the situation only by pointing 
out that *in the event of a cholera epidemic breaking out in 
the shipping season, the loss to the State would be enormous.1 
I*Fin.P*(Accts.)* 18?5* May No.21. The later ftlunicipal Reports 
contain repeated references to the lack of interest by committ­
ees in hospitals, vaccination, conservancy and drainage. In 
Moulmein, in particular, the people objected to effecting such 
improvements if extra taxation had to be imposed. It was in
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Agriculture Despite the heavy reliance of the government on
agriculture for revenue it was not until 1882 that 
a formal department of agriculture was established• Prior to
this, however, the government had attempted to introduce new crops 
to the province to diversify the economy. Besides rice, fruit, 
vegetables, some herbs and sugar were traditionally cultivated for 
home consumption, but the government attempted to encourage the 
cultivation of such commercial crops as tea, coffee, tobacco, and 
cotton and to extend the cultivation of sugar. The agricultural 
department was to continue this work, though this was not to be its 
main function.
Throughout all British India at this time provincial agricul­
tural departments were being established under the controlling 
authority of a central secretariat within the government of India. 
The idea, first mooted in 1866 after the submission of the report
on the Bengal and Orissa famine but dropped by Lord Lawrence as 
being premature, was revived by Lord M^o with the establishment
of a central secretariat but of only one privincial department,
that of the North Wtest Provinces. The rest of India was brought
into the scheme after the submission of the famine report of 1880
when Lord Ripon urged the formation of further departments.
The promotion of this scheme rested, however, on the condition
Moulmein too where the European community held largely aloof from 
municipal affairs. B.B.M.A.R.,1882-83 and 188^-85. In 1883-8^ it 
was considered that only Rangoon and Prome had good water sup­
plies, though other towns had attempted to clean and deepen public 
wells. B.B.A.R., 1883-8^, p.88.
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that agricultural departments should give priority to adminis­
trative work; the provision of * a more sound and accurate know­
ledge of agricultural facts and circumstances1’ was of secondary 
importance only. The government of India insisted on the prim­
ary importance of administrative work because
... there were very strong objections to the 
creation of a Department having for its sole 
object the improvement of agriculture, as 
there would be ground for suspecting that pub­
lic funds were being devoted to objects of 
which the value was to some extent doubtful.
In British Burma the main administrative task of the new 
department was the annual revision by supplementary survey of the 
village land records, first drawn up by the land settlement of­
ficers. The first director of agriculture was the settlement 
secretary who had been in charge of the land settlement work.
While this was mainly intended to provide a complet register of 
land holdings and cultivation to facilitate land revenue assess­
ments, settlement officers demarcated grazing and watering areas 
for stock in the course of their settlement work. These were 
to assist cultivators prevent the high mortality rate among their
cattle and buffaloes whidh was largely attributed to the lack of
111
these facilities. The extensive reports compiled by the settle- 
—
Note on the principal measures during the Viceroyalty of the 
Marquis of Ripon, (B.M.I.S.290/1^)i pp. 3. *• and 263.
11
The government’s veterinary classes also helped combat the mort­
ality rate of stock. Such losses were recognized as being one 
of the major causes of rural indebtedness.
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ment officers on the condition of the people and their modes of 
cultivation also provided material to aid the agricultural de­
partment in its other activities.
These were largely the continuation of the governments 
earlier work* New agricultural implements were introduced and 
traditional ones improved; pamphlets were distributed among the 
schools; model farms were established, and experiments were con­
tinued with different crops. To encourage the cultivation of sugar 
advances were made to prospective cultivators and the promotion of
tobacco cultivation was attempted by reductions in the land reven- 
112ue. Although the government reported some public response to
and interest in its agricultural projects, rice remained the pre­
dominant crop, the cultivated area not devoted to rice-growing
increased only from 10 per cent in 1866-67 to 1*f per cent in l88*f- 
1138 5* Many of the new crops were suited to British Burma but
conservatism combined with labour shortages to frustrate most 
government ambitions of diversifying the economy.
Forestry The forestry department of British Burma originated in 
1855 with the appointment of Sir Dietrich Brandis as
Tl2
The government also guaranteed markets for any jute produced in 
the province. B.B.A.B., 1882-83, p.^6.
^1^Ibid.,1866-6 7,p«77 and 188^-8 5, Intro.,p.9* There had been a 
large increase in cottom cultivation in the early 1860*s but with 
the return of American cotton to the world market, the cottom 
acreage‘declined from 11,000 acres in 1865-66 to ^ ,562 acres 
in 1868-69. B.B.A.R., 1866-6 7, p.77 and 1869-70, p.12*f.
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superintendent of the forests of Pegu* His appointment marked 
a turning point in forest administration in the British Bucmes^rov- 
inces. The forests of Tenasserim had been ruined by 1850 by tim­
ber traders through the inadequacies and mismanagement of govern­
ment administration* No policy of conservation had been pursued
and although a forest superintendent was appointed during the
11^ t To18^0 's, he was given no powers to enforce his position, 
prevent this happening in Pegu the teak forests there had been
declared the property of the state on the annexation of the prov­
ince and in 1856 rules were published to regulate the killing and 
felling of teak trees as well as their conservation and propagat­
ion. From this time on not only the teak forests but all forests
in the province were to come increasingly under government control
115and protection* Moreover all forest department officials were
legally empowered under the terms of the forest rules to enforce 
the forest reservation regulations. By 1883 several hundred 
square miles had been planted with teak seedlings and 3*758 square 
miles of forest had been declared 'reserved* forest, in which 
government maintained strict control over all timber-cutting
11*f
cf* John Nisbet, Burma under British Rule and Before,Vol.II, ,
(Westminster, 1901) , pp.^8-^9 and G.E.Harvey,* The Gbnqufestl-of' U^Byraa,
C.H.I.,Vol.VX, (nndia:/ 1958)«: P,.kkkV7
115This was especially so of Tenasserim, Irrawaddy, and Pegu div­
isions. Arakan was exempted from the rules applicable in the 
rest of the province in 1883 and subjected only to a few brief 
rules for the issue of licences by the deputy commissioners.
RaB.Smart, Akyab District Gagetteer,Vol.A, (1917)* p*135*
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116operations. By this time the forest department had also
grown to consist of two conservators, ten deputy conservators,
117and seven assistant surveyors.
The extension of forest reservations brought the forest de­
partment into greater contact with the hill peoples, who prac­
tised taung-ya cultivation in the forests. This practice was 
severely curtailed by the Forest Act of 1881 when taung-ya 
cultivation was restricted to specified areas. Host of these 
cultivators were Karens, of whom so many had worked as labourers 
for the forest department that forest officials were required to
become familiar with Karen, as an indigenous language, rather 
118than Burmese. To overcome hardship caused, by the 1881 res­
trictions, government offered loans to help taung-ya cultivators 
willing to move to the plains to settle there and also devised
a scheme to help both its plantation programme and those reluctant
. . n . 119 The teak plantations already estab-to move to the plains. ^ *
lished by this time had been achieved at great cost, being planted 
out by hand at a rate of 60 to 90 rupees an acre. In the new
116Note on the principal measures during the viceroyalty of the 
Marquis of Ripon,(B.M.I.S. 290/l5).p.^65* In 1872 the superin- 
tendent of the Arakan Hill Tracts had stimulated teak plantat­
ion by private enterprise by the distribution of seed and order­
ing teak plantations at police posts. R.B.Smart, op.cit.,p.159«
117Note on the principal measures, (B.M.I.S. 290/13)* p.8.
«i «iO
B.H.P., 1881, May Index No.28. Chins, Shans, and Burmese also 
practised taung-ya cultivation but with the latter two groups 
especially this was mostly a transitional stage before settling 
to cultivation in the lowlands.
119B.B.A.B... 1882-83, pp.122-123.
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scheme, made possible only by the government's greater knowledge
on the propagation and growth patterns of teak trees, forest
taung-ya cultivators were paid to plant teak seeds with the rice
in their taung-ya, which they undertook to till for one year only.
By this means the cost of planting was reduced to k to 8 rupees
an acre. In 1880-81 over 1,702 acres were planted, making a
total of 7,100 acres under plantation. An annual increment of
1201,200 acres was planned thereafter.
1PO
Ibid., 1880-81, Intro., p.25.
Chapter V
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE AND EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION
1862-1885
While the development of specialist departments within 
British Burma led to the appointment of more department offic­
ials, the increase in population and the expansion of cultivat- 
ation in this period caused such an increase in revenue and judic­
ial work that more executive staff had to be appointed as well.
The old administrative units were subdivided into smaller, more 
manageable ones. At the same time the economic difficulties 
of the Indian government made it no longer practical or possible 
to fill the growing number of positions of responsibility entirely 
with Europeans as formerly. Moreover, it was no longer politic­
ally expedient to do so, because of the growing demand among the 
people of India for more responsibility for and participation in 
government. Accordingly the process was begun of reducing the 
number of European personnel and allowing more indigenous people 
into positions from which they had previously been debarred. At 
the same time, attempt was made to invigorate and extend the in­
stitutions of local self-government already existing throughout 
the provinces of India, to develop the 'capacity for self-help1,
so prized by the Victorians, and incidentally to lighten the load
1and cost of administration. British Burma, though occupying a
1 ;
Quoted from Note on the principal measures of administration under
consideration in the Home Department of the Government of India 
during the yiceroyalty of the Marquis of Ripon.(188^).B.M.I.S.290/1X  
P-2/f9...........    ^
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position somewhat apart from the mainstream of events which led 
to these developments, was inevitably swept into the current of 
changing ideas and practices*
Nature of executive administration Apart from the loss of the
judicial responsibilities of
the chief commissioner, there was little other change in his
position and powers throughout this period* In 1868 he was
granted the right to exercise the powers of a local government
by Act I of that year. By this he could extend to British Burma
legislation already enacted in India in 1868 or thereafter.
Legislation enacted before that date could be introduced only
with the permission of the Governor-Geheral in Council and the
chief commissioner still did not have the power to originate
legislation in Burma. Legislative autonomy came only in 1897 
when Burma became a lieutenant-governorship. Until 1881 the
chief commissioner was aided by one secretary, usually a man of
considerable rank in the Commission, but after then a separate
2
secretary was appointed to deal with land records.
There was more change in the position and powers of the div­
isional commissioners in this period. At the time of the union 
of the three British Burmese provinces, though subordinate to the 
chief commissioner, they were ex-officio sessions judges with
2
He later became the director of the department of agriculture.
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appellate .jurisdiction over the deputy commissioners in judicial 
and revenue matters* They were also responsible within their 
divisions for the administration of revenue, medical and educat­
ional policies, municipal affairs and local funds, port affairs,
and communications with Karenni, the various Shan principalities,
3
and minor frontier tribes. Some responsibilities, such as pub­
lic works, were, however, transferred to the charge of the chief 
commissioner and commissioners were empowered to intervene in 
police administration only when this affected their general auth­
ority over divisional affairs. Most responsibility for police
4
administration was vested m  the inspector-general of police.
By 1885 the commissioners* judicial work was the heaviest
of their duties. Because of this and the development of specialis­
ation and centralisation in department heads, the commissioners*
5
control of some fields of administration was somewhat diminished.
In 1883, for instance, when commissioners were made inspectors of 
registration under the Registration Act of 1871, because of the
3
Town affairs were usually referred to as * municipal* affairs at 
this time, despite the fact that no town had municipal status. The 
area of the divisions of British Burma in 1862 were as follows;
Pegu 3^*290 square miles
Tenasserim 38*000 11 n
Arakan 17*780 11 **
B.B.A.R.,1861-62, Appendix A.
k
I.J.P.,1860, Oct.,No.3^ and R. Temple and H. Bruce, Report Upon 
British Burma, i860, I.0.L.,Elgin Papers, M.S.S.Eur.F.o3*Cat.83* 
Docket 47,p.20 and Yaman Govind Kale, Indian Administration,(Poona, 
1913), p.217.
^The British Burma Manual« (comp. C.S.Cooke), (1@78),Vol.I, p.439*
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rigid system of grading sub-registrars and registrars under a
provincial inspector-general, commissioners were given cautionary
and advisory powers only.^ As such developments were reducing the
liaison between the regular executive officials and those of the
specialist departments^ partly to prevent this^ commissioners were
made responsible for the land settlement operations within their
divisions, ’subject ... to the general guidance of the Settlement 
7
Secretary*. The divisional commissioners, however, represented 
the accumulation of many years of service in British Burma and thus 
were invaluable for their experience and knowledge of provincial 
affairs, especially after 1871, when the chief commissioners were
g
men with no experience of Burma.
There was little change in this period in the position of
the deputy commissioner, who remained the chief authority within 
the district. In the 1860's he had been in practice the fmaid 
of all work* he was often called, being expected to supervise all 
judicial, revenue, and police work within the district, and, except
in the most important districts, to be collector of customs, general
inspector of schools, and encourager of vaccination. By the 1880*s , 
however, while still responsible for all these activities, he had
c
B.H.P., 1883, Mch.Index No.15.
n
Ibid.,1880, Dec. Index No.38. The settlement secretary was in 
charge of all land settlement operations within the province.
g
Only Phayre and Fytche rose from the ranks of the British Burma 
Commission to become chief commissioners in the period. Their 
successors, familiar only with India, had to rely largely in the 
first years of their administration in British Burma on the advice 
and experience of the commissioners and other senior members of the 
Commission.
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9
fmany hands to help him1. Not only was there the police super­
intendent, first appointed in 1861, but also an executive engineer 
of the public works department, a civil surgeon, and in most dis­
tricts, an inspector of education, and, in some districts, a deputy
10conservator of forests* Furthermore, most of these officials 
had subordinates at subdivisional level, so that there were assist­
ant police superintendents, assistant engineers, and assistant
surgeons, all graded in such a way as to have equivalents in
11
status and salary in other departments.
Throughout the period deputy commissioners were also ex­
pected to control expenditure of local funds by the local hospitals 
and education committees. Moreover, after the two municipal bills
of 187^ they were also usually the presidents of the municipal and
12town committees. As well as this* they were expected to super-
g.M.Mitra^ ',Th9 Proposal to Separate Judicial and Executive Func­
tions in India*, A.Q.R., 3rd Series, Vol.XXV, No.^9*Jan.1908,p.6*f.
10 . . .Deputy Commissioners in the frontier districts also had the res­
ponsibility of conducting border affairs with their Burmese coun­
terparts. The deputy commissioner of Salween had the powers of 
British consul and political agent with the Siamese tributary 
state of Chiengmai and special responsibilities towards Karenni. 
I.F.P.(Pol.),187^»Jan.,No.91.
11By this time the establishments of administrative officials were 
also well defined and standardised according to the rank and nat­
ure of the charge. That of a deputy commissioner of a large dis­
trict would normally include an extra assistant commissioner, a 
superintendent of land revenue, a head revenue clerk, an excise 
officer, a judicial head clerk, and a registration clerk.
12
British Burma Manual, Vol.I, p.5^1• Assistant commissioners and 
civil surgeons also helped control expenditure by local committees. 
Only briefly in Rangoon was the municipal president, elected by 
the committee, a non-official.
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vise the activities of the rural boards. Although these instit­
utions of local government became increasingly autonomous through­
out the period and were intended to reduce the work of the admin­
istration, the fact that executive officials still presided over 
their activities meant that this load was only partially lightened. 
And in many towns the burden on executive officials was scarcely 
reduced at all, as some towns refused to accept the responsibility 
of forming municipal committees and in others it was sometimes
difficult to persuade townspeople of a desirable class to serve
13on the municipal committees. Town committees had proved them­
selves incapable of wielding the wider powers of municipalities
1*f
and needed even greater supervision by the deputy commissioners.
The rural boards came into existence only in l88*f and as there
was little for them to do because local funds were scarce for
local projects, their existence made very little difference to
15
the work of the executive officials.
The existence of specialist officials in a district led to 
the deputy commissioner's becoming almost as much a co-ordinator
^ B.B.M.A.R.,1885*86 and B.H.P.,1882, Mch.Index No.18. To encourage 
indigenous participation in local government and other honorary 
work, the government began to confer honorary titles on 'deserv­
ing persons' and to grant various insignia as well, such as gold 
chains and silver swords. The recipients of the first awards 
were mostly government officials but two were merchants, one from 
Rangoon and one from Moulmein. Both were honorary magistrates and 
members of the municipal committees. I.F.P. (Ext.Pol.),l88*f, July. 
No.212.
1
B.B.M.A.R..1882-83 and B.H.P.t 1883* Aug.Index No.25»
15
See iabove, page 17,
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of the different branches of the administration as an ihitdator 
of policy. For instance, the settlement officers in drawing 
up new revenue settlements discovered much about the general con­
dition of the people and about ways in which their condition could 
be alleviated, such as by the construction of a bridge here and 
a road there. The decision to act on such discoveries was taken
by the executive officer who would then transfer the matter to
16the appropriate department for implementation. Such a develop­
ment represented an improvement in administrative performance 
but it also represented an increase in bureaucratisation, which 
did not always enhance either the efficiency or the celerity of 
administration. It also led to the growth of some rivalry be­
tween the executive and departmental personnel and some confusion
17over areas of authority, especially in police administration.
Yet the development of departmental administration did allow 
the executive officials more time to devote to revenue and judicial 
work which grew with the increase in population and the expansion 
of the area under cultivation. Even then, measures had to be 
taken to ensure that deputy commissioners were not inundated by
16Cf. Charles A. Elliott,fThe Separation of Judicial from Executive 
Power in India1, A.Q.R., 3rd Series, Vol.II,No.*f, Oct.1896  
On accasion too the reports of the settlement officers revealed 
inadequacies on the part of executive officials, as when it was 
discovered that there were parts of the Akyab district not ever 
visited by the deputy commissioner. Report on the Settlement 
Operations in Akyab, 1885-86, p.3*
See further on page 26*f. Friction also developed between forest 
and executive officials over the enforcement of forest reservat­
ion regulations to the extent that provisions were made in the 
Forest Act of 1881 to overcome it. Note on the viceroyalty of
210
judicial work to the detriment of their executive duties. In 1883
to reduce the deputy commissioners1 growing load of civil appellate
work the Burma Courts Act of 1875 was amended to invest assistant
commissioners with power to hear civil appeals, as was already done
in the Central Province, and to transfer civil appellate jurisdic-
18tion to the divisional commissioners. Further alleviation of 
the deputy commissioners' judicial work came in 1883 when the jud­
icial commissioner ruled, after a similar ruling in Calcutta, that 
deputy commissioners no longer had revisional jurisdiction in crim­
inal justice over assistant commissioners with first class powers.
This meant that they had then only to review the judicial work of
19the assistant commissioners with second and third class powers.
Despite the necessity of introducing measures to decrease 
the deputy commissioners' judicial load, any idea of separating 
the judicial and executive branches of administration met with 
little favour in British Burma. In India the desirability of 
combining revenue and judicial powers in executive officials was 
being questioned, as this combination frequently made them judges 
in their own cause. In 187^, however, when the government of 
India raised the issue with the chief commissioner of British 
Burma, Ashley Eden, he strongly defended the existing system 
there and its suitability for the province. He declared,
the Marquis of Ripon,pp.453-^*
/iO
B.H.P.,1883< May Index No.6 and July Index No.3»
Ibid., 1885, Moh.Index No.8 .
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We have a primitive people, the majority of whom only 
twenty-two years ago were the subjects of an absolute 
monarch, to whom everything in the shape of Courts of 
Justice or judicial authority was entirely unknown.
They have been in the habit of looking to the officers 
placed over them as little less absolute than the nat­
ive officials whom they replaced; and, though they 
are no doubt beginning to understand better our more 
complicated system, there is po doubt that they are 
much puzzled at the nice distinctions we draw between 
executive and judicial functions; ... While it must 
be admitted that our judicial system in Burma does 
not meet the requirements of what are in themselves, 
unquestionably sound theories on the subject, it 
does seem to meet the requirements of the people - 
and this, after all, is surely the main point to 
keep in view.^Q
Even had suitable conditions existed in British Burma, there 
was not at this time enough judicial work in the districts, apart 
from the large seaport towns, which had their own judicial agencies, 
to justify the complete division of executive and judiciary. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the province could have afforded 
the luxury of a double staff, even when the volume of judicial work 
had grown, especially when there was constant pressure from the 
government of India for the maintenance of the most stringent econ­
omy.
Increase in number of administrative units. As it was the govern­
ment of India greeted
the need for increasing the number of administrative units in Brit 
ish Burma during this period with little enthusiasm, as each new 
unit involved the provision of new establishments and extra
po
Ibid., 187^, July Appendix E
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expenditure. Sanction was frequently granted for the creation 
of a new administrative unit only after repeated pleas from Burma 
and after proposals had been mooted for several years within the 
province. Often consent could be elicited only after the situat­
ion had assumed emergency proportions. Sanction for the separat­
ion of the district of Han-tha-wadi into two districts was given 
only after an outbreak of serious crime there, although the rapid 
development of the district had made its administrative work too 
much for one deputy commissioner for some time.
Similarly the creation of a fourth division, Irrawaddy, in 
1881, was virtually forced on the Indian authorities by the pressure 
of work accruing from the rapid development of the rich riverine 
division of Pegu. According to the census returns of 1872 and 1881 
the population of Pegu had grown frQm 1,662,058 to 2,330*^07* while
that of Tenasserim and Arakan had grown only from 600,727 to 811,818
21and from *f8*f,363 to 533*307 respectively. While the commissioner
of Pegu had been able to manage the administrative and judicial work 
in 1872, by 1880 he was no longer able to do so. Excise adminis­
tration had got out of hand and the commissioner of Pegu could not
have managed to undertake the supervision of divisional land revenue
22settlement operations then under consideration.
^ B.B.C.R., 1872, p.3^ and ibid., 1881, p.19-
22When the new division was formed the Irrawaddy became the natural 
boundary, so that there was a large seaport town, Rangoon and 
Bassein, in each division. Population, administrative work, and 
revenue were approximately equal. B.H.P.,1881, June Index No.^6. 
The divisional commissioners were of equal rank, the salaries
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In this period effective British administrative control was
also extended into the peripheral hill tracts of Arakan, Taung-ngu,
23
and Salween and the border areas were better explored and defined. 
Inter-tribal feuds and slave raids from the tribes of the Arakan 
Hill Tracts into the Akyab district caused the tract to be made 
into a separate administrative charge under a superintendent in
plf
1866. Only in the southern part of the tract, however, did the
British attempt to introduce some sort of order; the north was
controlled only through the repression of raids by the northern
25
tribes into the southern region. In the south 'a few simple
rules' of administration were drawn up; a police force of hill- 
men, mostly from Manipur, was organised; and a group of chief­
tains was made responsible for the arbitration of disputes and 
maintenance of order.26
of the Arakan and Tenasserim commissioners having been equalised 
in i860 on the recommendation of Bruce and Temple, op.cit. ,p.*f8 .
23It was found in 1879 that one village practising taung-ya cult­
ivation, which had been taxed by the British officials in Pegu, 
in reality lay across the border in Upper Burma. A Similar dis­
covery had been made two years earlier when it was found that a 
small fcact of Arakan on the west of the Arakan Yoma which was 
taxed by the Burmese was, in fact, British territory. I.F.P., 
(Gen.),l880,Mch.No.27 and ibid.,(Pol.),1877,Aug.No.197.
I.J.P.,1866, June No.80.
2^I.F.P.(Pol.), 1871,Mch.No.196; l876,Sept.,No.139; and I.Fin.P., 
(Accts.),18719 July, No.105.
I.F.P.(Pol.)t1873.Feb.Nos.9 and 10; and 187^, Aug.No.2^ and 
B.H.P., 1879* July Index No.4-. Later Gurkhas were recruited also 
for the police of the Arakan Hill Tracts.
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Until 187^ there was no attempt to extend effective British 
administrative control to the Karen Hills in the Taung-ngu dis­
trict. Administrative arrangements remained much as they had
27
in Phayre*s time. An annual tribute was levied from the tribes 
as a token of their allegiance to the British government. This 
was virtually the only contact with them* though police were later 
stationed in the southern part of the tract to protect the more 
peaceable tribes and the trade which had developed between west­
ern Karenni and Taung-ngu.
In 187^ a plague of rats reduced the mountain-rbound Karens 
to destitution. At the same time the development of doctrinal 
differences among the missionaries had so weakened their influence 
with the Karens that they reverted to their traditional inter­
tribal feuds which weakened them further. This prompted the chief 
commissioner to write that the existing state of affairs was 'a 
great reproach to our administration surrounded as we are there
28by Native States, to which we shall set an example*• The area 
was placed under an assistant commissioner and, though it was slow 
to pay its way, the trappings of British administration were grad­
ually introduced.
As a result of the expansion in the number of administrative
In 1861 Phayre had advised the deputy commissioner of Taung-ngu 
that any tribe beyond the *Moung Loung* River, which was the bound­
ary of effective British administration, wishing to pay tribute 
to the British was to be informed that the most desirable mark of 
friendship they could show the British government was to receive 
teachers from the American Baptist mission and have the children 
of the tribe educated. I.F.P.(Pol.),1875,Aug.No.260.
units the number of the British Burma Commission grew from forty
in 1862 to sixty-three by 1880 and the number of districts grew
29from twelve to nineteen between 1862 and 1885* There were also 
by 1883 thirty-five district siib^divisions, each containing one or 
more townships and extending over an area of between 800 and 2,000 
square miles. Usually there were at least two subdivisions to 
every district.^
Difficult districts in British Burma had always been organ­
ised into su&-d:i.visions for administrative purposes but only in the 
1870*s when there was a noticeable rise in the provincial crime 
rate did this become a regular feature of district administration. 
It was thought the establishment of as close a contact as possible 
between the European administration and the people had a deterrent
pO
Ibid.,1875* Aug.No.250 and B.B.A.R. , 187*1— 75«P*5* 37*000 rupees
were spent on them (mainly on paddy) as relief.
29 -Thayet-myo was created in 1870; Thon-gwa had been carved from the
Henzada, Rangoon, and Bassein districts in 1875 and Tha-ya-wadi 
had been separated again from Henzada in 1877* The urban centres 
of Moulmein and Rangoon were constituted as separate districts in 
1879* the old district of Rangoon becoming known as Han-tha-wadi, 
from which Pegu was carved in 1883* Salween formerly known as the 
Yun-zalln, had been separated from the control of the deputy com­
missioner of Swei-gyin in 1871 because the series of almost path­
less hills separating Salween from Shwei-gyin made effective ad­
ministrative control from the latter difficult, if not impossible.
I.F.C.P.. (Acots.and Fin.), 1883, Jan. No. k3 land B.B.A.R.. 1882- 
§3, pp.11-13.
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effect on disturbers of the peace. Ashley Eden had urged the 
need of appointing European officials to at least a dozen import­
ant places that were not administrative headquarters, believing 
there was 'no economy so false as that which stints the number of 
European officers'. He also believed that 'the people are glad 
to have a European among them, and settle round his head-quarters
33
at once with a full sense of the security ••• thus afforded them.' . : 
Because of this and the comparative paucity of European 
executive numbers, the practice of appointing young European exec­
utive officials to district headquarters to gain initial adminis­
trative experience declined somewhat. More were sent to serve 
immediately at sub-divisional head-quarters. Sub-divisional 
officers were mostly assistant .commissioners, though a few were 
extra assistant commissioners. After 1878, however, the govern­
ment of India ruled that Europeans could no longer be appointed 
as extra assistant commissioners and were eligible for the higher 
administrative positions only. This was to pave the way for the 
appointment of Burmans as sub-divisional officers. At the time 
as European supervision was still apparently needed in most sub­
divisions and as Burmans were inexperienced and their administrat­
ive ability in positions of such responsibility unproved, only the
^ B.H.P., 187^, Mch.Index No.209. In 1875 the inhabitants of Dany- 
byu petitioned the commissioner of Pegu for the continued appoint­
ment of a European assistant commissioner rather than the appoint­
ment of a Burman of the same rank. Ibid., 1875* July Index No. 1*f8.
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least onerous sub-divisions were transferred to them.
For these reasons the creation of further sub-divisions could 
meet the expanding administrative needs of the province to a lim­
ited extent only. Although the provision of establishments and
quarters for sub-divisional officers was less expensive than that 
for deputy commissioners and thus was favoured by the government 
of India, the placing of too much responsibility on officials of 
such comparative youth and inexperience was considered a false 
economy. Thus unlike in India, districts in British Burma became
smaller but deputy commissioners tended to be younger men on lower
33salaries than their counterparts in India. This system was not
without advantages for British Burma, as is pointed out below:
There is a good deal to be said for the system 
of large districts with senior men as Collectors 
and with officers on good salaries and of con­
siderable experience in charge of sub-divisions.
But for backward provinces, where improvement is, 
or ought, to be rapid, and where Native officials 
are comparatively untrained, Mr. Bernard the 
chief commissioner is clearly in favour of the 
system of small districts with the initiative 
in the hands of Deputy Commissioners who are 
tolerably young and who can really go into mat­
ters themselves
5 Ibid.,1881, May Index H0.29 and B.B.A.R.,1880-8 1.p.8 . The first 
Burmans in charge of sub-divisions were appointed in 1881. A sud­
den acceleration of the crime rate of Han-tha-wadi in 1883, however, 
was associated with the sudden replacement of Europeans by Burmans, 
although there was no increase in crime in one sub-division, which 
had been under a Burman for a year. See page 26*f> footnote A-0.
^ I b i d . , 1877« Mch. Index No.86.
5 Ibid., 1882, Oct.Index No.21.
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The Superior civil service. The 1878 ruling reserving the lower
ranks of the administration for in­
digenous people led to the civil service of British Burma being 
graded by 1885 into three classes: superior, provincial, and sub­
ordinate. The superior service included divisional commissioners, 
deputy commissioners, and assistant commissioners. These were 
either European or, occasionally, Eurasian. The provincial ser­
vice was composed of the extra assistant commissioners, while the
35subordinate service consisted of myo-ok and their subordinates.
By 1885 entry to all ranks of the civil service was being increas­
ingly regulated by success in competitive examinations. The guid­
ing principle was that on which the Indian Civil Service was based 
in 1853*
This practice was first begun in 1859 when Phayre introduced 
a set of rules for examinations to ensure that assistant and extra 
assistant commissioners had a minimum understanding of the Burmese 
language as well as of the main principles of revenue administrat­
ion, police management, criminal and civil justice and the ordinary
rules of administrative procedure. Promotion was made dependent
36on officials passing the two standards of the test. The rules
were introduced to Tenasserim and after 1862 to Arakan.
35High ranking police officials, such as district and assistant sup­
erintendents, were also included in the superior provincial service. 
In 1862 there had been only two classes in the civil service, the 
superior and the subordinate, the latter then including extra assis­
tant commissioners as well as their subordinates. See pages261-26^.
36
I.F.P.P.,1859« 29th July, No s .118-120, and 130* The rules were 
based on those already in force in the Punjab.
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They were first revised in 1865 when it was ruled that assis­
tant commissioners could not draw full pay nor be entered in the 
Commission until they had passed the lower standard of the pre­
scribed examination in Burmese. Promotion to a deputy commissioner 
depended on passing the second standard of the examination in Burmese,
but cash rewards were offered to those qualifying in Burmese or Karen
37at the higher standards. This revision was, however, relaxed m  
the following year to allow the appointment of officers *not passed 
in Burmese but otherwise well qualified for employment in the Com­
mission*. Such appoi^^ents were conditional on the officers* 
passing the test in Burmese after a probationary period of one year 
and having a knowledge of some other oriental language. This was 
because Phayre*s successor, Fytche, felt that by making entry to 
the Commission dependent on a knowledge of Burmese the field of 
selection was so narrowed that the best available men no longer 
entered the Commission.^
In 187^ the rules were altered again so that assistant com­
missioners could not draw their full salaries till both standards 
had been passed. The same rules applied to military officials. 
Covenanted civilians who had been transferred from India and who 
had passed both standards of the examinations of other provinces, 
could draw full pay as assistant commissioners but could receive
37I.Fin.P., 1866, Dec.No.259* Officers were also no longer required 
to have a knowledge of Persian.
I.F.P.(Gen.), 186?, Sept. Nos. 1? and 18.
39no promotion until passing the examination in Burmese. The gov­
ernment of India was less concerned about the acquisition of Burmese 
by officials not in the executive service and not of gazetted rank. 
Police superintendents and assistant superintendents were required 
to pass only the lower standard of the test in Burmese and until 
1885 subordinate police officials, such as inspectors, were not re­
quired to undergo examination. Members of the forestry department 
and medical officers in civil employment were also exempt from ex­
amination in Burmese.^
Until the 1880*s there were few members of the I.C.S. on the 
British Burma Commission. The ’Non-Regulation* provinces had been 
excluded from the provisions of the Act of 1861, which stipulated 
that places in the administrative service were to be held by coven­
anted civilians. After 1862 the practice, begun in the 1820*s of 
appointing military men to the higher ranks of the superior service 
was continued as well as that of appointing uncovenanted 
civilians. Although no other army officers became chief com­
missioner after Phayre and Fytche, in 1880 the three divis­
ional commissioners were all military officers as were eleven of the
I.Fin.P., (Expend.), 187^, Sept. No.10.
IlQ
B.H.P. 118731 June Index No. 127 and 1878, Aug.Index Nos.^fO and • 
After 1878 forestry officials were required to learn Karen; medical 
officers were required to know only the common vernacular of India, 
though after 1883 the voluntary acquisition of Burmese was encour­
aged by offering rewards for passing the examination in Burmese. The 
government of India had earlier queried the necessity of encouraging 
police inspectors to learn Burmese. See Chapter VI,footnote 39. In 
1873 only one officer had passed the examination in Karen; one as­
sistant commissioner and one police superintendent knew a little 
Shan; one officer spoke Toungthu. B.H.P.,1873.Feb.Index No.l6(a). 
Interpreters were mostly used for the various Indian languages, 
such as Telagu, and also for Chinese.
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eighteen deputy commissioners* Five of the remainder were uncov­
enanted civilians, the other two being civilians; and of six 
assistant commissioners of the first class four were military offic- 
ers and two were uncovenanted civilians*
Pressure from the I*C*S. and from the authorities in England 
led to the gradual reduction of this imbalance between military
and covenanted civilians, which prevailed in most 'Non-Regulation*
1+2provinces* It was with some reluctance that the administration
in British Burma yielded to such pressures, as members of the I*C.S. 
had received no special training for British Burma, but because of 
their qualifications were entitled to relatively high rank in the 
civil service* No longer was such significance attached to the 
employment of military personnel in civil administration, but most 
of the men in the British Burma Commission had had most of their 
administrative experience in Burma and thus were well acquainted 
with its peoples and problems* It was feared that an influx of 
civilians would both reduce the efficiency of administration be­
cause of their inexperience of Burma and retard the provincial
B.H.P.,1880, Nov.Index No.25.
kp
Cf.Edward Blunt, The I*C,S* - The Indian Civil Service,(London, 
1939)*p*^5« It was felt that the system of military appointments 
in * Non-Regulation* provinces was one of patronage and interest 
and as such was contrary to the principles established in 1853*
The ‘civilians* also resented the fact that their rate of promot­
ion in such provinces was usually very slow* L*S.,0'Malley, The 
Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930*(London,1931)«P*92 and I*F*C.P*, 
1883, Jan.No.Mf. These pressures for change, however, coincided 
with the fact that the Indian regiments and Indian staff corps 
could no longer spare the large numbers of officers previously 
drawn off for civil employment.
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promotion rate which was already slow. Nonetheless by 1885
the superior service contained an increasing number of covenanted
civilians though military officers still held the higher and better
44
paid appointments. By this time, however, provision had been
made for civilians to be trained in England, especially for service
45
in British Burma.
The difficulty of learning Burmese, the remoteness and differ­
ence of Burma from India, the fact that experience there was of 
little use elsewhere in India',: the notorious expensiveness of the 
place, and the slow rate of promotion did not make British Burma 
the most attractive province of India in which to serve. Salaries 
always lagged behind those in other provinces, even though Bruce
46
and Temple had pointed out the imprudence of this as early as i860. 
Though deputy and assistant commissioners reached their rank earlier 
in life, they warranted lower salaries for their more limited ex­
perience, and their prospects of further increments in salary and 
status were limited. Moreover, the same principle of offering 
lower salaries applied in the higher echelons. In 1881 the judicial
IT*---------------------------------------- "
B.H.P., 1876, Oct. Index No. 39.
44
J.S.Furnivall, A Study of the Social and Economic History of Burma, 
Part IV, p.4.
43
B.H.P., 1885, Aug. Index No.21. They were to be already familiar 
with Burmese when they arrived. No further uncovenanted civilians 
were to be appointed to the superior service.
46
Op.cit.tp.27« They were, however, responsible for the grading of 
deputy, assistant, and extra assistant commissioners in British 
Burma, as prior to i860 there was only one grade of each of these 
ranks and that the lowest. This did serve to facilitate the pro­
motion rate to some extent as well as to enhance the attraction 
of service in the province.
commissioner received a salary of only 2 ,500 rupees a month, com­
pared with the monthly salaries of 3,000 rupees and over of the 
judicial commissioners of Oudh, the Central provinces, and Mysore. 
It was thus difficult to secure or retain officers of suitable
47
calibre and experience for the position,:despite its importance.
Furthermore, though British Burma had always been an expen­
sive province in which to live, there was no special allowance for 
British officials serving there, despite the Indian governments 
eventual acknowledgement of the need of special allowances or 
higher rates of pay for the lower grades. New appointments were 
invariably of the very lowest class in the grade and because of 
the straitened circumstances of the government of India establish­
ments were kept at the barest minimum. This helped retard the 
promotion rate, as did the fact that the rate of retirement was 
also slow.^8
The generally unattractive conditions for administrative
service were blamed for the various irregularities which occurred
not infrequently in the British Burma Commission. Although these
were not on the scale nor of the frequency of the irregularities
that had filled the annals of pre-1852 Tenasserim, a significant
49number of scandals and anomalies continued to occur. Fytche had
Zf7B.H.P.,'l88l, Apr.Index No.3.
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This was largely due to the expensiveness of the province as few 
could save enough to retire early. Ibid.,1882,Oct.Index No.21.
49
The part of a commissioner in a timber fraud has already been 
noted. Many demotions and dismissals stemmed from impropriety of
attributed the poor standard of men attracted to the Commission to 
the difficult language tests. Ashley Eden, associating it with 
the practice of appointing uncovenanted civilians, claimed,
... the only object of employing Uncovenanted civil­
ians is that their services were supposed to be cheaper 
than those of the trained Covenanted officers, but when 
they are appointed to the Commission they receive pre­
cisely the same pay and emoluments as Covenanted offic­
ers, and there is no sort of economy in their employ- 
ment; while their appointment opens a road to great job­
bery and the class of men depends too much on the per­
sonal disposition of the head of a local administration 
and his ability to remit the pressure which is brought 
to bear upon him from every conceivable source, local
and European.__50
It was not only the uncovenanted civilians who were criticised;
insinuations were also made against the civilians sent from India.
According to Thirkell White, men were sent to Burma for their
51sins or for a term of years.
Efforts made to strike at the root causes of the troubles 
included the governments provision in 1877 of quarters in sub­
divisions. This prevented officials making their own arrange­
ments which, it was feared, were frequently the cause of 'the
scandal ... attached to the lives of so many officers formally
52
m  the Burma Commission*• In the 1880's the judicial commission­
er , on discovering a great number of irregularities in deputy com­
missioners* judicial work, such as neglect of rules, the passing
conduct either in a private or public capacity, though there were 
instances of gross negligence and insubordination as well.
50B.H.P.. 1873, June Index No.180.
51A Civil Servant in Burma, (London,1913)vP»7» White added, *A 
Chief Commissioner’s wife is said to have told one of these young 
men that other Brovinces sent their worst men to Burma.1
6f inadequate sentences, carelessness in dealing with habitual
criminals, and inadequate supervision of subordinates, suggested
that these be always taken into consideration in determining pro- 
53motion. A more positive step than this, however, was taken
with the reduction of European numbers at the lower levels of the
administration. It was expected that this would lead to a more
rapid and satisfactory rate of promotion and a consequent improve-
54
ment in morale and administrative performance.
Provincial and Subordinate Civil Service The attempt to grant
more administrative 
responsibility to the indigenous people was not made without meet­
ing difficulties. Until this time a significant characteristic 
of British administration in Burma had been the lack of provision 
for the participation of the indigenous people and the firm domin­
ance of administration by Europeans. Their wide distribution 
throughout the province and the close contact European officials 
were required to have with their administrative charges were part 
of the strength of the British administrative system. This had 
been somewhat diluted by the practice of keeping the ranks of the 
superior service at a minimum, making transfers frequent as
52B.H.P., 1877, Mch. Index N0 .86.
53Ibid.,1883,Sept.Index No.4. He also attributed the faults to 
lack of training in India for officers serving in Burma.
5 Ibid., 1880, Nov.Index No.25.
officials went on leave or were promoted, so that contact between 
officials sind districts was weakened. Now by allowing Burmans 
to prove their administrative ability in important positions, it 
seemed administrative efficiency must suffer further as Europeans 
were replaced by inexperienced and unproven Burman officers.
Both the governor-general, Lord Ripon, and Charles Bernard, chief 
commissioner from 1880 to 1883 and from l88*f to 1887* were willing, 
however, to put up with some decline in efficiency for the 'nat­
ional and political advantage* of giving more responsibility to 
55Burmans.
It was a question of deciding how much inefficiency was per­
missible as, for instance, the sharp increase in crimes in the
Han-tha-wadi district in 1882 had been associated with the sudden
56removal of \ European officiate and 1hor replacement by r. Burmans. 
Moreover, there were few Burman. officials sufficiently familiar 
with English even to be able to assist deputy commissioners at 
district head-quarters, especially with treasury work. Because 
of this, in smaller districts, such as Tavoy, Kyauk-hpyu, and Thon- 
gwa, where no assistant commissioners were stationed at district 
head-quarters, the district civil surgeons were allowed to help
57the deputy commissioners when the onus of work necessitated it.
Until 1880 only a very small number of Burmans had occupied
55Ibid.
Ibid. ,1882, Oct.Index No. 10. ... L.
Ibid., 1881, May Index No.29.
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positions of more than minor responsibility* None had been in­
vested with the full powers of a magistrate nor had any been ap-
58pointed to a sub-division except in a temporary capacity* The
early years of British rule had seemed to hold better prospects
for Burmans. Phayre had promoted the first Burman to be an extra
assistant commissioner as early as i860; this was Maung Khaing,
59a former sit-ke of Rangoon. In the same year Bruce and Temple
had recommended that 'some superior appointments should be open to 
deserving* Burmans and suggested that two rather remote extra­
assistant commissionerships in the Rangoon and Bassein districts 
be reserved for them.^ And in 1863 of the six first class extra­
assistant commissioners on *f00 rupees a month one wass Maung Khaing 
and of the three extra-assistant commissioners on 350 ruppes a month 
there was one other Burman.
By 1880 Burman extra-assistant commissioners could still earn 
no more than kOO rupees a month, although European extra-assistants 
could earn up to 600 rupees a month and were eligible for promotion 
to assistant commissionerships. As early as 186? there had been 
a resolution by the government of India on the necessity of employ­
ing indigenous peoples as assistant commissioners in the ’Non- 
Regulation* provinces but nothing had come of it in British Burma.
-g— — ----------------------------------------------------------------
^ B . H . P . t 1880, Nov. Index No.23.
^ 1 . F . P . P . , i860, 3rd Feb. No.289* See also pagss8*K5*footnote 8P.
^Op.cit., p.27«
61
I.F.P.,(Gen.), 1863» July, No.70* The latter was Maung Oung, later 
second judge of the Rangoon court of small causes. See below.
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The chief commissioner, Fytche, had thought that Burmans were not
qualified sufficiently to be so promoted, btt had suggested that
they might eventually hold one-fourth of the assistant commission-
62erships. He gave, however, no date for this.
The one appointment of importance open to Burmans was that 
of the second judge of the Rangoon court of small causes. This 
was sanctioned, however, more on political grounds than as a means 
of promoting the more able indigenous officials. The first judge 
of the Rangoon small cause court had understood Burmese, but when 
one was appointed who did not, dissatisfaction grew among the 
Burman community because complaints and pleading could no longer 
be in Burmese. To remove this cause of discontent, Ashley Eden 
had suggested that a Burman or someone thoroughly acquainted with 
Burmese be appointed also. The government of Indian initially 
rebuffed the suggestion on the grounds that Burmans did not pre­
dominate numerically in Rangoon, but eventually sanctioned it be­
cause of British fears in the previous year that the Burmese king
was trying to undermine British authority by the use of agents 
63provocateurs. Eden had urged,
Under our present system the salary of the highest
office to which a native of Burma can hope to attain
is Rupees -^00 per mensem. No Burmese official has
ever received a higher salary than this. From a pol­
itical point of view, this limit to their hopes and
62
I.F.P.,(Gen.),1867< Dec.Nos.2 and 3* The government of India had 
stipulated that a quarter of the assistant commissionerships was 
the maximum to be held by Burmans.
63
B.H.P., 1872, Aug.Index Nos. 30 and 41.
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ambitions is ... mischievous, in so much as it leads
them to compare the position of the leading Burmese
officials among us with that of the leading offic­
ials in Upper Burma. This contrast is unquestion­
ably very prominently and perseveringly presented 
to them by the Agents of the King., and other mis­
chievous and intriguing persons •••
He thought also that th^&ppointment would have the desirable effect 
of inducing the whole service of Burmese extra assistant commiss­
ioners to acquire greater legal knowledge. Moreover, he was of 
the opinion that indigenous society would benefit from the appoint­
ment, ass the injection of 'some sort of social disparity and ex­
citement' into it would relieve it from the social stagnation that
6k
came from the people being 'all too much on a dead level'.
The first reports on the new judge seemed to justify his ap­
pointment almost immediately. The number of cases in which Burmans 
were involved rose significantly and it was inferred that 'the
Burmese have greater confidence in a^Burman Judge than in an English 
65one*. By 1876, however, complaints were being lodged with the
chief commissioner about various irregularities occurring in the
66court of the second judge. Doubts were also being raised about
the legislative basis for the appointment, despite the amendment 
of the Burma Courts Act in 1875» As the first incumbent retired 
soon after, the position of his successor was put on a more regular 
footing and rules were framed to prevent the recurrence of the
55--------------------------------------------------------------------
Ibid., No.37-
Ibid., 187^1 May Index No.2.
66 • o r  rIbid., 1o76, Aug.Index No.56- There was also some personal antag­
onism between the two judges of the small cause court.
230
early irregularities.
One obstacle to be overcome in granting indigenous officials 
greater administrative responsibility was the differences that ex­
isted between the functions and conduct of officials under British 
and under Burmese rule. The system of governance under British 
rule rested on law* administered impartially and impersonally; 
whereas under Burmese rule the system rested mainly on custom and 
authority, which could be both personal and partial. Accordingly 
nepotism and 1gift-acceptance1 continued into the British regime 
and were still embarrassingly prevalent at the end of the period, 
although rarely were these found to amount to indictable corrupt­
ion. It was thought that the frequency of such practices might 
be reduced by raising the salaries of indigenous officials, but 
only by changing the values and customs of indigenous society 
could they be completely eradicated. People gave presents in the 
hope of influencing officials, as in the old regime, If they 
were not accepted by the officials themselves, their relatives and 
hangers-on would do so. G. D. Burgess, the secretary to the chief 
commissioner^ believed,
that the most the Myo-oke himself will do will 
be to accept supplies and carriage as he trav­
els, and such things as wood to make his house, 
bamboo to make his fence, grain for household 
use, and so on, without being too careful to 
see that the price is paid or that market rates
£rp 1 n ' i 1 ■ ■ ■' _ . .
B.H.P., 1877, Aug. Index No.^ f and I.J.P. ,1881, Nov.Index No.21. 
The incumbent was also required to know English. This was mainly 
to enhble his English-speaking judicial superiors to supervise 
his work.
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are given. He will also consent to receive 
small presents, particularly of eatables, such 
as a pig, turtle eggs, vegetables, etc. with 
a constancy and to an extent which are improper 
to his station.
Until 1862 the administrative role of indigenous officials
had been similar to what it had been under the Burmese, in that
each local official had responsibility for all affairs within his
territorial charge. After 1862, following the recommendation of
Bruce and Temple, the separation of powers in all administrative
positions below that of extra-assistant commissioner was carried
6<3
out. ' Myo-ok and sit-ke were formally restricted to judicial 
• _
work and thagyl to revenue work, but they were all still expected
to maintain their interest in all other public affairs, such as
70police and general social affairs. The judicial commissioner’s
emphasis on the importance of judicial work and the growing import­
ance of revenue work for thagyl caused, however, a contraction in 
the public interests of officials to those to which they had been 
specifically confined by the administrative rules. Such a develop­
ment inevitably had repercussions on the general standard of adminis­
trative efficiency in the province, and was frequently and officially 
deplored, especially at times of crisis. For instance, in 1883»
when there was a significant increase in the crime rate, the chief
’ "  1 ■  .
B.H.P., 1881, Feb. Index No.30. c :
69R. Temple and H. Bruce, op.cit.. p.22.
70The establishment of a separate police force in the 1850*s had not 
led to much co-operation by myo-ok, thagyl and gaung with it. In 
fact, considerable rivalry and even antagonism were shown towards 
the new officials.
commissioner declared,
There is a tendency on the part of all Magis­
trates ... to regard themselves as •Courts* and 
to look upon * the Bench* as their proper sphere*
This feeling extends to the Myooks, who should 
be made to understand that they are not mere 
legal machines but men invested with author­
ity and expected to obtain influence and to 
use it earnestly in the cause of order* The 
Burman Township Officer is as important a 
part of the administrative machine as the 
Deputy Magistrate of Bengal or the Tahsildar 
of the Central Provinces and Northern India*
It is essential that he should look upon him­
self as an Executive as much as a Judicial
Officer.^
As the organisation for the supervision of the lower courts 
was improved and extended, deficiencies in the judicial work of 
indigenous officials were increasingly brought to light. Al­
though it was known in 1863.that the judgements of Burman judges
were neither methodical nor always consistent with western logic,
72the British noted that they generally gave satisfaction. These
defects were less tolerated later, especially as indigenous offic­
ials were noticeably lenient in sentencing. In the 1880*s when 
the crime rate was rising steeply, this was regarded as a serious 
fault and great effort was expended in impressing on judicial 
officials the need of passing adequate sentences.
Attempts to ensure that indigenous officials understood their 
duties under the British administrative system and that they had 
the requisite qualifications, were largely concentrated on develop-
71B.H.P.. 1883, Sept. Index No.12.
72I.F.P.(Jud.),1863* Aug* N o . T h e  paucity of appeals against 
their judgements was viewed with some favour.
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ing the system of selection by examination* Phayre had consid­
ered introducing such a system in 1865 as it was becoming more 
apparent that the early method of selecting indigenous officials 
according to their influence and general administrative ability
was inadequate as far as testing their ability to administer 
73British law* It was Fytche, however, who began cautiously to
introduce the examination system in 1867* Although he believed
that this was a better method of deciding between the rival claims
of candidates than relying on the discretion of the local British
administrative official, he also believed that ‘the class from
which the Judges must be selected is restricted and time and edu-
7k
cation alone can improve that class'.
V
Until such a time, the initial effects of introducing such a 
system were not all good. Successful candidates were increasingly 
transferred to vacant positions where they had no influence over 
or knowledge of the people* As the commissioner of Pegu pointed 
out in 1871,
It is very difficult ••• to suddenly disturb 
arrangements which have long existed, and the 
sudden transferring to other places of men who 
have no ideas beyond their own district ••• 
would not be I think attended with immediate 
good results. Even the removal of some iriyookes 
lately who failed to pass their examination, I 
have come to believe, gave rise to a vindictive 
feeling.„
7?I.J.P.. 1865, Sept. No.19.
Ibid.. 1870, Jan.Index No.8%.
75B.H.P.. 1871, Dec. Index No.230.
By 1882 the system of selecting officials by examination,
though by no means fully introduced, was coming increasingly under
criticism from the divisional commissioners who thought that the
calibre and prestige of indigenous officials were declining because
frequently the most qualified men were too young to secure influence
and were without long-standing influence in the areas to which they
76were appointed. It was also recognised that education had 'not
made sufficient progress among the mass of the people* to make 
selection by examination *fair or afford a sufficient supply of 
the class of men wanted*. Moreover, the government could not ig­
nore the claims of those 'who have been doing good work in the
service of Government in the expectation of obtaining a reward in
77promotion to a Myookship*.
Because of this, it was then decided that candidates could
be examined after they had first been selected on the basis of 
good character, education and knowledge of English, previous good 
service, local standing and influence, hereditary claims, and phys­
ical fitness for active work. No person believed to be unfit
'either by reason of youth or any other disadvantage'was to be 
78
nominated. The subjects of the actual examination included
English and Burmese, law, the various penal and revenue rules, 
arithmetic, surveying and agriculture. A pass in Burmese was
Ibid., 1882, Oct. Index No.10.
Ibid., May Index No.14.
7 Ibid., 1883, Sept. Index No.12.
79obligatory. The other subjects were optional.
By this time qualification by examination was beginning to 
control the entrance to government clerkships as well, as these
frequently provided an entry to the ranks of the administrative
80service. Indeed, after 1881 they were included within it, be­
ing listed as the lowest rank of the subordinate civil service,
from which promotion could be more easily and regularly facilit- 
81ated. Prior to this, entry to a clerkship was mostly achieved
after a long term of 'volunteering* in an office, a system which 
was regarded as being both inefficient and favourable to the dev-
82elopment of corruption.
But although the examination system ensured a greater under­
standing of British administrative requirements, a knowledge of 
English was increasingly necessary once the way was open for Burman
79Ibid.,1882, Sept.Index No.18. Marks were also allotted for various 
educational certificates, for previous good service as a thagyl 
or other administrative official, hereditary claims by virtue of 
good service done to the British government by father, grand­
fathers or uncles, and physical fitness.
80
B.H.P.,1882, Mch.Index No.2*f, No.2. Clerkships to the Recorder's 
office and that of the comptroller, and to the public Works de­
partment's office were excluded from this for the time being, 
however.
81Until 187^ revenue accountants, still known as ahkun-wun, had 
been able to be promoted as sit-ke and extra assistant commiss­
ioners. It was thought judicial work suffered through promot­
ing men without judicial experience and after 187^ ahkun-wun were 
still able to become extra assistant commissioners but were con­
fined to work for the revenue department. B.H.P., 1873» July 
Index No . 156 and 187*N July Index No.100.
8?
Ibid., 18771 Nov. Appendix B and 1882, Mch.Index No.2^f, No.2.
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officials to take charge of sub-divisions and ultimately of dis- 
83tricts. As Charles Bernard pointed out,
As the requirements of British administration 
grow more and more complicated, it becomes very 
difficult for an officer who cannot read English 
to discharge duties of higher responsibility 
than that of township officer ... Without such 
knowledge they must remain ignorant of many of 
our laws and they can never really understand 
our administrative system and aims.g^
To some extent, the translation department had helped to 
keep non-English speaking officials abreast with administrative 
developments* First founded during the chief commissionership 
of Albert Fytche, because not ten out of ninety-two extra­
assistant commissioners entrusted with magisterial and revenue 
powers could then read English, the department had grown from the
translator-interpreter of 1869 to include by 1881 a senior trans-
85lator, two assistant translators, and one clerk* Even though
aided by external translators, the department could still not keep
up with the spate of work. Not until 1882, for instance, was the
Indian Stamp Act of 18?9 translated, although any document executed
on a wrong stamp after April 18?9 was liable to be declared null 
86and void. A list of law books the judicial commissioner consid-
83
B.H.P*, 1882, Nov.Index No.25* The latter development was not ex­
pected to take place until 1904 or later.
B.B.A.R., 1880-8 1, p.8.
83
I.Fin.P.(Expend.), l869,Mch.Nos.88 and 89-and B.H.P.,1881, July 
Index No.1101. Prior to 1869 government officials had done 
translation in their spare time. The duties of the translation 
department in 1881 included translating administrative rules and 
legislative acts, reporting on the five vernacular newspapers, 
o^and translating petitions and notices.
B.H.P., 1882, May Index No.18, No.3»
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ered essential for Burman officials was submitted to be translated 
into the vernacular, but the advantage of their knowing English 
could not be denied. Not only did English-speaking officials not 
have to wait on the translation department, they could resort im­
mediately to the originals and also receive personal copies of all 
legislation in force in British Burma.
The granting of more responsibilities to indigenous officials 
caused their salaries and prospects of promotion to be reviewed.
This was to ensure that they could afford to live in the style 
associated with officials, to place them above corruption, and to 
co-ordinate their salaries and grades with those of officials in 
the rest of British India. The salaries of myo-ok and the lower
grades of extra assistant commissioners had not been revised since
871862 in spite of a substantial rise in prices since then. Many
were discharging duties similar to those of the tahsilders of the
Punjab and the deputy collectors of Bengal and food prices and
wages in British Burma were, according to the chief commissioner,
at least double those in India. Yet the salaries of Burman offic-
88ials were considerably below those of their Indian counterparts.
O rj
The number of myp-ok had then been reduced from 67 to 39 and the 
area of townships increased. This was to raise their salaries 
from a minimum of 30 rupees a month to a minimum of 100 rupees. 
Bruce and Temple had then considered this the lowest on which 
myo-ok could maintain their position. Op.cit.,p.28.
88
Salaries of tahsildars ranged from 123 to 230 rupees a month while 
myp-ok (extra assistant commissioners of the third grade, 2nd and 
3rd classes) received 100 and 123 rupees a month respectively.
The maximum salary of a Burman extra assistant commissioner was 
4-00 rupees a month. B.H.P., 1881, Feb. Index No.30. Assistant
It was decided after a general enquiry into the condition 
of Burman officials in 1881 that it was ’doubtful whether i^is 
possible to live as a myo-oke on the pay of the two lower grades*
89
which were the most numerous. Myo-ok supplemented their m -
90comes *in oneway or another'. Colonel Duff, the commissioner
of Pegu, thought that the existing scheme of salaries for indigen
ous officials was open to the reproach that the British were
'training up men who must either, as a rule, become hopelessly
91involved in debt, or systematically corrupt'. The heavy pre­
dominance of the lower grades also served to frustrate hopes of 
promotion, which G. D. Burgess thought formed
one of the chief inducements to a Burman officer 
to walk in the straight and narrow path and 
strive to do well, as it is the position and
influence of a Myo-oke, and the distinction of
being addressed as Paya, which lead bad men 
to enter the Commission who would scorn to 
serve all their life as clerks on twice the 
pay*92
commissioners' salaries ranged from 300 to 700 rupees a month 
while deputy commissioners' ranged between 1,000 and 1,833 rupees 
a month. Ibid., 1882, Oct. Index No.21.
89
There were 63 extra assistant commissioners drawing less than 
150 rupees a month in 1880 and 33 earning more.
90Apart from receiving'gifts', it was widely thought that most 
myg-ok had; a separate source of income, such as land, house 
property, or invested money, though often these were in the name 
of a relative.
9 B.H.P.. 1881, Feb. Index No.30.
92Ibid.
While it was believed that corruption was rare, it was
thought that many irregularities might be removed, by raising
the minimum salary from 100 to 150 rupees a month and by consid-
93erably increasing the number of higher grade appointments.
This also enabled a closer correspondence to be established be­
tween the grades and salaries of Burman and Indian officials,
Oif
which was then the policy of the government of India* The
old system of classification was abandoned and myQ-ok and extra 
assistant commissioners became two distinct categories of offic­
ials* The latter received salaries ranging between 300 and 800 
rupees a month while the former were on salaries ranging from 150 
to 250 rupees. They then corresponded more closely with the 
tahsildars and deputy collectors of India, who had also been re­
graded. The latter were then the equivalents of extra assistant 
commissioners who constituted the new provincial service while
myQ-ok and all other officials receiving less than 300 rupees a
93month remained in the subordinate service.
B.H.P., 1881, Feb.Index No.30 and 1883» Sept. Index No.215- Five 
extra assistant commissioners were to receive over 500 rupees a 
month while 32 were to receive between 300 and 500 rupees a month. 
Most of these were not indigenous people. Previously only one ex­
tra assistant commissioner had received more than 500 rupees and 
11 over 300 rupees a month.
94
Bruce and Temple had recommended establishing greater parity be­
tween myQ-ok and tahsildars in i860. Op.cit.,p.28.
93
Extra assistant commissioners of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grades 
were also known as 1wundauk1and those of the 5th and 6th grade 
as sit-ke. The new system of classification caused some confus­
ion over nomenclature, legality, and jurisdiction, as the Burma 
Courts Act of 1875 had not been amended to include myQ-ok or the 
new grades of extra assistant commissioner. This was overcome,
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In the half decade that followed the decision to allow more 
administrative responsibility to Burmans, comparatively few rose 
to any eminence, despite British efforts to encourage a general 
increase in responsibility. In 1881 one Burman, Maung Ba One, 
who had been partly educated in England, was appointed as a pro­
bationer in the civil service under the statute of 1870, but in
95a1883 there were only three Burmans in charge of sub-divisions*
A few selected Burmans were given first class magisterial powers 
and some were handling civil cases up to the value of 3*000 rupees* 
As more Burmans acquired a knowledge of English, however, they were 
appointed as treasury officials, and the appointment of honorary 
magistrates led to more indigenous people participating in the 
administration of justice.
Although theoretically positions in the provincial and sub­
ordinate civil service were open to all Burmans, by 1885 the Bur­
mese, Arakanese, and mons predominated in a way disproportionate 
to their numbers. In 1887 Donald Sraeaton estimated that of the 
120 extra assistant commissioners and myo-ok in Lower Burma, there
were at most six Karens, although Karens formed one-fifth to one-
96sixth of the population. This resulted largely from the integ-
however, by a ruling of the chief commissioner, sanctioned by the 
goverment of India. I.F.C.P*(Accts.and Fin.),1883,Sept.Nos.1330 and 
1331 and B.H.P.,July Index No.3* See also page
9 5 aB . B . A . R . , 1880-81, p . 8.
96
The Loyal Karens of Burma, (London,1878),p.229* This situation com­
pared unfavourably with that prevailing earlier in the British re­
gime. Of the thirteen myo-ok Fytche had appointed i# Bassein in 
1853* four had been Karens. In 185^ Karen agents (na-gan) were 
appointed to each tribe in Taung-ngu and in 1859 two of these were
ration policy Eden had attempted to introduce in the 1870*6. Be­
lieving it ’inadvisable to attempt to elevate them into a separate 
and competing nationality* and considering it administratively in­
convenient to have two vernacular languages in one province, Eden 
cancelled the examination rules in Karen for candidates to myo-ok- 
ships in l8?2.^a
The rules were relaxed only when a Karen myo-ok *not other- 
wise eligible for appointment* was needed, such as in 1881 when a 
Karen was appointed in the Bassein district to check Burmese money­
lenders exploiting the Karens t h e r e . A p a r t  from their appoint­
ment in this way, entry to the civil service became more difficult 
for Karens in the 1880*s because of their need of passing examinat­
ions in both Burmese and English.
Thagyl Effort was also being made at this time to impress upon 
thagyl that they should use their local knowledge and 
influence for the greater benefit of the administration. Ever 
since 1862 they had tended to restrict their official activities 
to the revenue duties to which they had then been formally con­
fined. This formal restriction was due to a variety of reasons 
feut owed much to early British distrust against leaving thagyl 
with too much influence and too many opportunities for taking
promoted to the status of myo-ok. E.S.L.I.,185 -^»Encl.7 to Better 7 
of 18th July and I.E.P.P.,1839, 15th April, No.585.
^ aB.H.P.,1872, Nov.Index No.55 and 1875*Jan.Indes No.7^»
^^^Ibid.,1882, Oct.Index No.22.
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advantage of their traditional position in society, Colvin had
queried the prudence of granting them 'too much power' in 1853 and
many of the disorders in early British Arakan and Pegu had seemed
97to justify such a query. The later continued irregularities in
thagyi1s fiscal duties also roused British scepticism of their
98trustworthiness m  dealing with revenue matters.
These considerations were largely responsible for Bruce and 
Temple's recommending in i860 that thagyi be relieved of their 
police functions and that their fiscal responsibilities be reduced. 
The latter was to be achieved by inducing the people to accept 
long-term land revenue settlements and thus do away with the annual 
land revenue assessments conducted under the auspices of the thagyi. 
They also recommended that the area of thagyi* s circles be enlarged 
so that each thagyi collected over 6*000 rupees a year. In this 
way the total revenue paid to thagyi by commission would be con­
siderably reduced, as commission on collections over 6,000 rupees 
was only 5 Ver cent, compared with the 10 per cent on collections 
below that amount. Bruce and Temple recognised, however, the 
value of thagyi's influence and local knowledge to police and gen­
eral administration and stressed that though deprived of police
duties, they would still 'be bound to aid the Police under the
99General Regulations*.
97B.S.B.R.P.. 1853, 3rd June, No. 3 D.
98
In 1859 the estimated amount of revenue embezzled by the thagyi 
in Pegu was 11,820 rupees, almost three times the amount plund- 
dered by gang robberies after the collections had been made. 
I.F.P.P..1859. 3rd June, No.V77. \
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These recommendations were implemented but the British still 
continued to find cause for dissatisfaction with thagyi. Corrupt­
ion and tenacity to old ways as well as inadequacy as revenue 
officers were the most frequent charges made against them. For 
the first decade or so after 1862 most were still ignorant of the 
basic principles of surveying and were still reliant on the ser- 
vices of hired surveyors.
At that stage it was felt that the most effective way of
counteracting the * improper influence* of thagyi was by frequent
101
tours of the circles by the deputy commissioners. It was not
long, however, before some attempt was made to introduce the exam­
ination system as a method of selection. Albert Fytche had begun 
to insist on thagyi*s being qualified in surveying and deprived
thagyi of government assistance towards: the cost of hiring survey- 
102ors. Later in 1879 it was ruled that all thagyi appointed to
99 .•"R. Temple and H. Bruce, op.cit. ,pp.*f, 22, and 29* Circles were 
to be amalgamated, however, only when vacancies occurred and 
when there were no hereditary successors to be considered.
^^Arakanese surveyors had been mostly used at first in Pegu but 
were later mainly replaced by Karens. This put an end to the 
collusion that had been developing between surveyors and thagyi 
to the detriment of government revenue. I.F.P.(Rev.),1862,Dec.
No.16.
101T,._ ,T
Ibid., No.15*
102
I.F.P.(Gen.),1867. The temporary rule introduced by Phayre in 
1856 for government*s meeting the cost of surveying for thagyi 
collecting less than *f00 rupees a year was thus abolished. As 
a result of Fytche*s ruling, the number of thagyi qualified in 
the Rangoon district alope increased from two at the beginning 
of the year to eleven at the end, as well as seven sons and 
relations of thagyi. B.B.R.A.R., 1870-71, p*79*
244
circles of which the commission exceeded 500 rupees a year were 
to hold office only for a probationary period of a year. In 
this time they were to pass examinations in surveying, accounting, 
and the revenue law of the province. Hereditary claims, local 
influence, intelligence, and good character were also to be taken
into consideration, provided candidates had equal formal qualif-
• 103ications.
By the end of the period under review the revenue work of 
thagyl was being more favourably reported on although much was 
still criticised. The examination system ensured their possess­
ing a better knowledge of their revenue duties. Those who were 
unable to adapt to the changed conditions of service and who had 
previously relied more on the irregular perquisites of office than 
on their regular commission found that the need of being qualified
and the increasing British vigilance made the office no longer
10*fworth retaining. Furthermore, the amalgamation of smaller
circles ensured not only that government benefitted from the
smaller amount of revenue paid because of the larger commissions
on every circle, but also that annual commissions were adequate
105to attract more suitable men to the position. At the same
10?B.H.P., 1879, July Index No.bG.
104
B.B.R.A.R., 1870-71, p.78.
105
There were 930 circles in British Burma in 1883, whereas there 
had been 719 in Pegu alone in i860. R. Temple and H. Bruce, 
op.cit.,p.29 and B.B.A.R.,1882-85» p.11. Circleg£n Tenasserim 
had always been smaller than elsewhere in the province and 
thagyl there seemed least able. In 1853 there had been 217 
thagyi in Amherst district, of whom 156 received less thah 5
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time the opportunities for corruption had been largely reduced
as ~thagyi were required to submit some sort of security before
taking up their appointments.106
The formal restriction of thagyi to revenue work after 1862,
the continued emphasis thereafter on the correct performance of
their revenue duties, and the increase in revenue work caused by
the larger circles and increased area under cultivation, meant
that thagyi spent more time on book work and less in their circles.
Frequently they had assistants for the actual collections, so that
often thagyi knew nothing of their assistants* activities in their
circles until they received the tax receipts for the revenue coll- 
107ections. The widespread introduction of long-term land rev­
enue settlements also caused thagyi to have less to do with their 
circles. Furthermore, the practice had also been begun of trans­
ferring the more efficient thagyi to circles where revenue collect­
ions yielded higher commissions, so that their hereditary and long-
108standing ties with areas were being weakened as well.
rupees a month. B.S.B.R.P.,1853« 9th Dec.,No. 65 and Ibid.,30th 
Aug.,No.31« In 1868 there were 135 thagyl in the district, 70 of 
whom could neither read nor write. 33 could read and write but 
could not keep accounts or survey. Only 3^ thagyi-had a commission 
of 500 rupees a year, which was considered the minimum for at­
tracting competent men to the position. B.B.R.A.R.,1867-68,p.403.
1°6b .B.R.A.R. , 1880-81 ,p.2 1. S°me thagyi stood security for each other 
and others submitted securities to the government.
107
B.H.P.,1883»Aug.Index No.12. The fact that the assistants pre­
ferred to regard themselves as assistants to the supplementary 
surveyor and not to the thagyi also tended to weaken a thagyl* s 
knowledge of and influence in his circle. B.B. A.R., l88 f^-8 5,P*8 .q TH-TTN. n  71
B.B.R.A.R.. 1870-71, p.78.
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By 1883 this decline in influence and knowledge of their 
circles by thagyl as well as their general reluctance to become 
involved in any administrative work other than their revenue duties 
was being widely deplored by the more senior members of the com­
mission, Charles Crosthwaite, the chief commissioner then, com­
mented,
••• there is a great difference in the class of 
men now appointed as thoogyees. Formerly a thoogyee 
was generally selected from amongst those in a 
circle who had some influence and were respected; 
but now the chief point looked to is qualificat­
ion in surveying; and it is almost impossible 
to get men who have influence and are at the same 
time qualified.
Phayre had been dubious about the consequences of depriving thagyi
110of their police responsibilities in 1862, By 1885 his doubts
were justified when the advantages of the traditional system of 
having thagyi responsible for all matters within their circles 
were increasingly recalled, as it became more and more apparent 
that the separate police department the British had created was 
unable to cope with its responsibilities. But British insistence 
on the priority of revenue work and the evolution of an administ­
rative structure with divided responsibilities, allowed only lim­
ited success to such efforts as were made to restore to thagyi
111some measure of their former influence and local prestige.
9B.H.P.. 1883, Aug. Index No.12.
110
I.J.P., 1862 June No.3 9.
111 -  .The role of thagyi m  police administration is discussed further
in the next chapter.
Chapter VI
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION.
1862-1883
Although British Burma was not to be troubled again, at least 
in this period, by the disorders and ’dacoity’ that had hindered 
the imposition of British law and order in Pegu in the 1830,s, it 
was to be troubled by a steadily rising crime rate which grew out 
of all proportion to the increase in the population. And not only 
did petty crime and theft increase in number but also crimes of 
violence. In 1861 there had been 67 crimes of this nature while 
in 1882 there were 1*f8 murders, 91 cases of dacoity, and 211 of
"I
robbery. By 1883 it was believed that ’the province had got out 
of hand* and references to the ’criminality of the population* be­
came frequent. In these circumstances police administration lost 
none of the importance it had had in the first difficult years of 
British rule in Pegu.
No adequate explanation was found for the development of 
such a crime rate. The frequent murders were early attributed to 
the passionate and impulsive nature of the Burmans and the dacoity
of the post-1850’s was thought to be as much a stage through which
, , , . . 2  Immigrants, oftenexuberant youth passed as a serious crime.
itinerant workers among whom there was a high crime rate, were
^B.B.A.R., 1861-62, p.9 and 1882-83* P«83- By 1885 juvenile de­
linquency was also on the increase.
I.J.P.. 1871, Mch.Index No.10.
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blamed for many of the crimes in the province. Rises in the 
crime rate were also correlated with extraordinary conditions.
In 1866^6 7, for instance, many crimes were attributed to the high 
prices of food and to the political turbulence in Upper Burma fol-
Zf
lowing a rebellion there. Later explanations were sought in the
5
state of society. It was thought that the moral standards of 
the people had deteriorated following the decline in the Buddhist 
monasteries of British Burma. The increases in gambling and in 
alcohol and opium consumption were also interpreted as further
£
symptoms of the general moral and social decline of the people.
Yet as with other theories this was disproved on occasion, as in
3
It was thought that for many migrants from Upper Burma residence 
there had been 1 rendered uncomfortable by their own misdeeds' and 
that they were unaccustomed to 'the strict control to which our 
people are subjected'. B.B.A.R.,1871-72, p-83- It seemed, however, 
until the 1880's, at least, that there was a higher rate of con­
viction among the Indian community of the province than for the 
Burmans. In 1875* ®*39 per cent of the Buddhist population was in 
jail, compared with 1 .78 per cent of the Hindus and O .65 of the 
Mahommedans. B.B.A.R.,1876-77» p.2 6.
Ibid., 1866-67, p.38.
c
In 1876 it was noted that there was almost no connexion between 
the prevalence of theft and the dearness of food, so tha reverse 
explanation was offered - that in times of plenty more money was 
about and more people were tempted to steal more of it. B.B.A.R., 
1874-75, Intro, p.9.
£
The opium and gambling dens were also regarded as breeding grounds 
for crime, particularly in the 1880's when a game known as the 
Chinese lottery or 'the thirty-six animal game', became widespread 
throughout the province except in Rangoon, where it had been 
banned from the first. Regarded as a particularly pernicious form 
of gambling, it was finally suppressed in 1884. I.L.P., 1884, Oct. 
No.184.
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1883 when a crowd of between 10,000 and 30*000 assembled for three
days for the Rangoon boat races, only one offence was reported to 
7
the police.
Although a strong police force was maintained throughout 
this period, the considerable increase in crime which occurred 
in the 1870’s and after and the apparent inability of the police 
to suppress or detect it caused the administration to attempt strik-
g
ing at the supposed social roots of the trouble. Restrictions
were gradually introduced against gambling and in 1881 half the
opium shops of the province were closed and the prices of both
alcohol and opium increased. Effort was also made to increase
public co-operation in reducing; the crime problem, as there was
a growing suspicion that Burmans did not always set such great
9
store by British law and order. People were often apathetic
B.B.A.R.t 1880-81, p.11. J.S.Furnivall attributed the causes of 
the development of crime to the economic changes stimulated by 
the opening of the Suez Canal and to the growing agrarian instab­
ility. Colonial Policy and Practice, (Cambridge, 19^8), p.1^1. 
Dr.Kyaw Yin traced the causes to social dislocation from * the 
anti-social economic and political forces that enamated from the 
new colonial culture1. ’The Problem of Crime and the Criminal and 
its Solution in Socialist Burma*, J.B.R.S., June, 196^ f, Pt.1, 
Vol.XLVII, p.206. It would seem however, that this was not the 
first time crime had appeared in Burma, as the long reign of 
Bo-daw-hpaya* was marred by almost a decade of violence and brig­
andage. G.E.Harvey, History of Burma, (London, 1923)* p.272.
g
In 1879 it was reported there was an increase of 50 per cent in 
the crimes of violence in the previous five-year period and a de­
crease of ^ per cent in the number of convictions obtained from 
reported offences. B.H.P., 1879* May Appendix C.
9
Cf. Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma, (London,1912), 
p.23* It seems there was also a certain amount of social accept­
ance, if 4 ot 0f actual glamour, attached to a young man’s being 
a dacoit for a while.
to lawlessness and indisposed to help in its suppression* Accord­
ingly villagers slow in giving information on suspicious characters
or in co-operating with the police in other ways, were liable to
10fines or to have police quartered on them punitively. The law
requiring security for good behaviour was also invoked more fre­
quently. The effectiveness of such measures was limited, however, 
and the main burden of dealing with lawlessness rested with the 
police.
Reorganisation of police administration Police administration in
the British Burma prov­
inces had been reorganised at the time of their union in 1862.
This had been recommended by Bruce and Temple to correspond with 
the recommendations of the Commission of i860 for police adminis­
tration in all British India. The latter was influenced largely 
by the recent turmoil of the Mutiny but also by the organisation
of police administration in Madras, Sind, and Bombay, which had
11been largely based on that of the Irish constabulary. The m a m
feature of this system was the separation of the police force from 
the executive. After i860 each province was to have its own pol­
ice force, controlled by the provincial government or chief com­
missioner, but headed by an inspector-general of police. There was
10On the other hand villagers who co-operated with the police could 
be rewarded. Villages could receive a remittance of land revenue. 
B.H.P., 1883, May Index Nos. 11 and 12.
11
J.C.Curry, The Indian Police, (London, 1932), p*33*
to be in each district a European district superintendent of pol­
ice subject to the control of the district magistrate or deputy 
commissioner. To ensure that the police of India were wholly 
subject to the civil authority, the existing military police forces 
were to be disbanded. This was also because the latter were more 
expensive than a civil police force. The army was to be confined 
to purely military duties and all non-military functions formerly^ 
performed by the regular military forces, such as the guarding and
escorting of treasure and prisoners, were to be performed by the 
12civil police.
Before the Mutiny corruption had been rife among the Indian
police, who were underpaid and thus exposed to temptation. To
eradicate this, the rule was laid down that the wages of the lowest
ranks were to be superior to the current wage rates for unskilled
labour. As it was decided that ’no Police system can be really
effective in India which is not closely connected with the village
police', they were also to be directly related to, though not in^
corporated in, the graded hierarchy of the regular police, so that
13they were ultimately responsible to the district magistrate.
The implementation of these recommendations in British Burma 
under the first inspector-general of police, Lieutenant H. T.
Duncan, led to the reduction of the rather haphazard police arrange­
ments which had developed to meet the various crises in the past,
I.J.P.. i860, Oct. No.35. 
1^Ibid. N0 .3V.
to a system of graded hierarchies with responsibilities clearly
defined. The district police battalions, the river police, the
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion, and the town police were disbanded
14
and integrated into the grades of the new civil police. The 
traditional indigenous officials below the rank of thagyi became 
the village constabulary, responsible no longer to the circle 
thagyi and township myo-ok but to the new civil police.
The village constabulary included the gaung and theJkyei- 
dan-gyl, the latter being literally the chief tax-payers, found 
in almost every hamlet, and who, for exemption from the capitat­
ion tax, performed police duties similar to those of the village
watch of India. They also aided the thagyi with their revenue
- 15duties, as did the gaung. Th^latter were appointed for the
first time in Tenasserim and in Arakan rwa-gaung were no longer
paid by commission but by monthly salary as were the other gaung
16of the province. Bruce and Temple had also stipulated that
the village constabulary be relieved of revenue duties, but in 
practice only the gaung were.
14
Bruce and Temple had established both the salaries and grades for 
the new police force and only in Tenasserim was it necessary to 
adjust them because of the higher wages there. H.Bruce and R. 
Temple, Report upon British Burma, i860,I.O.L.,Elgin Papers,
M.S.S.Eur.F.83,p.20 and I.J.P. ,1861, 16th Aug., No.^fO.
15 -. _
Kyei-dan-gyi in Tenasserim were often referred to as deputy 
thagyi, presumably because of the help they gave the thagyi in 
their revenue collections. Their duties and status were nominally 
equal to those of gaung, possibly to legalise their employment 
according to the provisions of the 183^ code of procedure for 
Tenasserim in which only rwa-gaung, thagyi, and peons were cited 
as rural police officials.
16
I.F.P., (Gen.), 1863, June, No.35*
The whole reorganised police system of 1862 was carefully 
based on securing the maximum efficiency with the maximum economy. 
For instance, the number of gaung were limited to the number that 
could be paid at 10 rupees a month each from a fund consisting of 
a fourth of the increased returns from the recently augmented cap­
itation tax. They were then expected to manage considerably larger
17
areas of jurisdiction because they no longer had revenue duties. 
Establishing the police system on this basis of economy and effic­
iency was to be a rather different matter, however, from maintain­
ing it on this basis.
The r^ank and £■ ile The main difficulty for the authorities with
the lower ranks of the police force was that 
of attracting men of high enough quality, integrity, and respons­
ibility to form an efficient police force. As early as i860 the 
commissioner of Tenasserim had noted,
... the fact of a Burman becoming a policeman 
is prima facie evidence that he is an inferior 
man of his class; he must be more or less idle, 
thriftless, wanting in energy and manly independ­
ence if he quit the illimitable field for private 
industry which the country offers to the humblest 
and poorest, for the prospects which the service 
of Government hold out to him.^g
17Their area of jurisdiction was about 80 square miles. The number 
of gaung was more than halved in most districts but in Rangoon 
district only 80 out of 223 were left. I.J.P., 1861,1st May,
Nos. 2 and 3* in Arakan only one-fourth of the rwa-gaung were 
retained.
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This was less true of the police of the 1 8 8 0 !s , but there was 
still dissatisfaction with the lower ranks, especially in view 
of the increasing crime rate and the inability of the police to 
deal with it.
In British Burma with its constantly expanding economy and 
continuous dearth of labour throughout this period, wages for lab­
our continued to rise, so that minimum wages for police constables 
always lagged behind the basic rate for coolies. Although periodic 
attempts at adjustment were made, these occurred with insufficient 
frequency and adequacy to be anything more than temporary alleviat­
ion. This was partly due to the straitened circumstances of the 
government of India, but also to its reluctance to accept that lab­
our costs in British Burma were higher than elsewhere. The basic 
tenet laid down by the Police Act of 1861 that the minimum salary 
in all provincial forces should always be rather higher than what 
a constable could earn by his labour, so that dismissal from the 
police force should always be a substantial punishment thus re­
mained largely a dead letter.
T he r a t e  of d i s c h a r g e s  was high, b o t h  b y  v o l u n t a r y  a p p l i c ­
a t i o n  a n d  by d i s m i s s a l .  T h i s  s e r i o u s l y  r e d u c e d  p o l i c e  e f f i c i e n c y .
The rate of discharges was particularly high in Tenasserim, despite
*
the fact that the basic rate for a police constable there was high-
er than in Pegu or Arakan. In Tenasserim in 1867 few good men 
were willing to enter the lower ranks on 10 and 12 rupees a month
19when 20 to 30 rupees could be earned in the forests. In areas
such as Myan-aung where there were heavy embankment and road works
in progress and where the rate of pay for labour was considerably
above that offered in the lower ranks of the police force, similar
difficulties were experienced in securing good men. The police
force was frequently used as a convenience, with only those unable
to obtain work elsewhere staying on and these were the ones prone
20
to dismissal because of their inability and negligence.
By 1875 30 per cent of the police were recruits and the per-
2'
centage stayed at that level with only minor fluctuations thereafter.
Although wages were raised in 1868, 1875? 1879* and 1882, they were
outpaced by the rise in wages elsewhere. By 1882 only twelve men
22had served long enough to be eligible for a pension. In some
districts where opportunities for seeking casual employment were 
limited, such as Tavoy and Kyauk-hpyu, good police recruits always 
seemed available, but these districts were the less populous and 
less troublesome ones. In expanding districts, such as Shwei-gyin, 
Thon-gwa, and Han-tha-wadi, the police force had to compete with
19I.J.P., 1867, July Index No.53.
20I.Fin.P. (Expend.), 1868 ,Aug.No.*f. This impermanence of men in the 
ranks was also attributed to Inmans * dislike of regular discipline.
21
B.H.P., 1876,Nov.Index No. -^9* This figure is slightly misleading, 
however, as the inspector-general of police pointed out, that 
though a large proportion of men resigned every year, 'the men 
enlisted in their places are not necessarily raw recruits, who 
have Id learn their work before being of any use. Many of them are 
men who have been in the service before, who left it, tempted by 
higher pay offered elsewhere, angry with some of their comrades, 
or perhaps prompted merely by love of change. 1 Ibid.,Index No.5^*
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the attractions of rice cultivation*
With this high rate of instability and inexperience in pol­
ice ranks, British attempts to increase police efficiency by in­
creasing the strength of the police force met with little success. 
Between 1862 and 1885 the strength of the police force rose from 
5,695 to 7i218.^ This growth paralleled, to some extent, the 
increase in the number of districts but it was also due to the 
provincial authorities1 belief that only by increasing the numbers
of police in relation to the area of the province could headway
2kbe made against the increase in crime. The most noticeable
return from this, however, was a considerably augmented police 
expenditure.
It was thought the low standards of police performance re­
flected not only the low rates of pay but also the few incentives 
to good service. Until 1882 promotion prospects were limited and 
there were virtually no other incentives to good service. There-
B.H.P..1881, Nov.Index No.9, and B.B.A.R. .1882-83. p. 2*f. The 
basic rate for police frequently lagged by as much as 2 or 5 
rupees a month behind that for labourers.
^ B.B.A.R.,1862-65, P»1*N and l88*f-85» p.11. The 1862 figures in­
clude a contingent of Indian police at Port Blair; by 1885 this 
had been severed from the jurisdiction of the chief commissioner.
2k
I.Fin.P.,(AcctsJ,1870« July, No.50. In British Burma in 1870 
there was one policeman to every 16}£ square miles, while in the 
Punjab there was one to every k}i square miles, and in the Central 
Provinces one to every 11 square miles. By 1878, however, there 
was a much higher proportion of policemen to population in British 
Burma than anywhere in India, one policeman being employed to 
every *f28 of the population in British Burma, compared with an 
average of one policeman to 1,500 or 1,^ f00 in other provinces. 
B.H.P.,1876, Nov..Index No.^9*
after a scheme was devised of granting good conduct stripes,
each worth an extra rupee a month, and promotion prospects were
25
considerably improved*
By 1880 greater consideration was also being given to the 
thought that police performance would have been better if more 
heed had been taken of Burmans' known dislike of being expected 
to serve away from the areas of their birth. Although this 
had been established when recruiting was underway for the first 
police battalions in Pegu, the British continually disregarded 
it by transferring men from one area to another whenever and 
wherever the public interest required it. Hen frequently left 
the force once transfers were proposed and it was known that 
Burman wives were even more strongly attached to the area of 
their birth. Host divisional commissioners considered police 
performance was better when men served in the area of their re­
cruitment, although the commissioner of Irrawaddy reported that 
the deputy commissioner of Bassein thought the almost entirely 
local enlistment there had 'become almost an evil by tending to
make the police clannish'. There was, moreover, no greater
. .. 26 permanency m  it.
^Ibid., 1882, Sept. Index No.8 , No.5
26tv-*Ibid.
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Because of the difficulty of keeping men in the police force, 
there could be no thought of establishing an examination system 
similar to that in the executive service to select men, but there 
was no basic and regular system for police training at all. Pol­
ice schools had been maintained intermittently since 1868 but they 
were by no means a regular introduction to police work, as their 
existence and functioning depended on the police superintendents* 
’having enough time** As this rarely happened, the only police 
who had any proper police drilling were the quasi-military police 
of the Salween and Arakan Hill Tracts* The usual method of re­
cruiting police constables consisted of a sergeant enlisting vil­
lagers to fill vacancies"* Although appointments were subject to 
the confirmation of the district police superintendents and deputy 
commissioners, before confirmation was given the recruits were 
usually equipped with arms and other accoutrements and immediately 
put on duty. Even when their positions were confirmed, they were 
left to pick up a knowledge of their duties as best they could*
As the inspector-general of police pointed out in 1883, this 
haphazard method allowed recruits to acquire erroneous ideas of 
their powers and duties. He added, *The sergeant is supposed to 
impart instructions to recruits, but as he has been brought up in 
the same slipshod manner, I do not see how he is competent to do so, 
and as a matter of fact he rarely attempts to ... *. He proposed
27remedying this by establishing a police training depot. Although 
as an experimental measure a depot for training thirty men was sanc­
tioned in September, little was reported of the scheme, and in 1886
after the outbreak of widespread violence,* the whole police force
• a 28 was reorganised.
Superior appointments As in the executive service the opportun­
ities for the promotion of indigenous people 
from the lower ranks of the police force were limited. Higher ap­
pointments, as in other administrative departments, were reserved 
for Europeans, the necessity of having adequate European police 
supervision of the districts having been stressed by the Commission 
of i860. As in the exeautive service, however, more and higher 
appointments were gradually opened to indigenous people, in res­
ponse to the political and other pressures gathering momentum in
29India in the 1870*s and after. There seems, however, to have
been no anticipation of Burmans becoming district and assistant 
superintendents. These positions remained reserved for Europeans.
27Ibid., 1885, Feb., Index No.5.
p O
Ibid., Sept. Index No.15 and L.B.A.E., 1885-86, p.11.
29In 1872 there were 556 men classified as officers in British Burma, 
as opposed to 5*820 constables. Of the former *t00 were Burmese and 
Karens, ^5 were Europeans and 18 Eurasians. The rest were mainly 
Indians. Only 7^» including 5*1 Europeans and Eurasians, received 
over 100 rupees a month. By 1885 the number of officers had grown 
to 70^ -, as compared with the constabulary of 6 ,^5 6. Of the officers, 
498 were Burmese, 30 were Karen, 7 were Shan, and 12 from other 
hill tribes. Almost 600 still received less than 100 rupees a 
month and of the remaining hundred receiving more 6k were Euro­
pean or Eurasian. J.S.Furnivall, A Study of the Social and Econ­
omic History of Burma, Pt.IV,Statistical Appendix,p.2 and
There had been some attempt to increase the incentives and
promotion rate for deserving indigenous officers in the 1870's.
A few new and higher grades were created then and at least on one
occasion an inspector 'who had done remarkably good service' was
promoted to the gazetted ranks. It was also made possible for
inspectors and head constables to be promoted by transferring them
30
to the executive service as extra assistant commissioners.
The prospects of promotion for indigenous officers were still 
comparatively few, however, and at the end of the 1870's when the 
European numbers in the executive service were being reduced, the 
chief commissioner embarked on a similar course in the police de­
partment. The prospects of promotion from the ranks were viewed 
with some scepticism, however, by the inspector-general of police 
and many district superintendents. The former believed that 
sergeants should be men of good family,,recruited in any part of 
the province, and that they should be given rank without ever ser­
ving as constables. Notwithstanding these views, promotion from 
the ranks remained the rule rather than the exception and the number
of European inspectors was considerably reduced, as Burmans were
31promoted to their place. Basic salaries were also raised for
inspectors, the lowest commissioned officers, from 120 rupees a
B.B.P.K., 1885^Appendix F, p.xvii.
^ B.H.P.,1871 * Nov. Index No.33; 1876 Aug. Index No.33; and 1879* 
May, Appendix B.
•^B.H.P., 1881, Aug.Index No.1^+ and Herbert Thirkell White, A Civil 
Servant in Burma, (London, 1913)* p.6 .
month and a more regular rule was developed for allowing the pro­
motion of Burmans, eligible except for their race to be assistant 
superintendents, to the executive service. There it had already-
been established that good Burman police officers often made effic-
32ient extra assistant commissioners and township officers.
The inability of the police to check the rising crime rate 
in the province caused the administration to become somewhat crit­
ical of the Europeans’ filling the highest echelons of the police 
force. By the 1880's it seemed that these had come to suffer many 
of the disadvantages that prevented the rank and file being filled 
by more able men. Salaries were lower and the rate of promotion 
slower than in India. This was especially so after 1869 when the 
financial crisis of the government of India necessitated the abolit­
ion of two district superintendentships and two assistant superinten- 
33denships. Despite the creation of new districts after that date,
by 1881 the pre-1869 numerical strength had not been restored.
There were only '\k district superintendentships and at least five
districts were always under assistant superintendents or inspectors.
As there were frequently as many as two district superintendents
absent on leave in a year, there were often as many as seven dis-
3ktricts officered by men of inadequate rank and experience. The
rule of i860 stressing adequate supervision by European police
^ B.H.P., 1882, May Index No. 8 and 1881, Nov. Index No.9* 
I.Fin.RXExpend.), 1870, Feb. No.65.
J B.H.P.. 1881, Dec. Index. No.8 .
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officers was thus falling into abeyance.
There was also an apparent decline in the quality of Euro­
peans who had recently entered the police service. According to 
the chief commissioner, Charles Bernard,
The average stamp of younger officers in the police 
is below the average of the same class in India.
This can hardly be otherwise when the India recruit
enters the police on a salary of Rs.230 or Rs*200, 
while the Burman recruit, in a province where liv­
ing is much dearer than in India, enters as an Ins­
pector on Rs*120, and takes six to eight years to 
become an Assistant District Superintendent.
Police officers who are to be District Superintend­
ents ought to be men of good education; and they 
ought to be able to obtain a competent salary with­
in a few years of entering the service* Of late
years in Burma some of the recruits for the Police
Department have not had these ad vantages.,
To some extent, this was a reflection of a general trend in 
Indian police administration at this time. With the rather lim­
ited scope of police work, the more ambitious and able men went
either into the army or into the Indian Civil Service and few from
36either of these were given police postings in the l880*s. In
1883 there were only four military men in the British Burmese police
force, including the inspector-general of police. Of the remaining 
three, the most junior had joined the police service some twenty 
years before.^
To improve morale and efficiency among the higher police 
officers the chief commissioner proposed increasing the number of
?5Ibid., 1882, May Index No.8 .
36See J. C. Curry, op.cit *, p *33*
^ B.H.P., 1883, July Index No*2 +^.
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district superintendents and assistant superintendents and bring­
ing the salaries of first class superintendents up to the same 
level as those in India, i.e. from 9 0 0  to 1 , 000 rupees a month.
It was not felt there was any necessity for providing any special 
incentives for increasing the number of military personnel to im­
prove police administration. The government of India disagreed 
with this, believing a society such as that of British Burma had 
a special need of military men. Accordingly only the salaries of
military officers were raised but sanction was given to all the
38other recommendations.
As a further effort to improve the performance of European 
officials in police administration, it became compulsory in 1885
39for all non-Burman officers to pass the police test in Burmese. 
Although there had been some criticism in the past that the stand­
ard of this test was too elementary, at least it ensured some 
knowledge of the vernacular. And a more widespread knowledge 
of the vernacular by European police officers would ensure im­
proved contact between police and people and counteract, to some 
extent, the effects of the reductions in the numbers of European
^Ibid.,1882,Hay Index No.8; 1883, Aug*Index No.13; Sept.Index No.77; 
and j-ffi.C.P. ( Accts.and Fin.),l882, Nos. 1391 and 1^92.
^ B.H.B^ 1885* Mesh.Index No.16. These included inspectors. In 1866 
the government of India had queried the necessity of encouraging 
police inspectors, who voluntarily passed both standards of the 
examination in Burmese, by granting them the same awards as were 
allowed to superintendents and assistant superintendents. Phayre 
replied,, 1 There are so few Officers who really study the Burmese 
language, and comparatively few who learn it at all, that I Con­
sider it highly desirable to encourage the acquisition of it as 
much as possible. I.Fin.P.,(Expend.),1866. Dec.Nos. 265 and 266.
officials, occurring throughout executive as well as police ad-
40
ministration, and of the relatively frequent transfers. These
made it difficult for district officers to become as familiar with 
their districts as the administration would have liked.
Role of executive in police administration There was also greater
insistence by the chief 
commissioner on deputy commissioners’ retaining complete control of 
their districts as well as greater emphasis on their responsibility 
for the condition of them. As early as 1871 deputy commissioners 
had been threatened with removal from their districts for failing
to keep control of them, but the fault lay not only with the deputy
ic 
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41commissioners. In 1876 there were instances of pol e officials’
not recognising the authority of deputy commissioners.
The official view was that the superintendent of police was 
no more than
the assistant of the District Officer in the Police 
Department, just as the Assistant Commissioner is in 
general business; and in the important duties con­
nected with Police administration, it is absolutely 
necessary that the larger experience of the Deputy 
Commissioner should be brought to bear upon them...^
4o
In 1882 when there was a sudden increase in the crime rate in Han- 
tha-wadi, the sub-divisional officers, all of senior rank, had sud­
denly all been promoted. Other Europeans were not immediately 
available to replace them and the Burmans who took over temporarily 
were unable to manage. The chief commissioner commented, ’It is 
difficult to see how this could have been avoided without depriv­
ing deserving officers of the promotion they had earned.’ B.H.P., 
188$, Oct. Index No.10.
Ll i
Ibid., 1871, Oct. Index No.30. 
if2---------
Ibid., 1876, Oct. Index No.20.
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Ibid. ..............................................
Deputy commissioners were urged to supervise police administration 
more fully though in such a way as not to undermine the position 
and prestige of police officers# Their supervision was to include 
the confirmation of all police enlistments, promotions, and dis­
missals, and keeping to a minimum the number of transfers of Bur-
kk
mese police from their home districts.
At the same time the judicial work of the executive was made 
to assume greater importance in police administration. In 1885 
it was thought,
... it is difficult to define in general terms 
where the responsibility of the police ends and 
that of the Magistrate and Judge begins. It is the 
business of all alike to work together for the 
suppression of crime and the maintenance of jus­
tice and good order. ... If the village police 
officials fail to work well with the regular pol­
ice, if cases are badly got up and acquittals at
Sessions are unduly numerous, the District Magis­
trate should feel that a direct slur is cast upon 
his personal efficiency. ^
The punitive powers of the courts were looked upon as having a 
potentially preventative effect on crime and from 1875 on there was
steady pressure not only from the local administration but also from
the government of India for increasing the number of long term sen­
tences and checking the apparent leniency of the courts, especially
Ll Ll
Ibid.,B.H.P., 1881, Nov. Index No.9 and 1883, Sept., Index No.12. 
In differences of opinion on these subjects between deputy com­
missioners and district superintendents, the decision of the ins­
pector-general of police was final. The British Burma Manual, 
(Gomp.C.S.Cooke), Vol.I,l878,p.438.
B.H.P.. 1885, Aug. Index No.5.
the lower ones. Sentences to whipping were officially preferred
47
to fines, although the latter were by no means inconsiderable.
Special police treasures It was in 1883 when gang robberies were
becoming increasingly prevalent and viol­
ent, that a special appointment for a superintendent of dacoity 
/f8
was made. He was also to be in charge of police administration
in Rangoon. The appointment had been decided on because of the
success similar officers had had in suppressing dacoity and thuggee 
in Bengal, the North West Provinces, and central India. The super­
intendent of dacoity was to proceed to districts where dacoity was 
particularly rife. He could temporarily take charge of a district 
or could act in concert with police officers of the tract to which 
he was deputed. Because of his duties in Rangoon and because 
cases of dacoity were particularly numerous and violent around
Rangoon and the surrounding district of Han-tha-wadi, his base
49was to be m  Rangoon. The appointment was not intended as a 
permanent one and no extra appointment was made, as the superin- 
TlC
Ibid. and I.J.P., 1875, Sept. Index No.19.
47In 1880 the average fine was 17 rupees which was equal to a month*s 
salary for a labouring man. B.B.A.R., 1880-81, Intro.,p.13*
48 . . .Other special police forces were the railway police, organised m  
1877, and a separate prison guard, organised in 1884.
49B.H.P,, 1883, Jan. Index No.1, No.13- His Rangoon duties were, in 
fact, to receive priority. See below.
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tendent of Thayet-myo, Mr. Jameson, received the appointment and
Thayet-my9 was left in the charge of an assistant superintendent.
The appointment proved so successful that the inspector-
general of police urged that his appointment be continued for at
least two or three years more and the special title of assistant
inspector-general of police was also created for him, so long as
50he retained his special office. There had been some fears that
Jameson*s position would cause friction with deputy commissioners
and district superintendents but Jameson*s powers helped bridge
the gulf in co-operation between the police of Rangoon and those
51of the neighbouring districts of Han-tha-wadi and Pegu. As 
Rangoon was the centre to which a large number of bad characters 
was drawn and as the outlying districts and villages were the ob­
jects of their attacks, this co-operation was essential. It was 
in this area that Jameson’s efforts as superintendent of dacoity 
were most successful.
Police administration in Rangoon In Conjunction with Jameson’s
work as superintendent of dacoity, 
the police administration of Rangoon was also reorganised. The 
need for this had been urged from at least as early as 1869* as the 
increasingly cosmopolitan and commercial nature of the city bred
50
Ibid., Oct. Index No.10 and Dec. Index No.12.
51Ibid, June Index No. 7*
social complexities, which made effective police administration
beyond the capabilities of the police establishment set up in the 
521860*s . There was a large floating population, continually
augmented by arrivals of up-country Burmans seeking temporary or 
seasonal employment, and constantly swollen by other immigrants.
The fact that Rangoon was the largest shipping port also meant 
that the difficulties of police administration were increased by 
the presence in the town of transient sailors. Police adminis­
tration in Rangoon was further complicated by the fact that crimes 
were committed by the people not only of the town but also of the 
surrounding district.
The defects found in the rest of the provincial police were 
also present in the Rangoon police, though perhaps to a greater 
degree. Rangoon, as the administrative headquarters of the prov­
ince and the chief rice port and commercial centre, was the most 
affluent area in British Burma, so that the police, on their com­
paratively low wages, were more exposed to bribery and temptation 
there than elsewhere. There was also much more opportunity for 
the more enterprising and able men, so that the men who filled the
ranks of the Rangoon police force tended to be less able than the
53district police. This was also due to the fact that it was a
^ 1.J.P., 1870, Oct. Index No.85»
53Ibid., The recorder of Rangoon had called in 1869 for the needof 
entrusting a * different class of men altogether ... with the pro­
tection of life and property in Rangoon*• In 1873 the town magis­
trate of Rangoon also spoke of the ‘inferior morals* of the pol­
ice. B.H.P., 187^, Feb. Index. No. 1*f3 and I.J.P.,1870, Oct.Index 
No.85.
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predominantly Indian force, possessing little knowledge of Burmese, 
Such a situation had arisen from the fact that from the earliest 
years of British rule, Indians had been employed in most subordin­
ate capacities in Rangoon and all the major seaport towns. This 
was mainly due to the fact that Burmans did not take kindly to 
menial labour and, moreover, were unfamiliar with English and 
European ways, and were expensive to employ. In this way, Indians 
came to fill the ranks of the police forces in the larger towns.
By 1883 there were 2,000 Indians in the provincial police, con-
54
stituting almost a third of it. While some were employed
throughout the province as jail and treasury guards, the majority 
were in the police forces of Rangoon, Moulmein, and Akyab.
Some attempt had been made to remedy the defects of the Ran­
goon police in the 1870*s when both their numbers and pay were 
increased. And in 1876 when charges of corruption were made against 
both rank and file and inspectors and superior officers, transfers 
away from the town became more frequent, as it was thought,
Men should have a chance of escaping corruption 
in the town by being sent up country after a 
certain service, for it is putting human nature,
and particularly 20 Rupees a mon^h human nature,
to too severe a test to expect the men, to with­
stand such temptation for any length of time.^
When Jameson was appointed superintendent of dacoity in 1883* 
the situation in Rangoon had deteriorated sharply. The increases
5 B.H.P., 1883, Jan. Index No.13.
^B.H.P., 1874, Feb.Index No. 1^3 and 1876,Feb.Index Nos.33 and J>k.
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in the crime rate in the town and Han-tha-wadi and in the number 
of cases of violence and gang robbery were outpacing those in the 
rest of the province* Public alarm was growing and confidence 
in the police at an all-time low. A letter from the secretary 
of the local chamber of commerce to the chief commissioner ex­
pressed the concern of the commercial and largely European pop­
ulation of the city for the prevalence of crime, particularly in 
the rice season when there were large sums of money about* It 
also queried the policy of paying police constables wages lower 
than those of a coolie and expressed unease at the growing trend 
of placing 'so many Native officials to posts of importance through- 
out the province and in connexion with the police force.1
Because of this public anxiety and the deteriorating situ­
ation, special temporary measures were resorted to, until Jameson 
had time to consider the situation and submit a scheme to remedy 
it. This included the ordering of extra reserves from Akyab and 
Thayet-myo; the issuing of additional arms to the Rangoon police; 
the establishment of an extra police station; and the detailing 
of twenty armed and mounted police to patrol the roads and suburbs 
of Rangoon. A reserve of military guards from the Rangoon canton­
ment was also placed at the disposal of the civil authorities to
Ibid., 1883, Jan. Index No.4. There was by this time a higher 
rate of wages in Rangoon than elsewhere because of the high cost 
of living.
57restore public confidence.
Jameson*s main reform was not the usual remedy of increases
in wages and police numbers but a reduction in the number of Ind-
58 . . . . .ians in the police force. He decided that police administration
had suffered from the fact that the majority of the police did not 
understand Burmese. Because of the largely non-Burman character
of Rangoon he could not dispense, however, with all Indian and
59European police. A European assistant superintendent was ap­
pointed as well as a Burman detective inspector to assist Jameson. 
The number of European inspectors was reduced to allow greater 
opportunities for the non-Europeans in the lower ranks but a 
special European guard was organised to quell the nightly dis­
turbance by drunken sailors and soldiers, who could be handled 
only by Europeans. This was under the charge of the one remain­
ing European inspector who was responsible for the central divis-
$Q
ion of the town.
^Ibid., Index No.2, No.5»
58
In fact it was not really possible to consider further pay rises 
in the existing system because police wages in Rangoon had risen 
from *f0 to 50 per cent in the previous four years.
59 , 1885,Feb.Index No.7* Jameson noted that some Indians who 
had been in the police force for eight to ten years *had not the 
faintest notion of the language of the country.* He was optimis­
tic that the recently enhanced rates of pay and the better pros­
pects of promotion would be sufficient to attract a better class 
of Burmans to the police. B.H.P.,1883< May Index No.11.
60
Ibid. Previously the police authorities had been embarrassed that 
the European constables were frequently in no better condition to 
carry out their duties than the sailors they were employed to 
restrain. Ibid.,1875. July Index No.52.
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By the end of 1885-86, largely as a result of Jamesons
work, the situation was greatly improved. There was a decrease
of almost 50 per cent in the number of crimes of violence and an
appreciable increase in the number of crimes detected and brought 
61to conviction. This was also due partly to the success of the
executive in securing greater public participation in the suppres­
sion of crime. An instance of this lay in the fact that the
IjtHgyl of several Burmese suburbs organised civilians to patrol
62the streets on dark nights. They were later emulated by mem­
bers of the Chinese community.
Frontier police Police administration in the frontier districts,
while similar in its routine tasks to police ad­
ministration elsewhere in the province, was compounded by the prox­
imity of the frontier. Crime in these districts was frequently 
caused or influenced by events and circumstances beyond it. 
Rebellions and political and economic troubles there were usually 
followed by a corresponding rise in the number of border infringe-
63raents and disturbances in the frontier districts. The increased
61
L.B.A.R., 1885-86, p.11.
c . p
B.H.P., 1884, Jan. Index No.27 and 1885* Dec.Index No.2. The 
]ii-gyi had been prompted to do this by the Burmese members of the 
municipal committee. They were later to be recommended by the 
government as an example toQu-cigyi elsewhere in the province.
83When, for instance, large numbers of men were thrown out of work 
in 1864 by slackness in the timber trade in British Burma and 
across the border, there was a sudden increase in crime in 
Martaban. I.Fin.P., 1866, Jan. No. 553*
trading and commercial activities that developed after British
occupation of lower Burma also provided many opportunities for
dacoity, theft, and murder* Predatory hill men took advantage
of the large annual caravans of Shan and Karenni traders who passed
. Gkto and from Moulmem.
Although these situations were often dealt with by negotiat­
ion with the relevant authorities in Upper Burma, Siam, and Karenni, 
the effectiveness of negotiation was limited by the good will of 
the central authorities and the amenability of the frontier offic­
ials. Agreements to extradite criminals helped police adminis­
tration to some extent, but they were observed only fitfully by 
both sides. The most effective way of dealing with these problems 
then was by maintaining a strong and permanent police force in the
frontier districts. This was especially so after the death of
- 65Mm-don when Anglo-Burman relations deteriorated.
The usual problems of attracting reliable men to the police
force existed on the frontier as in the rest of the province but
were enhanced by the relative remoteness of the frontier areas,
the higher costs of living there compared with other districts,
66and the unhealthy nature of the terrain. Burmese were only
TK
I.F.P.,(Pol.), 1871, Nov. No.231.
65
D.P.Singhal, The Annexation of Upper Burma,(Singapore,i9 60)»p*35 
et seq. Rumours of Burmese invasions into British Burma also in­
creased the desire of the adfckhistration for adequate frontier 
policing. I.F.P./I88Q, Dec. No.17*
66
Special incentives had been offered to secure the services of 
better men for the frontier police as early as 1859. These in­
cluded exemption from capitation tax, limitation of duty to one
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readily available for police service in the riverine district of
Thayet-myo. In the harsher, hilly, jungle areas of Taung-ngu
and Salween, reliance had to be placed on the hill people but only
the Karens proved themselves as police men. Few, however, stayed
67in the police force for more than five or six years. Gurkhas
were popular in the frontier police and did not fall ill there,
but they were difficult to recruit and more expensive to employ
than the Burmans, especially as there was the added expense of
recruiting parties. In l88*f it was therefore decided to make
police service more attractive to the Karens by raising their
68wages to parity with those of the Gurkhas.
Increasing reliance was also placed on the people themselves 
to co-operate with the police and to provide their own protection. 
Frontier villages were issued in 1882 with muskets and those vil­
lagers who stockaded themselves well were exempted from taxation. 
Special allowances were also given to the kyei-dan-gyl of fron­
tier villages.^
frontier post, the assignment of plots of land tax-free in the 
vicinity of the posts, and release from land revenue obligations 
on land owned in the villages of origin. I.F.P.P.,1839* 27th May, 
Nos.kky and
67
Shans and Karennis were found to be too unreliable for police 
work; Karen women were known to dislike having policemen for 
husbands. B.H.P., 1885* Mch. Index No.22.
68Ibid., 188^ -, Sept.Index No.17* Gurkhas were employed mostly in 
the Arakan Hill and Salween Hill Tracts. Panthays adapted well 
to police service in Shwei-gyin.
69
B.H.P.,18821 Mch.Index No.8 and 1885* Nov.Index No*3*No.4. 
Kyei-dan-gyi were also frequently referred to as village headmen.
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Rural police By this time it was becoming more apparent that the
rationalisation of the traditional rural police sys­
tem, first begun in the 1860's, had not led to greater efficiency 
in the conduct of police duties by flaung and kyei-dan-gyi* In 
fact, there was a considerable decline* In view of the inability 
of the regular police to cope with the rising crime rate in the 
province, this development was regarded with growing concern by
the authorities and considerable effort was expended in attempt­
ing to check it.
Although gaung had lost some of their traditional authority
and social prestige in i860 with the loss of their revenue duties,
by 1870 they were still regarded as ’the cheapest and ••• the
most efficient portion of our Police force** It was thought,
A man will readily become a village goung for 
Rupees 10 per mensam; the same man would prob­
ably not become a policeman for Rupees 50 or 
even Rupees 100 per mensem. By employing 
village goungs on Rupees 10 per mensem we 
actually get a higher and more respectable
class of men to assist us than we could do
in the Regular Police force for five times 
the money
Yet their numbers were steadily reduced throughout this period, 
largely because the administration could not afford to maintain 
them. In 1869, for instance, when the government of India ruled 
that the cost of rural police be transferred to the local cess on
land revenue; the administration was forced to declare almost 100
70 -
B.H.P.,1870iNov.Index No.2km Gaung wer^klso exempt from capit­
ation tax*
71of the 9^5 gaung in the province redundant. This caused their
area of jurisdiction to be enlarged and also diminished the close
contact and local influence gaung were expected to have with the
people. Moreover, by 1879 the salary of gaung was still at the
level it had been in 185^ in Pegu and although most gaung were also
landowners, 10 rupees a month was no longer sufficient to attract
72
men of the same standard as formerly.
Traditionally kyei-dan-gyi as the chief tax-payers of the
villages and hamlets had considerable local prestige and acted as
arbiters in petty disputes and as official witnesses at marriages
73
and divorces, for which they received nominal fees. Only m
the absence of the rwa-gaung did they have minor police duties in
7*fthe Burmese regime. The British initially regarded them as the
representative men of their villages and pressed them into their
service by delegating to them the responsibility of reporting all
misdemeanours and heinous crimes in their villages and accompanying
the thagyl on their rounds through their villages. Their duties
75were restricted to the limits of their own village.
Gradually these duties were augmented and changed until in 
187^ it was reported that kyei-dan-gyi performed little work of a
^ Ibid., Index No.32. By 1883 there were 711 gaung and 7*71^ kyei- 
dan-gyi . B.B.A.R., 1882-83, Intro.p.21.
^ B.H.P., 1879» Mch. Appendix A.
^Sladen to Commissioner of Tenasserim, 18th Nov.,187^* Sladen 
Papers, (I.O.L., M.S.S., Eur. E.290/6.)
Ma Mya Sein, Administration of Burma,(Rangoon,1938),pp.109 and 112. 
^B.H.P. 1873, June Appendix A.
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legitimate nature but were constantly harassed by the police and 
sent on missions away from their villages. Moreover, it was a 
constant temptation on the part of the British district officials 
to develop the apparent potential that lay in kyei-dan-gyi into 
an unpaid agency for detecting dacoity, illicit distilling, evas­
ion of revenue payments, and the checking of fraudulent and inaccur­
ate tax returns. An ambiguity in the revenue rules seemed to 
justify this, and despite attempts to define the functions of kyei-
dan-gyi in 1864, 1875, 1881, and 1884, their functions varied from
76
district to district.
Because of this it was found that kyei-dan-gyi were no longer
the chief tax-payers nor the representative men of the village.
There was no prestige attached to the position any more and it was
no longer regarded as a punishment to deprive a kyei-dan-gyi of
his office for neglect of duty. In some districts it was impossible
77to find a person willing to accept the position.
This and the obvious inability of the regular police to check 
the rising crime rate led to the framing of the Bill for Rural
76
Ibid.,1874, July Apgendix H. Charles Crosthwaite defined the duties 
of gaung and kyei-dan-gyi as being essentially the same, except 
that the gaung was primarily a government officer, though he may ... 
be also a village notable and a landholder •••; secondly that the 
gaung is peripatetic, while the headman is stationary. The head­
man is in fact a representative villager who lives within his 
flbeatM ...* B.H.P., 1884, Apr. Index No.8.
77
Ibid.,187^1 No.24. Fytche had reported as early as 1861 that it 
was difficult to persuade men to fill the p§sition of kyei-dan- 
gyi in Tenasserim. I.J.P., 1861, Aug.Nc&51 and 52.
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District Cess in 1879 to attempt to reform the rural 
It was thought that mere exemption from the capitation 
longer sufficient for kyei-dan-gyi, as it had been orig­
inally, when holding the position had seemed honour enough, espec-
then
ially as most kyei-dan-gyi were/already landholders in no real need
of government salaries. The main proposal was to increase the
emoluments of rural police so that they could live wholly or mainly
on them. The funds for this were to come mostly from a 3 per cent
increase in the local cess on land revenue. As these were not so
great as were anticipated, the reforms intended were only partly 
79implemented.
All rural police were arranged into grades with fixed emolu­
ments. Within the limited funds available the salaries for gaung 
were increased, however, and salaries were introduced for kyei-dan-
gyi . For the former these ranged between 10 and 30 rupees a month
gO
§.nd for the latter between 10 and 120 rupees a year. At the
same time plans were made for gradually reducing the number of gaung. 
This was because they were so much more expensive to employ than
78It was also to make better provision for the postal service, pub­
lic works and education.
^ B.H.P.,1879 Mch. Appendix A and ibid., 1880, Nov. Index No.9 It 
had also been proposed that land be granted free of tax to rural 
police, a scheme first suggested by Ashley Eden in 1875- B.H.P.,1875% 
June Appendix H. This was sanctioned by the government of India 
provided that the provincial government made up any loss of land 
revenue accruing from such exemptions.
80
B.H.P.,1880, Oct. Index No.3* They could still be exempt from pay­
ment of land revenue in lieu of a money award. In Arakan, however, 
kyei-dan-gyi remained unpaid. B.B.A.R., 1882-83<Intro., p.2^ f.
Police and
i  • 7 8police.
tax was no
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the kyei-dan-gyi and because there were so many regular police 
officials. In some districts too not much use was made of gaung 
and it was also thought that kyei-dan-gyi would be so much improved 
that there would be less need for gaung. Charles Bernard, in 
fact, envisaged dispensing eventually with gaung altogether.
He believed,
the village headman is the back-bone of the system; 
it is he who has to bear the brunt of rural police 
work, and it is in order to make him content to 
undertake and bear this burden that the whole 
scheme or rural police has been devised. To leave 
him the burden without bettering his position, 
and to place over him a well-paid gaung with a 
roving commission, might end in making the pres­
ent unsatisfactory state of things worse instead 
of better.
Bernard's successor, Charles Crosthwaite, continued his work
by attempting to strengthen what he believed was the foundation of
the rural police, the village elders, (theliitigyl). Assuming that
each kyei-dan-gyi was formerly a rifegyi of the village, Crosthwaite
enunciated a policy of according greater government recognition to
the influence and position of luagyl by bringing them into closer
82association with the officials of the administration. He decided
also that future appointments of kyei-dan-gyi were to be made by 
deputy commissioners in consultation with the Village itegyi and that 
no kyei-dan-gyi was to be permitted to remain as such without a
81 —B.H.P., 1881, July Index No.5« Redundant gaung were frequently
reduced in rank to kyei-dan-gyi. Bernard was later persuaded that 
such an old indigenous institution as the gaung could not be dis­
pensed with entirely.
^^ Bus-gyi were also expected to co-operate with the police by giving 
information.
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majority of luagyi voting in favour.
The results of these efforts were disappointing. In many 
instances it was found that the Reforms1 of the preceding years
had had the effect of making the position of kyei-dan-gyi even
more unpopular as respectable men declined to take on appointments 
with the small pittances that were all the funds of most districts
8kcould afford. Crosthwaite decided that the tfcagyi were the
indigenous officials who had held the local influence and respect
which the government had tried to fasten on the gaung and kyei-
dan-gyi. He pointed out,
In Burma, there are no village communities with 
their recognised headmen, and no landowners of 
power and influence. But there are the thugyis ... 
who under the indigenous system still in force in 
Upper Burma are responsible for all matters within 
their circles. In British Burma the tendency,
arising naturally from our system of dividing
labour is to disassociate them from all duties
except those of a purely revenue nature. This
tendency must be checked.
In i860 Phayre had regarded the thagyi as the keystone of
the police system, defining him as
... all in all; he is generally or ought to be 
the man of influence in the circle both by off­
icial position and family connection. If he does 
not know the whole ins and outs of his circle he
is no more fit to be a thoogyee than a cab driver
——^ ^ _
B.H.P.,18851 Sept.Index No.12. He also suggested exempting ltfrgyi
from the capitation tax, the consulting of Ifrtgyi by deputy com­
missioners on tour about the state of the district, and the hold­
ing of durbars for the reception of the principHe men of the dis­
trict when the chief commissioner was on tour.
8k
B.H.P.,188^-, Feb. Index No.8 .
gcr
Ibid., 1883, Sept. Index No.12.
is to command a man of war. The thoogyee is to 
the Police of the Circle what the main spring 
is to the watch ... the goungs are merely his 
subordinates, wheels which he puts into motion 
and regulates.g^
In the succeeding years their potential for aiding police adminis­
tration was frequently sacrificed,, in the efforts by the adminis­
tration to improve their revenue abilities, although periodically
87
thagyi were reminded that they did have police responsibilities.
During the attempts to reform the rural police system in the
1880*s , Bernard had permitted some thagyi to undertake the police
duties of gaung in sparsely populated districts where their revenue
88duties were comparatively light. Crosthwaite attempted to in­
crease the participation of all thagyi in police administration.
He considered thagyi had been denigrated and undervalued too much 
in the past and so tried to impress on police and other officials 
the need of showing greater courtesy to thagyi in order to ensure 
their co-operation. Deputy commissioners were requested to order 
township officials to assemble all the thagyi in their townships and 
explain their legal responsibilities in giving active aid in pre­
venting and detecting crime, and to warn them that they were to be 
penalised as severely for failure in these duties as in their purely
QC
I.F.P.P., i860, 20th Jan. No.216.
Q rp
Ashley Eden, for instance, had had printed notices issued to each 
thagyi to inform them exactly what the British government expected 
of them. Deprivation of office was among the penalties for fail­
ing to carry out police duties. B.H.P., 1872, Mch.Index Nos. 
kG and k7 and April Index No.^+7*
00
B.H.P., 1880, Nov. Index No.9-
revenue duties* Deputy commissioners were also required to sub­
mit half-yearly reports on the most helpful and the most negligent
89thagyi in police matters. The latter were to be referred to
the inspector-general of police but those specially recommended
90for good service were to be presented with a revolver.
These efforts brought some improvement but it was apparent
that the enlargement of thagyi*s circles and their heavy revenue
responsibilities disqualified them from resuming their old import-
91ance m  police administration.
^Ibid., 1883, Aug. Index No.12 and Sept. Index No.12. Crosthwaite 
also ordered that no one was to build or occupy a house without 
securing the permission of the thagyi, which was to be dependent 
on the consent of the village elders. This was to check the 
movement of bad characters from place to place.
, l88*f, July Index No.18.
91Charles Crosthwaite, op.cit., p.22.
RETROSPECT
By the time of the outbreak of the third Anglo-Burmese war 
in 1883, the basic administrative objectives of the British in the 
province had largely been achieved. The province had prospered; 
the people had multiplied; and revenue had increased on such a 
scale that administrative costs were more than paid for. Although 
the increase in crime meant that there was less order in . the province 
than the British would have liked, there was more order than there 
had been in 1832 and, indeed, for many years prior to that.
Yet many administrative objectives, other than these basic 
ones, were attained only with qualified success. Efficiency and 
economy were largely achieved but had there been less economy there 
may have been more efficiency. For this the connexion with the 
Indian government was largely responsible both by its fiscal and 
legislative superiority and by its imposition of Indian moulds of 
government on the administrative structure. At the higher levels 
these contributed largely to the efficiency of administration but 
at the lower levels they tended to inhibit efficiency.
Although indigenous officials were gradually assuming wider 
powers and responsibilities, the limited success of British educ­
ation policy and the lack of widespread acceptance or appreciation 
of British political and social ideals ensured only partial success
1
for British efforts to foster local self government. But the
people had responded to the introduction of a laissez-faire economy
and by their efforts, partly aided by British public works, British
hopes for the development of the province into a great rice-producing
2
area were realised. There had been little response, howevei; to 
British attempts to develop other commercial crops and the develop­
ment of a rice-exporting economy merely caused the decline of other 
local industries.
British efforts to introduce greater permanence into land 
occupation were more successful. Abandonment of lands' was no 
longer reported by 1870 and the demand for land grew so great that 
land, considered virtually valueless in 1852, was selling at 10 
rupees an acre in 1885- The increase in price and demand for
The lack of appreciation of municipal bye-laws to improve the sani­
tation of the towns was one aspect of this. The people of Shwe- 
daung had objected to the town being declared a municipality for 
fear that municipal bye-laws would prevent them from tying up their 
goats under their houses. B.B.A.R., 1880-81, Intro., p.26.
2
Although much significance had been attached to the opening of the 
Suez Canal for its stimulus on rice production in British Burma and 
although rice production undoubtedly increased after 1870, the boom 
was already underway before then. The effects of removing the re­
strictions on rice imports and on establishing greater social 
security can be seen in the increase in rice cultivation in Arakan 
between 1830 and 1852 and later in Pegu, where the acreage under 
rice almost trebled between 185^+-55 and 1868-6 9. P.A.H.,1856-57< 
Appendix F and B.B.A.R.,l868-69» Appendix p.cxiv. It had doubled 
again by 1885* See also Aye Hlaing, 'Trends of Economic Growth and 
Income Distribution in Burma 1870-19^-0', J.B.R.S. ,Vol.LXVII ,Pt.i, 
June 196 -^, p.9^.
3
This was in Han-tha-wadi. Report on Settlement Operations in the 
Hanthawaddy and Pegu Districts, 1883-8 -^, Resolution, p.2. Prices 
ranged there between 10 and 2 rupees an acre. Mortgage rates in 
another tract ranged between and 1.69 rupees an acre. Ibid.
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land led, however, to a growing incidence of tenancy and of absentee 
landlordism and there was no legislation to protect tenants' occup­
ation or to control the rate of rent*
Between 1861 and 1885 the area under cultivation grew from 
1 »552,563 acres to -^,210,000 acres, of which 2 ,657,000 acres were 
in the Pegu—Irrawaddy area and in the same period, as a result of 
natural increase and migration, the population grew from 1,897,897 
to 3,736,6Mt*Zf By swelling the labour supply, this population 
growth facilitated the increase in land holdings to 30 acres or 
so in the areas where cheap labour was available and land readily 
cultivable. Cultivators in Han-tha-wadi could draw on the large 
pool of cheap labour in Rangoon and those in Akyab relied on seas­
onal labourers from Bengal* In areas where these conditions did
not apply, holdings frequently remained at the subsistence size
5
of 5 acres or so.
Migration, the quest for land, and the increasing use of
hired labour caused great social mobility within the province.
1882-83,p*26. Land prices in the Prome-Hengada districts ranged
between 50 and 11 rupees an acre. Report on Settlement Operations
in the Prome District,1884-85* Resolution and Report on the Settle-
ment Operations in the Henzada District, 1885-8 0, p.25*
L------ ----------------------------------
B.B.A.R., 1861-62,p.32, B.B.C.R.,1881, pp.26-27 and 73-72S and 
L.B.A.R., 1885-86, Appendix No.7*
5
Saw Siok Hwa, The Rice Industry of Burma, 1852-19^0i (unpublished 
Ph.D.thesis, 1963), pp.97-98 and B.B.C.R.,I881,p.98. In one tract 
of Han-tha-wadi of 6,02^ cultivators, 1,099 had holdings of 50 
acres or more; and 129 had holdings of more than 100 acres.
Report on the Settlement Operations in the Hanthawaddy District, 
180O-8I, Resolution.
People moved from the older areas where little further economic 
development was possible to areas opened in the delta and by the
g
railways- Many migrants settled there as well* While this 
social mobility was apparently connected with the rising crime 
rate, it also weakened further the influence of both traditional 
and European administrative officials, already being weakened by 
the exigencies of British administrative policy- This, the in­
trusion of British influences, and the development of schisms and 
sects among the hpon-gyi prevented the development of the solid
social mores that typified Upper Burma and weakened further such
7
traditional life as had existed on the advent of British rule-
The development of a commercial economy and of comparative 
general prosperity in the province led to an overall increase in 
the size of towns and villages but, more significantly, to the 
urban development of the main administrative and commercial centres
g
of Rangoon, Moulmein, and Akyab* In such urban centres, the 
way of life was least traditional, these being where the Anglo- 
vernacular schools predominated and where people came when seeking
—In Han-tha-wadi in 1881 only 68 per cent of its population were 
born within its limits* Most of the others came from Upper Burma. 
B.B.C.R., 1881, pp.26-27.
7
Settlement officers noted the influence of public works department 
styles on indigenous architecture, so that kyaung sometimes looked 
more like 1 police stations than anything else1. Report on Settle­
ment Operations in Pegu and Hanthawaddy Districts,l882-83iP.11- 
A growing taste for imported goods and styles of living was also 
noted.
g
By 1881 Moulmein and Akyab had both developed from obscure fishing 
villages in 1826 to towns with populations of 33*107 and 3 3 i9&9 
respectively while the population of Rangoon had grown from an 
estimated 10,000 at the turn of the century to 13^,176. B.B.C.R.
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Q
advancement under the new regime. Moreover, in the towns there 
there was a high concentration of non-indigenous people. At the 
time of the *1881 census 6*f per cent of the inhabitants of Rangoon
10
were born outside its limits and almost 3& per cent were from India.
The development of the larger towns into largely foreign en­
claves was part of the emerging pattern of occupational specialis­
ation that J.S.Furnivall was later to describe as the * plural soc- 
11iety1. The Burmese, Mons and Arakanese were increasingly con­
fined to rice cultivation and other rural occupations. They pre­
dominated in the executive, revenue, and judicial branches of the 
administration but in departments such as public works and medicine 
Indians were employed almost exclusively. And though the Karens 
were revealing different aptitudes from those of the major ethnic 
groups, many increasingly shared the latterfs rural occupations.
In the towns and villages, the less industrious Burmans were being 
displaced by the more energetic and enterprising Indians and Chinese.
1881,p.29 and D.G.E.Hall, Europe and Burma, (London, 19^5) 1 p-8 f^.
9
Although there was still much evidence in the towns of popular sup­
port for Buddhist institutions and monks, there was growing laxity 
in the observation of traditional Buddhist obligations. U Kaung 
comments on the growing number of people there who discarded the 
ancient custom of sending their sons for three years to the kyaung. 
fA Survey of the History of Education in Burma before the British 
Conquest and After*, J . B . R . S . Vol.XLVI ,Pt .ii,Dec., 1965»P-76 anc^  
I.P.Minayeff, Travels in and Diaries of India and Burma,(Calcutta, 
1962), p.183.
10
B.B.C.R.,1881,p,75- In 1881 3?'195iOOO people had been born within 
the province; 316,018 had been born in Upper Burma; 11,801 in the 
Shan States and Siam; 11,31*f in China; and l84,7*f8 in India.
1 1
C o l o n i a l  P o l i c y  a n d  P r a c t i c e  - a c o m p a r a t i v e  s t u d y of B u r m a  and 
( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 ^ 8 ) , pp.3 0 3 - 1 2 .
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By 1885 g r o w i n g  n u m b e r s  of I n d i a n s  w e r e  no t  r e t u r n i n g  to I n d i a  
at the end of each s e a s o n  but o n l y  a s m a l l  p e r c e n t a g e  of t h e m  t o o k  
to rice c ultivation. Th e  I n d i a n s  w h o  h a d  m o s t  c o n s p i c u o u s  c o n n e x ­
ions v/ith the rice i n d u s t r y  w e r e  the C h e t t y a r s  of M a d r a s  w h o  w e r e  
a l r e a d y  a s s u m i n g  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as m o n e y  lenders, f i n a n c i n g  the B u r ­
m e s e  in their s c r a m b l e  for land. M o s t  I n d i a n s  r e m a i n e d  in the 
u r b a n  centres, p r o v i d i n g  l a b o u r  for the r i c e  m i l l s  a nd w o r k i n g  as 
c o o l i e s  on the w h a r v e s  a n d  at the r a i l w a y  s t a t ions. T h e  g h a r r y
d r i v e r s  were m o s t l y  f r o m  M a d r a s  a nd the r e t a i l  p i e c e g o o d s  trade
12was c h i e f l y  in the h a n d s  of S u r a t i s  a n d  C h i n e s e .  T h e  C h i n e s e
were, ii^act, m a i n l y  g e n e r a l  t r a d e r s  a nd a r t i s a n s  but a lso c o n ­
t r o l l e d  the m a i n  o u t l e t s  of o p i u m  a n d  a l c o h o l  as w e l l  as the m a j o r  
g a m b l i n g  dens of the pro v i n c e .  T h e  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  l a r g e  C h i n e s e
13p o p u l a t i o n  in M e r g u i  a n d  T a v o y  w e r e  m o s t l y  i n v o l v e d  in t i n - m i n i n g .
A p a r t  from its e m p h a s i s  on the E n g l i s h  a nd B u r m e s e  l p n g u a g e s  
in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and in educ a t i o n ,  the B r i t i s h  m a d e  no o t h e r  
ef f o r t s  to e n c o u r a g e  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  in m a n y  w ays a c t i v e l y  p r o ­
m o t e d  the m a i n t e n a n c e  of ethnic a nd l i n g u i s t i c  d i f f e r e n c e s .  F r o m  
the first years of B r i t i s h  rule in Pegu, the B r i t i s h  h a d  e x p l o i t e d
^ B.B.A.R. ,188^--83i p*&3. early as 1837 Christopher T.Winter had 
noted in Moulmein that the boatmen, washermen, and domestic serv­
ants were all foreigners, the latter being mostly from Madras. Six 
Months in British Burma; or, India beyond the Ganges in 1837»(London,
185a), p.39.
13V e r y  l i t t l e  was k n o w n  of the C h i n e s e  as a c o m m u n i t y  a n d  as no one 
in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r s t o o d  C h i n e s e ,  r e l i a n c e  h a d  to be p l a c e d  
on the a d v i c e  of the P r o t e c t o r  of C h i n e s e  in the S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  
a nd on the e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  a d v i c e  of the H o n g  K o n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
B.II.P. , 1883, M c h . I n d e x  N o s .25-27.
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for their o w n  b e n e f i t  the e t h n i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  that h a d  b e e n  one of 
the w e a k n e s s e s  of the B u r m e s e  re g i m e .  L a t e r  w h e n  R a n g o o n  was d i v ­
i de d  into ele c t o r a l  c o n s t i t u e n c e s  for m u n i c i p a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
these wer e  b a sed on i n t e r e s t s *  r a t h e r  t h a n  on areas, and as 1 i n t e r ­
ests* c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  race, the v a r i o u s  e t hnic d i v i s i o n s  of the com- 
m u n i t y  b e came the e l e c t o r a l  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .
D e s p i t e  B r i t i s h  l i n g u i s t i c  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  the Karens, the 
w o r k  of the m i s s i o n a r i e s  e n s u r e d  t h e r e  was no d e c l i n e  in K a r e n  
n a t i o n a l i s m .  Nor was t h e r e  m u c h  a p p r e c i a b l e  l e s s e n i n g  in . 
t r a d i t i o n a l  B u r m e s e - K a r e n  a n t i p a t h y .  The u s a g e  of Mon r e c e i v e d  
no e n c o u r a g e m e n t  from t he a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  but n e i t h e r  was t h e r e  a n y
r e s t r a i n t  upo n  it as there h ad b een in the B u r m e s e  regime, an d
15for a time its u s a g e  i n c r e a s e d .  L a t e r  it d e c l i n e d  t h r o u g h  in ­
c r e a s i n g  M o n - B u r m e s e  i n t e r m a r r i a g e  a n d  p r e s u m a b l y  b e c a u s e  of
16B r i t i s h  l i n g u i s t i c  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Yet t h e r e  w as e v i d e n c e  that
t r a d i t i o n a l  M o n - B u r m e s e  a n t a g o n i s m  h a d  not b e e n  e n t i r e l y  f o r g otten. 
W h e n  the B u r m e s e  king, M i n - d o n ,  e x p r e s s e d  an i n t e r e s t  in r e n o v a t i n g  
a p a g o d a  in the tow n  of Pegu, the p r e d o m i n a n t l y  M o n  p o p u l a t i o n  of 
the tow n  r e f u s e d  the o f f e r  b e c a u s e  M i n - d o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  *the h e r e d i t -
; 1 . ■
Hiigh Tinker, The F o u n d a t i o n s  of L o c a l  S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t  in India,
Pak i s t o n ,  a n d  B u r m a , (London, 195*0« p.*fr9.
B.B.R.P.I.,1 8 7 2 - 7 5.P.79• This increase was mainly round Moulmein.
T he M o n - s p e a k i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  h a d  d e c l i n e d  from 1 8 1 , 6 0 3  in 1872 to 
^5 ^ , 5 5 3  in 1881. B . 3 . C . R . , l 8 8 l f-p.7Q. M a n y  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  by  this 
time c o n s i d e r e d  it was no l o n g e r  n e c e s s a r y  to m a i n t a i n  an y  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  b e t w e e n  Mons, B u r m e s e ,  a nd S h ans.
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17ary e n emy of the T a l a i n  peopl e * .
The p e ople in g e n e r a l  m a y  not h a v e  b e e n  e n t h u s i a s t i c  about 
B r i t i s h  r u l e  but t h e y  a p p r e c i a t e d  the s t a b i l i t y  a n d  p r o s p e r i t y  it 
ha d  b r o u g h t  them. T h e  c u r r e n c y  w a s  of f i x e d  a n d  u n v a r y i n g  v a l u e  
and taxation, t h o u g h  heavy, w a s  s t a b i l i s e d  and ce r t a i n .  T he B r i t ­
ish a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  m a y  h ave l a c k e d  the gl a m o u r  a n d  e x c i t e m e n t  of 
the court of M a n - d a l e i  but that w a s  s t i l l  v i s i b l e ,  if f r o m  a d i s ­
tance, a nd the p e o p l e  t h e m s e l v e s  w e r e  no l o n g e r  r e s t r i c t e d  b y  the
s u m p t u a r y  laws of the B u r m e s e  r e g ime, so that they c o u l d  b l o s s o m
18into s i lks and jewels. N o r  w e r e  t h e y  l i a b l e  a n y  l o n g e r  to debt
19
bondage or to forced and unpaid labour.
C o m p a r e d  w i t h  its p r e d e c e s s o r  an d  w i t h  o t h e r  c o l o n i a l  a d ­
m i n i s t r a t i o n s  in S o u t h  East Asia, the B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s y s t e m  
in B u r m a  p r e s s e d  but l i g h t l y  on  t he people. F o u n d e d  as it was on 
c o n c e p t s  of i m p a r t i a l  law, it was also a r e l a t i v e l y  h u m a n e  system. 
An d  w i t h  its c o m p a r a t i v e l y  n e g a t i v e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
s u c h  c h a n g e s  as o c c u r r e d  in s o c i e t y  d u r i n g  this p e r i o d  w e r e  m a i n l y
I . F . P . , ( P o l . ) ,  1871, Jan. N o . 136 a n d  Feb. No . 1 9 1 .
13
C . E . H a r v e y ,  B r i t i s h  R u l e  in B u r m a , (London, 19^-6), p . 38; Mi Mi 
K h a ing, B u r m e s e  F a m i l y ^  (London, N.Y., a n d  Toronto, 19^6), p.118; 
a n d  A r c h i b a l d  R o s s  C o l q u h o u n ,  B u r m a  a nd the B u r m a n s , (London, 188*0, 
p . 31* O n l y  o f f i c i a l s  h a d  b e e n  a b l e  to w e a r  f i n e r y  in the B u r m e s e  
regime; the mas s  of the p e o p l e  w e r e  r e s t r i c t e d  to the w e a r i n g  of 
c o a r s e  cloth.
19
B e c a u s e  of the c h r o n i c  s h o r t a g e  of l a b o u r  in the p r o v i n c e ,  d e p u t y  
c o m m i s s i o n e r s  w e r e  e m p o w e r e d  to call on  the i n h a b i t a n t s  of  an a r e a  
to m a i n t a i n  the e m b a n k m e n t s  there. S u c h  labour, t h o u g h  p r e s s e d ,  
was paid. I . J . P .,1877* Mch. I n d e x  N o . 3, 33, a n d  5k\ I . L . P . ,1881,
Jan. A p p e n d i x  V; and B . H . P . , 1883* Dec. Index N o . 24.
e ith e r  side e f f e c t s  of the r e a l i s a t i o n  of t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  or due 
to n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n .  A d i r e c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n n e x i o n  w i t h  
L o n d o n  s u c h  as the S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  had, m a y  have b e e n  p r e f e r ­
able to the s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of the p r o v i n c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to the 
I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  but this w as a far h a p p i e r  a nd m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a r r a n g e m e n t  t h a n  that w h i c h  e x i s t e d  b e t w e e n  F r e n c h  
I n d o - C h i n a  a n d  Paris. A n d  a l t h o u g h  the i m p o s i t i o n  of I n d i a n  
m o u l d s  of g o v e r n m e n t  on i n d i g e n o u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c e s  m a y  
have i n h i b i t e d  t h e i r  mos t  e f f i c i e n t  f u n c t i o n i n g ,  the y  w e r e  i n ­
c o r p o r a t e d  into a g e n e r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  m u c h  m o r e  
e f f i c i e n t  tha n  the one the B r i t i s h  r e p l a c e d .  M o r e o v e r  the 
f o u n d a t i o n s  h a d  b e e n  l a i d  for the future.
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LIST OF OLD AND MODERN SPELLING OF BURMESE WORDS*
Akyab Sit-twei Myat Tun Myat Htun
Allanmyo A-lan-myp• Pegu Pago
Amherst Kyaik-hkanri Prome Pyei
Arakan Yahkaing-pyei Ramree Yan-bye
Ava In-wa
•
Rangoon Yan-gon
Bassein Pathein Salween Than-lwin
Beeling Bi-lln Sandoway Than-dwe
Cheduba Man-aung Sarawah Tha-rawaw
Donabew Danu-byu
•
Sittang Sit-taung
Engapo In-gabu Tavoy Dawe
Henzada Hin-thada
•
Tenasserim Tanin-tha-yi
Irrawaddy Ei-ya-wadi Tharrawaddy Tha-ya-wadi
Karennee Kayin-ni Thonegwa Thon-gwa
•
lugyi lu-gyl thugyi thugyi
Martaban Mok-tama Toungoo Taung-ngu
Meaday Myei-de Twankay (Twante) Twan-tei
Meng Loung Min-laung Yandoon Myaung-don
Mergui Beik Yoonzaleen Yun-zalln
Moulmein Maw-lamyaing
* This is not intended to be a complete list of all Burmese words
used in the thesis. It is intended only to eliminate any con­
fusion the use of the modern spelling may have caused and to give 
the modern spelling for words of which the old spelling or names 
have been used in the text.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.Q.R. The Asiatic Quarterly Review
B.A.R. 
B.B.A.R.
Bengal Administration Report 
British Burma Administration Report
B.B.C.J.R. British Burma Criminal Justice Report *
B.B.C.R. British Burma Census Report
B.B.M.A.R. British Burma Municipal Administration Report
B.B.P.R. British Burma Police Rejport
B.B.R.A.R. British Burma Revenue Administration Report
B.B.R.P.I. British Burma Report on Public Instruction
B.H.P. Burma Home Proceedings
B.M. British Museum
B.P.P. Bengal Public Proceedings
B.R.P. Bengal Revenue Proceedings
B.S.B.R.P. Bengal Sudder Board of Revenue Proceedings
B.S.P.P. Bengal Secret and Political Proceedings
C.H.I. Cambridge History of India.
E.S.L.I. Enclosures to Secret Letters from India
i.e.S. India Civil Service
I.F.C.P. India Finance and Commerce Proceedings
I.Fin.P. India Finance Proceedings
I.F.P. India Foreign Proceedings
I.F.P.P. India Foreign and Political Proceedings
I.J.P. India Judicial Proceedings
I.L.P. India Legal Proceedings
I.O.L. India Office Library
I.S.P. India Secret Proceedings
J.B.R.S. Journal of the Burma Research Society-
L.B.A.R. Lower Burma Administration Report
L.B.M.A.R. Lower Burma Municipal Administration Report
L.B.R.A.R. Lower Burma Revenue Administration Report
P.AVR. Pegu Administration Report
T.M.A.R. Tenasserim and Martaban Administration Report
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